OS Credential Dumping T1003

Tactic: Credential Access

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.

Events covered

61 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation
SysmonEvent ID 5Process terminated
SysmonEvent ID 7Image loaded
SysmonEvent ID 8CreateRemoteThread
SysmonEvent ID 10ProcessAccess
SysmonEvent ID 11FileCreate
SysmonEvent ID 12RegistryEvent (Object create and delete)
SysmonEvent ID 13RegistryEvent (Value Set)
SysmonEvent ID 14RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename)
SysmonEvent ID 17PipeEvent (Pipe Created)
SysmonEvent ID 18PipeEvent (Pipe Connected)
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4624An account was successfully logged on.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4648A logon was attempted using explicit credentials.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4656A handle to an object was requested.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4657A registry value was modified.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4661A handle to an object was requested.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4662An operation was performed on an object.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4663An attempt was made to access an object.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4672Special privileges assigned to new logon.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4673A privileged service was called.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4674An operation was attempted on a privileged object.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4688A new process has been created.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4689A process has exited.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4690An attempt was made to duplicate a handle to an object.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4692Backup of data protection master key was attempted.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4697A service was installed in the system.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4703A user right was adjusted.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4728A member was added to a security-enabled global group.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4732A member was added to a security-enabled local group.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4756A member was added to a security-enabled universal group.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4768A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4769A Kerberos service ticket was requested.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4904An attempt was made to register a security event source.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4905An attempt was made to unregister a security event source.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5136A directory service object was modified.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5145A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5382Vault credentials were read.
Application-ErrorEvent ID 1000Faulting application name: Faulting_application_name, version: version, time stamp: 0xFaulting_module_name.
Defender-DeviceEventsOpenProcessApiCallProcess opened (OpenProcess API call)
Defender-DeviceEventsProcessPrimaryTokenModifiedProcess primary token modified
Defender-DeviceNetworkEventsNetworkSignatureInspectedNetwork signature inspected
Defender-DeviceProcessEventsanyProcess activity (any)
Defender-DeviceProcessEventsProcessCreatedProcess created
ESENTEvent ID 216Event ID 216
ESENTEvent ID 325Event ID 325
ESENTEvent ID 326Event ID 326
ESENTEvent ID 327Event ID 327
Linux-AuditdEvent ID 1302PATH
Kernel-Audit-API-CallsEvent ID 5OpenProcess API call audited
Kernel-GeneralEvent ID 16The access history in hive HiveName was cleared updating KeysUpdated keys and creating DirtyPages modified pages.
NtfsEvent ID 98Volume DriveName (DeviceName) CorruptionActionState.
PowerShellEvent ID 4103Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData.
PowerShellEvent ID 4104Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal).
Windows-DefenderEvent ID 1116Product Name has detected malware or other potentially unwanted software.
Windows-DefenderEvent ID 1117Product Name has taken action to protect this machine from malware or other potentially unwanted software.
Windows-DefenderEvent ID 1121Microsoft Defender Exploit Guard has blocked an operation that is not allowed by your IT administrator.
PowerShellEvent ID 800Event ID 800
Service-Control-ManagerEvent ID 7045A service was installed in the system.
Sysmon-for-LinuxEvent ID 1Process Create
VSSAuditEvent ID 8222Event ID 8222
Windows-Error-ReportingEvent ID 1001Fault bucket , type.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 389 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (209 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine110contains 79, regex_match 19, match 6, in 5, wildcard 5, ends_with 2, starts_with 2, eq 1 --full , --name , -f , (?i)ntds\.dit, create
Image94ends_with 74, contains 14, eq 11, regex_match 7, is_not_null 2, starts_with 2, wildcard 1\powershell.exe, \pwsh.exe, \rundll32.exe, \\lsass\.exe$, \ntdsutil.exe
EventID71eq 70, in 14688, 1, 4104, 10, 4656
process_name66eq 43, ends_with 10, in 6, regex_match 4, contains 3, match 3, is_not_null 1, ne 1, starts_with 1, wildcard 1cat, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, (?i)adexplorer(64)?|adexp\.exe, \lsass.exe
OriginalFileName55eq 53, in 2, contains 1, is_null 1powershell.exe, cmd.exe, reg.exe, appcmd.exe, fx_ver_internalname_str
event.type33eq 29, in 3, ne 1start, creation, change, process_started, deletion
TargetFilename28ends_with 13, contains 10, regex_match 8, eq 2, starts_with 2, wildcard 2.dmp, \.dmp$, \lsass, \ntds.dit, *lsass*.dmp
TargetImage28ends_with 23, eq 4, in 1\lsass.exe, lsass.exe, ?:\windows\system32\lsass.exe, \\lsass.exe, \system32\lsass.exe
EventType26eq 14, in 9, ne 2, wildcard 1exec, exec_event, ProcessRollup2, IntrusionEvent, creation
process.args20eq 14, wildcard 7, starts_with 5, contains 3, in 3, match 1*connectionstring*, --exec, --json, --pid, --reference=
GrantedAccess17eq 14, ends_with 5, contains 1, in 1, starts_with 10x1010, 0x1410, 0x1fffff, 0x1418, 0x1438
ScriptBlockText16contains 8, in 6, eq 3cert_system_store_local_machine, crypto::certificates, ).create(, *-dumpcr*, *[system.io.file]::copy*
Type14eq 14
host.os.type14eq 14
CallTrace13contains 12, ends_with 1, in 1, match 1, starts_with 1dbgcore.dll, dbghelp.dll, seclogon.dll, ), *dbgcore.dll*

Top indicator values (2647 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
event.typeeq
start
24606
EventIDeq
4688
19313
EventIDeq
1
13237
EventIDeq
4104
10268
EventIDeq
10
716
EventIDeq
4656
719
EventIDeq
4663
634
EventIDeq
4103
5105
EventIDeq
4662
513
TargetImageends_with
\lsass.exe
1616
SubjectUserNameends_with
$
93
event.categoryeq
process
9128
EventTypein
exec
8171
EventTypein
exec_event
8139
EventTypein
start
7134
EventTypein
ProcessRollup2
6117
Imageends_with
\rundll32.exe
795
Imageends_with
\powershell.exe
5182
CommandLinecontains
lsass
69
CommandLinecontains
.dmp
510
CommandLinecontains
\windows\ntds\ntds.dit
55
CommandLinecontains
create
524
DeviceProducteq
X Series
67
DeviceVendoreq
Vectra Networks
67
MessageTypeeq
2
621
Propertiescontains
1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
66
Propertiescontains
1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
66
Propertiescontains
89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c
66
AccessMaskeq
0x100
55
GrantedAccesseq
0x1fffff
59

Exclusions (560 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
SubjectUserNameends_with
$
11
SubjectUserNamestarts_with
MSOL_
4
Imageends_with
\aurora-agent-64.exe
3
Imageends_with
\aurora-agent.exe
3
Imageends_with
\mbaminstallerservice.exe
3
Imageends_with
\thor.exe
3
Imageends_with
\thor64.exe
3
SubjectUserSideq
S-1-5-18
3
process_nameeq
c:\windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe
3
user.ideq
S-1-5-18
3
GrantedAccesseq
0x1410
2
GrantedAccesseq
0x40
2
GrantedAccesseq
0x410
2
Imagecontains
\appdata\local\
2
Imagecontains
\appdata\local\temp\
2

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 170 rules

Elastic 68 rules

Splunk 94 rules

Kusto 33 rules

YARA-L 21 rules

Panther 3 rules