Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding T1027.001

Tactic: Stealth

Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations.

Events covered

8 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 6 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (6 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine4regex_match 3, contains 1(?i)(copy|more|Get-Content|type|cat|gc)\s+.*?((\/b\s+\S+\..., -s +, if=/dev/random, if=/dev/urandom
EventID3eq 31, 4103, 4104, 4688
Image1ends_with 1/dd, /truncate
Type1eq 1
param11contains 1\csfalconserviceuninstalltool_, \program files\crowdstrike\, \program files\sophos\
type1eq 1EXECVE

Top indicator values (17 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
CommandLineregex_match
(?i)(copy|more|Get-Content|type|cat|gc)\s+.*?((\/b\s+\S+\.dll\s+\+\s*\S+\.dll...
33
CommandLinecontains
-s +
1
CommandLinecontains
if=/dev/random
12
CommandLinecontains
if=/dev/urandom
1
CommandLinecontains
if=/dev/zero
13
EventIDeq
1
1237
EventIDeq
4103
1105
EventIDeq
4104
1268
EventIDeq
4688
1313
Imageends_with
/dd
13
Imageends_with
/truncate
12
param1contains
\csfalconserviceuninstalltool_
1
param1contains
\program files\crowdstrike\
1
param1contains
\program files\sophos\
1
param1contains
\system32\drivers\crowdstrike\
1
param1contains
\windows\system32\scriptcontrol64_
1
typeeq
EXECVE
128

Exclusions (5 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
param1contains
\csfalconserviceuninstalltool_
1
param1contains
\program files\crowdstrike\
1
param1contains
\program files\sophos\
1
param1contains
\system32\drivers\crowdstrike\
1
param1contains
\windows\system32\scriptcontrol64_
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 3 rules

Splunk 3 rules