Remote Services T1021

Tactic: Lateral Movement

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Events covered

80 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation
SysmonEvent ID 3Network connection
SysmonEvent ID 7Image loaded
SysmonEvent ID 10ProcessAccess
SysmonEvent ID 11FileCreate
SysmonEvent ID 12RegistryEvent (Object create and delete)
SysmonEvent ID 13RegistryEvent (Value Set)
SysmonEvent ID 14RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename)
SysmonEvent ID 17PipeEvent (Pipe Created)
SysmonEvent ID 18PipeEvent (Pipe Connected)
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4624An account was successfully logged on.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4625An account failed to log on.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4656A handle to an object was requested.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4663An attempt was made to access an object.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4672Special privileges assigned to new logon.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4674An operation was attempted on a privileged object.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4688A new process has been created.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4697A service was installed in the system.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4698A scheduled task was created.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4768A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4769A Kerberos service ticket was requested.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4770A Kerberos service ticket was renewed.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4771Kerberos pre-authentication failed.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4776The domain controller attempted to validate the credentials for an account.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4778A session was reconnected to a Window Station.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4779A session was disconnected from a Window Station.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4825A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4964Special groups have been assigned to a new logon.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5140A network share object was accessed.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5142A network share object was added.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5143A network share object was modified.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5145A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5152The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a packet.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5154The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted an application or service to listen on a port for incoming connections.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5155The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked an application or service from listening on a port for incoming connections.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5156The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5157The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a connection.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5158The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a bind to a local port.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5159The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a bind to a local port.
Defender-DeviceEventsanyDefender event
Defender-DeviceFileEventsanyFile activity
Defender-DeviceFileEventsFileCreatedFile created
Defender-DeviceFileEventsFileModifiedFile modified
Defender-DeviceFileEventsFileRenamedFile renamed
Defender-DeviceImageLoadEventsanyImage load
Defender-DeviceImageLoadEventsImageLoadedImage loaded
Defender-DeviceInfoanyDevice information
Defender-DeviceLogonEventsLogonSuccessLogon succeeded
Defender-DeviceNetworkEventsanyNetwork activity
Defender-DeviceNetworkEventsConnectionSuccessConnection succeeded
Defender-DeviceNetworkEventsConnectionFailedConnection failed
Defender-DeviceNetworkEventsInboundConnectionAcceptedInbound connection accepted
Defender-DeviceNetworkEventsConnectionRequestConnection request
Defender-DeviceNetworkEventsConnectionAttemptConnection attempt
Defender-DeviceNetworkInfoanyDevice network configuration
Defender-DeviceProcessEventsanyProcess activity
Defender-ExposureGraphEdgesanyExposure graph edges
Defender-ExposureGraphNodesanyExposure graph nodes
Defender-IdentityInfoanyIdentity information
Linux-AuditdEvent ID 1105USER_START
Linux-AuditdEvent ID 1106USER_END
PowerShellEvent ID 4103Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData.
PowerShellEvent ID 4104Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal).
RemoteDesktopServices-RdpCoreTSEvent ID 131The server accepted a new ConnType connection from client ClientIP.
RemoteDesktopServices-RdpCoreTSEvent ID 148Channel ChannelName has been closed between the server and the client on transport tunnel: TunnelID.
SMBClientEvent ID 31018Guidance: An administrator has enabled AllowInsecureGuestAuth.
SMBServerEvent ID 4000The SMB client connection to the share was established.
TerminalServices-LocalSessionManagerEvent ID 21Remote Desktop Services: Session logon succeeded.
TerminalServices-LocalSessionManagerEvent ID 24Remote Desktop Services: Session has been disconnected.
TerminalServices-LocalSessionManagerEvent ID 25Remote Desktop Services: Session reconnection succeeded.
TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManagerEvent ID 1149Remote Desktop Services: User authentication succeeded.
TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManagerEvent ID 20503Shadow View Session Started.
TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManagerEvent ID 20504Shadow View Session Stopped.
TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManagerEvent ID 20508Shadow View Permission Granted.
OpenSSHEvent ID 4process: payload.
PowerShellEvent ID 400Event ID 400
PowerShellEvent ID 800Event ID 800
RPCFWEvent ID 3An RPC server function was called.
Service-Control-ManagerEvent ID 7045A service was installed in the system.
Sysmon-for-LinuxEvent ID 1Process Create

Authoring guide

These 426 rules share fields, values, and exclusions.

