Permission Groups Discovery T1069
Tactic: Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.
Events covered
19 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 124 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (107 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (1455 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.
Exclusions (177 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 35 rules
- Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer
- Active Directory Group Enumeration With Get-AdGroup
- AD Groups Or Users Enumeration Using PowerShell - PoshModule
- AD Groups Or Users Enumeration Using PowerShell - ScriptBlock
- ADExplorer Writing Complete AD Snapshot Into .dat File
- BloodHound Collection Files
- Domain group enumeration
- Group discovery (command)
- Group discovery (PowerShell)
- HackTool - Bloodhound/Sharphound Execution
- HackTool - SharpView Execution
- Local domain group enumeration
- Local group enumeration triggered by Azure Virtual machine recovery tool
- Local Groups Discovery - Linux
- Local Groups Discovery - MacOs
- Local Groups Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE
- Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - PoshModule
- Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ProcessCreation
- Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ScriptBlock
- Massive SAM users/groups enumeration (native)
- Net.EXE Execution
- Permission Check Via Accesschk.EXE
- Potential Active Directory Reconnaissance/Enumeration Via LDAP
- PUA - AdFind Suspicious Execution
- RBAC Permission Enumeration Attempt
- Reconnaissance Activity
- Remote local admin group enumeration via SharpHound
- Renamed AdFind Execution
- Sensitive SAM domain user & groups discovery (native)
- SharpHound host enumeration over Kerberos
- Suspicious Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer
- Suspicious Get Information for SMB Share
- Suspicious Get Information for SMB Share - PowerShell Module
- Suspicious Get Local Groups Information
- Suspicious Get Local Groups Information - PowerShell
Elastic 26 rules
- Account or Group Discovery via Built-In Tools
- Active Directory Discovery using AdExplorer
- AdFind Command Activity
- AWS IAM Principal Enumeration via UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
- Deprecated - PowerShell Script with Discovery Capabilities
- Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities
- Discovery of Domain Groups
- Entra ID Sign-in BloodHound Suite User-Agent Detected
- Entra ID Sign-in TeamFiltration User-Agent Detected
- Enumeration of Administrator Accounts
- Enumeration of Privileged Local Groups Membership
- Enumeration of Users or Groups via Built-in Commands
- Kubectl Permission Discovery
- Kubectl Workload and Cluster Discovery
- Kubernetes Direct API Request via Curl or Wget
- Kubernetes Suspicious Self-Subject Review via Unusual User Agent
- Potential Enumeration via Active Directory Web Service
- PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions
- Remote System Discovery Commands
- Sudo Command Enumeration Detected
- Suspicious Access to LDAP Attributes
- System Owner/User Discovery Linux
- Unusual Group Name Accessed by a User
- Unusual User Privilege Enumeration via id
- Whoami Process Activity
- Windows Account or Group Discovery
Splunk 51 rules
- Adfind Commands (PowerShell)
- Adfind Commands (Sysmon)
- Adfind Commands (Windows Event Log)
- Adfind Execution (EDR)
- Adfind Execution (PowerShell)
- Adfind Execution (Sysmon)
- Adfind Execution (Windows Event Log)
- ASL AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion
- AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion
- Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments
- Detect AzureHound File Modifications
- Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments
- Detect SharpHound File Modifications
- Detect SharpHound Usage
- Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher
- Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery
- Domain Group Discovery With Wmic
- Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView
- Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic
- Get WMIObject Group Discovery
- Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging
- GetAdGroup with PowerShell
- GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block
- GetDomainGroup with PowerShell
- GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block
- GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell
- GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block
- IcedID Discovery Commands (EDR)
- IcedID Discovery Commands (Sysmon)
- IcedID Discovery Commands (Windows Event Log)
- Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol
- Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups (PowerShell)
- Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups (Sysmon)
- Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups (Windows Event Log)
- Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups (PowerShell)
- Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups (Sysmon)
- Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups (Windows Event Log)
- PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery
- Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging
- PowerView_SharpView Commands (PowerShell)
- SharpHound Enumeration (Windows Event Log)
- SharpHound Keywords (PowerShell)
- Windows Admin Permission Discovery
- Windows Azure PowerShell Module Installation Via PowerShell Script
- Windows Group Discovery Via Net
- Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior
- Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior
- Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration
- Windows Sensitive Group Discovery With Net
- Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution
- Wmic Group Discovery
Kusto 10 rules
- Cross-Cloud Suspicious Compute resource creation in GCP
- Cross-Cloud Suspicious user activity observed in GCP Envourment
- GCP IAM - Privileges Enumeration
- GCP IAM - Publicly exposed storage bucket
- GCP IAM - Service Account Keys Enumeration
- Hunt for ADWS requests from unknown devices
- LDAP reconnaissance via search filters
- OCI - Insecure metadata endpoint
- OCI - Instance metadata access
- Probable AdFind Recon Tool Usage