OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets T1003.004

Tactic: Credential Access

Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts. LSA secrets are stored in the registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.

Events covered

19 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 23 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (39 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine4contains 3, match 1 export , eˣport , save , (?i)KERNELBASE.dll, (?i)mimikatz
EventType4eq 3, ne 1LogonFailed, NetworkSignatureInspected, logged-in-special, open
Image4ends_with 2, eq 1, is_not_null 1\memprocfs.exe, \reg.exe, active directory
OriginalFileName3eq 3reg.exe, memprocfs.exe
process_name3ends_with 1, eq 1, match 1(?i).lsass.exe, \system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe, reg.exe
EventID2eq 21, 10, 4656, 4688, 4690
ObjectName2contains 1, starts_with 1\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SAM\SAM\DOMAINS\Account, \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SAM\SAM\DOMAINS\Builtin, \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SECURITY\Cache, bckupkey
ObjectType2eq 2Key, SecretObject
RelativeTargetName2contains 1, eq 1.tmp, system32\, winreg
ScriptBlockText2eq 1, in 1cert_system_store_local_machine, crypto::certificates, dpapi::cred, invoke-ninjacopy, stealthclosefile
TargetFilename2contains 1, ends_with 1, eq 1?:\windows\system32\config\regback\sam, ?:\windows\system32\config\regback\security, ?:\windows\system32\config\regback\system, \cachedump.exe, \cachedump64.exe
event.category2eq 2process
AccessMask1eq 10x2
Description1eq 1MemProcFS
Details1eq 1, is_not_null 10x00000000

Top indicator values (179 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
OriginalFileNameeq
reg.exe
242
event.categoryeq
process
2128
AccessMaskeq
0x2
14
CommandLinecontains
export
13
CommandLinecontains
eˣport
1
CommandLinecontains
save
1
CommandLinecontains
ˢave
1
CommandLinecontains
-device
1
CommandLinecontains
::aadcookie
12
CommandLinecontains
::detours
12
CommandLinecontains
::memssp
12
CommandLinecontains
::mflt
12
CommandLinecontains
::mstsc
12
CommandLinecontains
::multirdp
12
CommandLinecontains
::ncroutemon
12
CommandLinecontains
::ngcsign
12
CommandLinecontains
::preshutdown
12
CommandLinecontains
::printnightmare
12
CommandLinecontains
::skeleton
12
CommandLinecontains
\sam
1
CommandLinecontains
\security
1
CommandLinecontains
\system
1
CommandLinecontains
\syˢtem
1
CommandLinecontains
\ˢam
1
CommandLinecontains
\ˢecurity
1
CommandLinecontains
\ˢystem
1
CommandLinecontains
\ˢyˢtem
1
CommandLinecontains
crypto::
12
CommandLinecontains
dpapi::
13
CommandLinecontains
dumpcreds
12

Exclusions (18 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
Imagewildcard
?:\program files (x86)\padvish av\apccsvc.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\bitdefender\endpoint security\epsecurityservice.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\common files\mcafee\avsolution\mcshield.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\cylance\optics\cyoptics.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\n-able technologies\avdefender\epsecurityservice.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\sophos\endpoint defense\sophosscancoordinator.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\sophos\endpoint defense\sspservice.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\symantec\symantec endpoint protection\*\bin64\ccsvchst.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\trend micro\amsp\coreserviceshell.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\windows defender advanced threat protection\mssense.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\taskhost.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\taskhostw.exe
1
PrivilegeListeq
SeDebugPrivilege
1
ScriptBlockTexteq
powersploitindicators
1
ScriptBlockTexteq
sentinelbreakpoints
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 13 rules

Elastic 5 rules

Splunk 3 rules

Kusto 2 rules