System Owner/User Discovery T1033

Tactic: Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Events covered

10 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 78 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (43 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine38contains 26, match 7, regex_match 3, ends_with 2, eq 2, starts_with 2, in 1, is_not_null 1 list, get, (?i)((tracert)|(query)|(net\s+((localgroup)|(group)|(conf..., -filter \, /c
process_name26eq 19, in 4, match 3, starts_with 1, wildcard 1arp.exe, id, whoami.exe, atbroker.exe, bginfo.exe
Image23ends_with 21, eq 1, is_not_null 1, regex_match 1, starts_with 1, wildcard 1\whoami.exe, /esxcli, \cmd.exe, \net.exe, \powershell.exe
OriginalFileName19eq 18, contains 1whoami.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.dll, query.exe, quser.exe
event.type14eq 14start
EventID12eq 124104, 1, 4688, 4103
EventType9in 5, eq 4exec, exec_event, ProcessRollup2, GetCallerIdentity, executed
parent_process_name9eq 4, in 4, match 1bash, (?i)(powershell\.exe)|(cmd\.exe), AcroRd32.exe, Acrobat.exe, FoxitPhantomPDF.exe
ScriptBlockText8contains 6, eq 2, in 2, starts_with 2, match 1 -filter \, | select , $env:username, > , *[system.environment]::username*
ParentImage7ends_with 5, contains 2, eq 2, is_not_null 1, is_null 1, starts_with 1-tomcat-, \caddy.exe, \httpd.exe, -, :\program files\microsoft monitoring...
host.os.type7eq 7
dc_process_name6gt 62, 1
process.args5eq 3, contains 2, in 2, wildcard 2, ne 1%appdata%, %homepath%, %localappdata%, */bin/*sh*, *import*pty*spawn*
Type3eq 3
event.category3eq 3process

Top indicator values (704 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
event.typeeq
start
14606
Imageends_with
\whoami.exe
1019
Imageends_with
/esxcli
59
OriginalFileNameeq
whoami.exe
99
process_nameeq
whoami.exe
911
process_nameeq
quser.exe
68
process_nameeq
qwinsta.exe
68
process_nameeq
dsget.exe
57
process_nameeq
dsquery.exe
512
process_nameeq
net.exe
522
process_nameeq
net1.exe
535
process_nameeq
powershell.exe
5104
process_nameeq
arp.exe
48
process_nameeq
cmd.exe
477
process_nameeq
gpresult.exe
47
process_nameeq
hostname.exe
47
process_nameeq
ipconfig.exe
48
process_nameeq
nbtstat.exe
48
process_nameeq
netsh.exe
418
process_nameeq
netstat.exe
48
process_nameeq
nltest.exe
410
process_nameeq
ping.exe
49
process_nameeq
qprocess.exe
47
EventIDeq
4104
6268
EventTypein
exec
5171
EventTypein
exec_event
4139
EventTypein
start
4134
CommandLinecontains
get
44
CommandLinecontains
list
44
dc_process_namegt
2
44

Exclusions (174 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
CommandLinematch
(?i)\x5cSplunkUniversalForwarder\x5c(etc|bin)\x5c
2
usermatch
\$$
2
CommandLinecontains
rmdir
1
CommandLinecontains
.dll
1
CommandLinecontains
/active
1
CommandLinecontains
/add
1
CommandLinecontains
/delete
1
CommandLinecontains
/domain
1
CommandLinecontains
/expires
1
CommandLinecontains
/passwordreq
1
CommandLinecontains
/scriptpath
1
CommandLinecontains
/times
1
CommandLinecontains
/workstations
1
CommandLinein
*/server:127.0.0.1*
1
CommandLinein
*/server:localhost*
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 30 rules

Elastic 19 rules

Splunk 25 rules

Kusto 1 rule

YARA-L 3 rules