Account Discovery: Local Account T1087.001
Tactic: Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Events covered
10 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Sysmon | Event ID 3 | Network connection |
| Sysmon | Event ID 11 | FileCreate |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4661 | A handle to an object was requested. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4799 | A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. |
| ESF | exec | Process Execution (Notify) |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4103 | Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData. |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
| Sysmon-for-Linux | Event ID 1 | Process Create |
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 47 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (37 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (979 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.
Exclusions (74 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 15 rules
- BloodHound Collection Files
- Cisco Collect Data
- HackTool - Bloodhound/Sharphound Execution
- Local Accounts Discovery
- Local domain group enumeration
- Local System Accounts Discovery - Linux
- Local System Accounts Discovery - MacOs
- Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - PoshModule
- Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ProcessCreation
- Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ScriptBlock
- Net.EXE Execution
- Suspicious Group And Account Reconnaissance Activity Using Net.EXE
- Suspicious Reconnaissance Activity Using Get-LocalGroupMember Cmdlet
- Suspicious Use of PsLogList
- User properties enumeration via commandline
Elastic 9 rules
- Account or Group Discovery via Built-In Tools
- Deprecated - PowerShell Script with Discovery Capabilities
- Enumeration of Administrator Accounts
- Enumeration of Users or Groups via Built-in Commands
- Mounting Hidden or WebDav Remote Shares
- Potential Meterpreter Reverse Shell
- PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions
- Unusual User Privilege Enumeration via id
- Windows Account or Group Discovery
Splunk 22 rules
- Common Reconnaissance Commands (PowerShell)
- Common Reconnaissance Commands (Sysmon)
- Common Reconnaissance Commands (Windows Event Log)
- CSVDE Export Active Directory (PowerShell)
- CSVDE Export Active Directory (Sysmon)
- CSVDE Export Active Directory (Windows Event Log)
- Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments
- Detect AzureHound File Modifications
- Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments
- Detect SharpHound File Modifications
- Detect SharpHound Usage
- GetLocalUser with PowerShell
- GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block
- GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell
- GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block
- Local Account Discovery With Wmic
- Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol
- SharpHound Enumeration (Windows Event Log)
- SharpHound Keywords (PowerShell)
- Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account
- Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution
- Windows User Discovery Via Net