Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location T1036.005

Tactic: Stealth

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Events covered

10 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 62 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (59 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
Image28ends_with 14, starts_with 5, wildcard 4, contains 2, eq 2, is_not_null 2, in 1, match 1, ne 1\svchost.exe, /dev/shm/, \schtasks.exe, c:\windows\system32\, *:\\windows\\cursors\\*
event.type24eq 24start, creation
process_name23eq 15, match 2, starts_with 2, wildcard 2, contains 1, ends_with 1, in 1(?i)^(svchost\.exe|rundll32\.exe|services\.exe|powershell..., cdb.exe, cmd.exe, cmstp.exe, kworker
EventType8in 5, eq 3ProcessRollup2, creation, exec, exec_event, file_create_event
ParentImage8ends_with 6, eq 3, is_null 2, contains 1, is_not_null 1\msmpeng.exe, -, \mrt.exe, :\program files (x86)\zemana\antimalware\antimalware.exe, :\program files\axis communications\axis camera...
host.os.type8eq 8
OriginalFileName7eq 6, ne 1schtasks.exe, \msiexec.exe, cdb.exe, elevation_service.exe, msmpeng.exe
TargetFilename7contains 5, ends_with 5, starts_with 3.dll, .exe, /bin/, /entrypoint, /etc/
CommandLine6contains 4, regex_match 2, ends_with 1, eq 1, is_null 1, match 1 -nop -w hidden -c $m=new-object net.webclient;$m, /create , audiodg, conhost, (?i).*mmc\.exe.*((Windows\s+\\\\System32)|(Windows\s+Syst...
process.args6eq 2, starts_with 2, is_not_null 1, wildcard 1-c, -cf, -pd, /bin/, /sbin/
parent_process_name4eq 4CiscoCollabHost.exe, Discord.exe, Teams.exe, WorkFolders.exe, elevation_service.exe
EventID3eq 31, 11, 4688
Hashes3is_not_null 2, ne 1ddc7a6c3a4b50d23daffe8e364c575fd7df9af9711b14d153b09553ddd3670a0
dll.name2eq 2aadauthhelper.dll, aadcloudap.dll, aadjcsp.dll, axvlc.dll, libvlc.dll
event.category2eq 2file, process

Top indicator values (4077 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
event.typeeq
start
23606
Imageends_with
\svchost.exe
423
Imageends_with
\schtasks.exe
256
ParentImageends_with
\msmpeng.exe
3
ParentImageends_with
\mrt.exe
2
ParentImageends_with
\ngen.exe
2
process_nameeq
cmd.exe
377
process_nameeq
cmstp.exe
310
process_nameeq
control.exe
38
process_nameeq
mshta.exe
331
process_nameeq
regsvr32.exe
325
process_nameeq
rundll32.exe
360
process_nameeq
wscript.exe
329
EventTypeeq
load
29
EventTypein
ProcessRollup2
2117
EventTypein
creation
223
EventTypein
exec
2171
EventTypein
exec_event
2139
EventTypein
file_create_event
29
EventTypein
start
2134
Imagestarts_with
/dev/shm/
223
Imagestarts_with
/run/
28
Imagestarts_with
/tmp/
225
Imagestarts_with
/var/run/
211
Imagestarts_with
/var/tmp/
224
Imagestarts_with
c:\windows\system32\
2
Imagestarts_with
c:\windows\syswow64\
2
OriginalFileNameeq
schtasks.exe
223
ParentImageeq
-
2
TargetFilenamecontains
c:\$windows.~bt\
2

Exclusions (432 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
process.code_signature.trustedeq
true
4
ParentImageends_with
\msmpeng.exe
3
ParentImageends_with
\mrt.exe
2
ParentImageends_with
\ngen.exe
2
Imagestarts_with
c:\windows\system32\
2
Imagestarts_with
c:\windows\syswow64\
2
Imagewildcard
?:\program files (x86)\*.exe
2
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\*.exe
2
Imagewildcard
?:\users\*\appdata\local\google\chrome\application\chrome.exe
2
Imagewildcard
?:\users\*\appdata\local\island\island\application\island.exe
2
Imagewildcard
?:\users\*\appdata\local\mozilla firefox\firefox.exe
2
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\werfault.exe
2
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\syswow64\werfault.exe
2
ParentImageeq
-
2
TargetFilenamecontains
c:\$windows.~bt\
2

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 21 rules

Elastic 30 rules

Splunk 9 rules

Kusto 2 rules