Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares T1021.002

Tactic: Lateral Movement

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Events covered

34 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation
SysmonEvent ID 3Network connection
SysmonEvent ID 7Image loaded
SysmonEvent ID 11FileCreate
SysmonEvent ID 12RegistryEvent (Object create and delete)
SysmonEvent ID 13RegistryEvent (Value Set)
SysmonEvent ID 14RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename)
SysmonEvent ID 17PipeEvent (Pipe Created)
SysmonEvent ID 18PipeEvent (Pipe Connected)
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4624An account was successfully logged on.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4625An account failed to log on.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4672Special privileges assigned to new logon.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4688A new process has been created.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4697A service was installed in the system.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4776The domain controller attempted to validate the credentials for an account.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4964Special groups have been assigned to a new logon.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5140A network share object was accessed.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5142A network share object was added.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5143A network share object was modified.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5145A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5152The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a packet.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5154The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted an application or service to listen on a port for incoming connections.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5155The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked an application or service from listening on a port for incoming connections.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5156The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5157The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a connection.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5158The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a bind to a local port.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5159The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a bind to a local port.
Defender-DeviceLogonEventsLogonSuccessLogon succeeded
Defender-DeviceNetworkEventsanyNetwork activity (any)
Defender-DeviceNetworkEventsConnectionSuccessConnection succeeded
Defender-DeviceNetworkEventsInboundConnectionAcceptedInbound connection accepted
PowerShellEvent ID 4104Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal).
SMBServerEvent ID 4000The SMB client connection to the share was established.
Service-Control-ManagerEvent ID 7045A service was installed in the system.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 108 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (94 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine30contains 14, match 7, regex_match 7, wildcard 4, starts_with 3, eq 2, ends_with 1, in 1, ne 1 use , net.*use.*(C|ADMIN|IPC)\$, cp , \\\\, mi
EventID19eq 18, in 15145, 1, 17, 18, 5140
Image19ends_with 14, eq 4, contains 3, regex_match 1\net.exe, \net1.exe, system, /mount, /mount_afp
ShareName16eq 6, wildcard 5, in 2, contains 1, ends_with 1, match 1\\*\ADMIN$, \\\\\*\\IPC$, C$, ADMIN$, Admin$
RelativeTargetName14ends_with 5, eq 5, contains 2, in 1, regex_match 1, starts_with 1\cmd.exe, \powershell.exe, \pwsh.exe, *.dll, *.exe
OriginalFileName13eq 13net.exe, net1.exe, psexec.c, cmd.exe, powershell.exe
event.type13eq 11, in 4start, change, creation, process_started
EventType10eq 8, in 1, ne 1connection_accepted, creation, ConnectionAttempt, ConnectionFailed, ConnectionRequest
process_name10eq 9, in 1cmd.exe, psexec.exe, bitsadmin.exe, conhost.exe, mount
src_ip10ne 7, is_not_null 3, cidr_match 2, eq 2, contains 1127.0.0.1, ::1, ::, %admin_netork_administration%, %vulnerability_scanners%
process_id8eq 7, ne 14
TargetFilename7ends_with 2, starts_with 2, contains 1, in 1, wildcard 1c:\users\, *\\desktop\\*, *\\documents\\*, *\\downloads\\*, ?:\programdata\microsoft\windows\start menu\programs\startup\*
DestinationPort6eq 5, in 1445, 139, 5985, 5986
SubjectUserName6ends_with 5, eq 1$, %admin_account%
user.id6starts_with 4, ne 2S-1-5-21, S-1-12-, S-1-5-18, S-1-12-1-

Top indicator values (915 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
event.typeeq
start
9606
Imageends_with
\net.exe
749
Imageends_with
\net1.exe
747
process_ideq
4
711
EventIDeq
5145
618
EventIDeq
1
5237
EventIDeq
5140
48
EventIDeq
11
323
EventIDeq
17
34
EventIDeq
18
36
OriginalFileNameeq
net.exe
628
OriginalFileNameeq
net1.exe
644
src_ipne
127.0.0.1
623
src_ipne
::1
621
DestinationPorteq
445
58
ShareNameeq
\\\\\*\\IPC$
57
SubjectUserNameends_with
$
53
CommandLinecontains
use
46
CommandLinecontains
cp
38
CommandLinecontains
mv
34
CommandLineregex_match
net.*use.*(C|ADMIN|IPC)\$
44
LogonTypeeq
Network
440
ShareNamewildcard
\\*\ADMIN$
46
process_nameeq
cmd.exe
477
user.idstarts_with
S-1-5-21
45
user.idstarts_with
S-1-12-
34
event.typein
change
316
event.typein
creation
315
AccessMaskeq
0x2
24
AuthenticationPackageNameeq
NTLM
29

Exclusions (151 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
SubjectUserNameends_with
$
5
process_namein
*:\\program files \(x86\)\\adobe*
4
process_namein
*:\\program files \(x86\)\\google*
4
process_namein
*:\\program files \(x86\)\\microsoft*
4
process_namein
*:\\program files\\adobe*
4
process_namein
*:\\program files\\google*
4
process_namein
*:\\program files\\microsoft*
4
process_namein
*:\\windows\\system32\\searchindexer.exe
4
process_namein
*:\\windows\\system32\\svchost.exe
4
process_namein
*:\\windows\\systemapps\\microsoft*
4
process_namein
*\\amazon\\ssm\\instance*
4
process_namein
*\\appdata\\local\\google*
4
process_namein
*\\appdata\\local\\kingsoft\\*
4
process_namein
*\\appdata\\local\\microsoft*
4
process_namein
system
4

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 51 rules

Elastic 21 rules

Splunk 26 rules

Kusto 5 rules

YARA-L 5 rules