Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups T1069.001

Tactic: Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.

Events covered

11 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 46 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (40 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine16contains 13, in 2, regex_match 1 group, /etc/group, group, --collectionmethods session , --loop --loopduration
process_name13eq 12, ends_with 1, in 1cmd.exe, dscl, net1.exe, powershell.exe, wmic.exe
ScriptBlockText9contains 7, in 2, eq 1-f , -pr , .getgporeport(), ::getipglobalproperties(), ::getprocesses
Image8ends_with 7, contains 1/cat, \net.exe, \net1.exe, /dscacheutil, /dscl
OriginalFileName8eq 8net1.exe, net.exe, wmic.exe, accesschk.exe, sharphound.exe
Payload5contains 5-f , -pr , add-exfiltration, add-persistence, add-regbackdoor
event.type5eq 4, in 1start, process_started
process.args5eq 3, wildcard 3, in 2, starts_with 2, contains 1, ne 1%appdata%, %homepath%, %localappdata%, *admin*, -l
EventID4eq 44104, 4799
EventType4eq 3, in 1exec, ProcessRollup2, exec_event, user-member-enumerated
event.category4eq 4process, iam
host.os.type4eq 3, in 1
ContextInfo3contains 3-f , -pr , doesnotrequirepreauth, gcim , get-ciminstance
file_name3in 3*-azapplicationadmins.json, *-azcloudappadmins.json, *-azglobaladminrights.json, *.bat, *.cmd
process.args_count3eq 2, ge 12, 3

Top indicator values (977 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
OriginalFileNameeq
net1.exe
444
OriginalFileNameeq
net.exe
328
OriginalFileNameeq
wmic.exe
261
event.typeeq
start
4606
CommandLinecontains
group
37
CommandLinecontains
group
22
CommandLinecontains
/etc/group
22
CommandLinecontains
invoke-azurehound
22
EventIDeq
4104
3268
event.categoryeq
process
3128
process_nameeq
net1.exe
335
process_nameeq
cmd.exe
277
process_nameeq
dscl
25
process_nameeq
net.exe
222
process_nameeq
powershell.exe
2104
process_nameeq
wmic.exe
247
EventTypeeq
exec
2171
Imageends_with
/cat
210
Imageends_with
\net.exe
249
Imageends_with
\net1.exe
247
ScriptBlockTextcontains
win32_group
22
SubjectUserNameends_with
$
23
process.argseq
group
23
process.argseq
localgroup
22
process.argseq
user
24
process.argsstarts_with
/Groups
22
process.argsstarts_with
/Users
22
process.args_counteq
2
29
CallerProcessNamecontains
microsoft.compute.vmaccessagent
1
CallerProcessNameeq
-
1

Exclusions (92 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
SubjectUserNameends_with
$
3
user.ideq
S-1-5-18
2
CallerProcessNameeq
-
1
CallerProcessNameeq
C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe
1
CallerProcessNameeq
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe
1
CallerProcessNameeq
C:\Windows\System32\CloudExperienceHostBroker.exe
1
CallerProcessNameeq
C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe
1
CallerProcessNameeq
C:\Windows\System32\Netplwiz.exe
1
CallerProcessNameeq
C:\Windows\System32\RecoveryDrive.exe
1
CallerProcessNameeq
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
1
CallerProcessNameeq
C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
1
CallerProcessNameeq
C:\Windows\System32\SettingSyncHost.exe
1
CallerProcessNameeq
C:\Windows\System32\SrTasks.exe
1
CallerProcessNameeq
C:\Windows\System32\SystemPropertiesComputerName.exe
1
CallerProcessNameeq
C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 21 rules

Elastic 9 rules

Splunk 16 rules