Account Discovery: Local Account T1087.001

Tactic: Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.

Events covered

10 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 47 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (37 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine22contains 16, match 3, in 2, ends_with 1, regex_match 1(?i)((tracert)|(query)|(net\s+((localgroup)|(group)|(conf..., (?i)((netstat)|(netsh)|(schtasks)|(tasklist)|(driverquery..., (?i)((whoami)|(dir)|(hostname)|(hostname)|(systeminfo)|(i..., -u, /etc/passwd
process_name14eq 12, ends_with 1, in 1, match 1net1.exe, dscl, net.exe, powershell.exe, wmic.exe
EventID12eq 124104, 4688, 1, 4799
OriginalFileName11eq 11net1.exe, net.exe, wmic.exe, psloglist.exe, quser.exe
Image9ends_with 8, contains 1\net.exe, \net1.exe, /cat, /dscacheutil, /dscl
ScriptBlockText6contains 4, in 2, eq 1-uacfilter, .getgporeport(), ::getipglobalproperties(), ::getprocesses, add-exfiltration
event.type5eq 4, in 1start, process_started
process.args5wildcard 4, eq 3, in 2, starts_with 2, contains 1%appdata%, %homepath%, %localappdata%, *admin*, -list
host.os.type4eq 3, in 1
event.category3eq 3process
EventType2eq 2exec
TargetFilename2ends_with 1, eq 1, starts_with 1/etc/machine-id, /etc/passwd, /proc/net/if_inet6, \pocket_containers.json, _computers.json
Type2eq 2
dc_process_name2gt 22
file_name2in 2*-azapplicationadmins.json, *-azcloudappadmins.json, *-azglobaladminrights.json, *_computers.json, *_containers.json

Top indicator values (979 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
EventIDeq
4104
6268
EventIDeq
4688
3313
EventIDeq
1
2237
OriginalFileNameeq
net1.exe
644
OriginalFileNameeq
net.exe
528
Imageends_with
\net.exe
449
Imageends_with
\net1.exe
447
event.typeeq
start
4606
process_nameeq
net1.exe
435
process_nameeq
net.exe
322
CommandLinecontains
user
317
CommandLinecontains
administrateur
23
CommandLinecontains
administrator
22
CommandLinecontains
-u
26
CommandLinecontains
/etc/passwd
24
CommandLinecontains
/etc/sudoers
26
CommandLinecontains
domain admins
23
CommandLinecontains
enterprise admins
23
CommandLinecontains
exchange trusted subsystem
22
CommandLinecontains
invoke-azurehound
22
CommandLinecontains
remote desktop users
23
CommandLinecontains
useraccount
24
CommandLinecontains
usuarios de escritorio remoto
23
CommandLinecontains
utilisateurs du bureau à distance
23
CommandLinecontains
x:0:
22
CommandLinematch
(?i)((tracert)|(query)|(net\s+((localgroup)|(group)|(config)|(share)|(use)|(u...
33
CommandLinematch
(?i)((netstat)|(netsh)|(schtasks)|(tasklist)|(driverquery)|(qprocess)|(nslook...
22
CommandLinematch
(?i)((whoami)|(dir)|(hostname)|(hostname)|(systeminfo)|(ipconfig)|(route)|(ar...
22
event.categoryeq
process
3128
EventTypeeq
exec
2171

Exclusions (74 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
user.ideq
S-1-5-18
2
CommandLinecontains
/add
1
CommandLinecontains
rmdir
1
CommandLinecontains
/active
1
CommandLinecontains
/add
1
CommandLinecontains
/delete
1
CommandLinecontains
/domain
1
CommandLinecontains
/expires
1
CommandLinecontains
/passwordreq
1
CommandLinecontains
/scriptpath
1
CommandLinecontains
/times
1
CommandLinecontains
/workstations
1
CommandLinecontains
add
1
CommandLineends_with
/add
1
CommandLineends_with
/delete
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 15 rules

Elastic 9 rules

Splunk 22 rules

Kusto 1 rule