Masquerading T1036

Tactic: Stealth

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.

Events covered

30 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation
SysmonEvent ID 3Network connection
SysmonEvent ID 5Process terminated
SysmonEvent ID 6Driver loaded
SysmonEvent ID 7Image loaded
SysmonEvent ID 11FileCreate
SysmonEvent ID 13RegistryEvent (Value Set)
SysmonEvent ID 29FileExecutableDetected
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4663An attempt was made to access an object.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4688A new process has been created.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4689A process has exited.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4720A user account was created.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4768A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4781The name of an account was changed.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4799A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5058Key file operation.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5059Key migration operation.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5156The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5379Credential Manager credentials were read.
Defender-DeviceProcessEventsanyProcess activity (any)
Defender-DeviceProcessEventsProcessCreatedProcess created
ESFexecProcess Execution (Notify)
ESFrenameFile Rename (NOTIFY)
ESFwriteFile Write (NOTIFY)
PowerShellEvent ID 4103Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData.
PowerShellEvent ID 4104Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal).
Windows-DefenderEvent ID 1119ProductName has encountered a critical error when taking action on malware or other potentially unwanted software.
PowerShellEvent ID 400Event ID 400
Service-Control-ManagerEvent ID 7045A service was installed in the system.
Sysmon-for-LinuxEvent ID 1Process Create

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 261 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (128 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
Image94ends_with 66, contains 12, starts_with 12, wildcard 8, eq 5, is_not_null 3, match 2, ne 2, in 1, is_null 1\cmd.exe, \bitsadmin.exe, /dev/shm/, \cscript.exe, \powershell.exe
CommandLine71contains 48, regex_match 15, ends_with 7, in 6, match 3, ne 2, eq 1, is_null 1, starts_with 1, wildcard 1 /create , /addfile , /transfer , cp , (?i)(copy-item|copy|xcopy|cp|cpi|robocopy)\s+.+(\x5c(syst...
process_name61eq 28, in 7, match 6, regex_match 6, ne 5, starts_with 5, contains 2, ends_with 2, wildcard 2, is_not_null 1kworker, bash, cmd.exe, cmstp.exe, powershell.exe
OriginalFileName51eq 46, contains 2, in 1, is_not_null 1, ne 1, wildcard 1bitsadmin.exe, msbuild.exe, msdt.exe, schtasks.exe, xcopy.exe
event.type50eq 49, ne 2start, creation, deletion
EventID36eq 364688, 1, 4103, 4104, 11
EventType24in 12, eq 9, ne 2, starts_with 1exec, exec_event, ProcessRollup2, creation, load
parent_process_name22eq 10, is_not_null 5, match 3, in 2, regex_match 2, ne 1(?i)\s+\x5c, (?i)lsass\.exe, cmd.exe, explorer.exe, (?i)^\w{1,2}\.exe
ParentImage21ends_with 14, eq 4, is_not_null 3, contains 2, is_null 2, in 1, ne 1\msmpeng.exe, -, \mrt.exe, .doc.js, .doc.lnk
TargetFilename18contains 12, ends_with 8, starts_with 5, in 2, wildcard 2, match 1.exe, .dll, .doc., .docx., $recycle.bin
host.os.type18eq 16, in 2
Type11eq 11
process.args10eq 5, wildcard 3, starts_with 2, ends_with 1, is_not_null 1-c, &, *--as *, *--as-group*, *--as-uid*
event.category8eq 7, in 1process, file, library, network
Description6eq 4, contains 2, starts_with 1Edit resources of exe, Execute processes remotely, Java Update Scheduler, Java(TM) Update Scheduler, Microsoft Access

Top indicator values (5560 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
event.typeeq
start
46606
event.typeeq
creation
445
EventIDeq
4688
12313
EventIDeq
1
11237
CommandLinecontains
/create
715
CommandLinecontains
/addfile
55
CommandLinecontains
/transfer
55
CommandLinecontains
cp
48
EventTypein
exec
7171
EventTypein
exec_event
6139
EventTypein
ProcessRollup2
4117
EventTypein
start
4134
Imageends_with
\cmd.exe
7130
Imageends_with
\powershell.exe
7182
Imageends_with
\pwsh.exe
7168
Imageends_with
\bitsadmin.exe
629
Imageends_with
\rundll32.exe
695
Imageends_with
\svchost.exe
623
Imageends_with
\conhost.exe
44
Imageends_with
\cscript.exe
473
Imageends_with
\powershell_ise.exe
441
Imageends_with
\regsvr32.exe
465
Imageends_with
\schtasks.exe
456
Imageends_with
\wscript.exe
475
EventSubTypene
AttackAttempt
57
OriginalFileNameeq
bitsadmin.exe
512
event.categoryeq
process
5128
Imagestarts_with
/dev/shm/
423
Imagestarts_with
/tmp/
425
process_nameeq
cmd.exe
477

Exclusions (979 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
process.code_signature.trustedeq
true
5
Imageends_with
\cmd.exe
4
Imagein
*:\\windows\\system32\\*
4
Imagein
*:\\windows\\syswow64\\*
4
Imagein
*:\\windows\\winsxs\\*
3
Imagestarts_with
/tmp/newroot/
4
Imagestarts_with
c:\windows\system32\
3
Imagestarts_with
c:\windows\syswow64\
3
parent_process_namematch
^-$
4
process_nameeq
rundll32.exe
4
ParentImageends_with
\msmpeng.exe
3
dll.code_signature.statuswildcard
errorCode_endpoint*
3
dll.code_signature.statuswildcard
errorExpired
3
process.code_signature.statuswildcard
errorCode_endpoint*
3
CommandLinecontains
sdelete
2

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 96 rules

Elastic 78 rules

Splunk 63 rules

Kusto 24 rules