Fields filtered most (239 distinct)

These fields appear most often in rule filters.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine87contains 50, regex_match 20, in 8, wildcard 7, eq 6, match 4, ends_with 2, is_null 1, starts_with 1 use , net.*use.*(C|ADMIN|IPC)\$, -R , \\\\, cp
Image66ends_with 45, starts_with 9, eq 8, wildcard 6, contains 5, regex_match 2, is_not_null 1, is_null 1\net.exe, \net1.exe, /dev/shm/*, \cmd.exe, \powershell.exe
process_basename66eq 50, in 14, wildcard 3, is_not_null 1, ne 1, starts_with 1cmd.exe, powershell.exe, svchost.exe, pwsh.exe, mstsc.exe
EventType63eq 45, in 15, ne 5, starts_with 2exec, start, creation, deletion, ssh_login
EventID57eq 56, in 11, 4688, 5145, 4104, 11
event.type50eq 44, in 8start, change, creation, process_started, access
DestinationPort34eq 20, ge 5, in 5, gt 2, regex_match 2, le 13389, 445, 5985, 5986, 49152
OriginalFileName32eq 31, in 1net.exe, net1.exe, PowerShell.EXE, Cmd.Exe, Plink
parent_process_basename27eq 23, in 3, contains 2, wildcard 1services.exe, cmd.exe, mmc.exe, sshd, svchost.exe
src_ip26ne 13, eq 8, is_not_null 4, cidr_match 3, in 2, contains 1, match 1, starts_with 1127.0.0.1, ::1, , %vulnerability_scanners%, 10.0.0.0/8
process.args23eq 15, wildcard 7, starts_with 6, contains 2, in 2, ends_with 1, regex_match 1-c, \\*, *:3389, *DavWWWRoot*, *RemoteForward*
event.category21eq 16, in 5file, process, network, network_traffic, authentication
Initiated18eq 18incoming, ingress, egress, true
ShareName17eq 7, wildcard 5, in 2, contains 1, ends_with 1, match 1\\*\ADMIN$, \\\\\*\\IPC$, \\*\IPC$, C$, \\*\C$
ParentImage16ends_with 10, eq 3, contains 1, is_not_null 1, wildcard 1\mmc.exe, \svchost.exe, , /usr/sbin/sshd, ?:\Program Files*\Microsoft Office\*.exe

Top indicator values (2278 distinct)

These values appear most often in rule predicates.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
event.typeeq
start
361036
src_ipne
127.0.0.1
1322
src_ipne
::1
1320
EventTypeeq
start
11388
EventTypeeq
exec
5547
EventIDeq
1
10226
EventIDeq
4688
10284
EventIDeq
4104
8269
EventIDeq
5145
819
Initiatedeq
incoming
1010
Initiatedeq
ingress
1012
process_ideq
4
1017
process_basenameeq
cmd.exe
9122
process_basenameeq
powershell.exe
7187
process_basenameeq
svchost.exe
621
user.idstarts_with
S-1-5-21*
926
user.idstarts_with
S-1-12-*
825
DeviceProducteq
X Series
77
DeviceVendoreq
Vectra Networks
77
Imageends_with
\net.exe
749
Imageends_with
\net1.exe
747
Protocoleq
tcp
716
SourcePortge
49152
716
event.outcomeeq
Success
7306
SubjectUserNameends_with
$
65
src_ipeq
::1
66
EventTypein
exec
5180
OriginalFileNameeq
PowerShell.EXE
5134
OriginalFileNameeq
net.exe
525
OriginalFileNameeq
net1.exe
539

Exclusions (1155 distinct)

These values appear most often in top-level exclusions.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
process.code_signature.trustedeq
true
11
Imagewildcard
?:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
6
Imagewildcard
?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe
4
Imagewildcard
?:\Program Files\*.exe
4
SubjectUserNameends_with
$
6
Signatureeq
Veeam Software Group GmbH
4
process_namein
*:\Program Files \(x86\)\Adobe*
4
process_namein
*:\Program Files \(x86\)\Google*
4
process_namein
*:\Program Files \(x86\)\Microsoft*
4
process_namein
*:\Program Files\Adobe*
4
process_namein
*:\Program Files\Google*
4
process_namein
*:\Program Files\Microsoft*
4
process_namein
*:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
4
process_namein
*:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft*
4
process_namein
*:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe
4

Rules under this technique

These vendors publish rules tagged with this technique.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 128 rules

Elastic 116 rules

Splunk 104 rules

Kusto 55 rules

YARA-L 7 rules

Panther 16 rules