Account Discovery T1087
Tactic: Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., Valid Accounts).
Events covered
39 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 199 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (170 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (2174 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.
Exclusions (211 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 52 rules
- Active Directory Computers Enumeration With Get-AdComputer
- Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer
- Active Directory honeypot enumerated by a suspicious host (Bloodhound)
- Active Directory PowerShell module called from a non administrative host
- Active Directory Structure Export Via Csvde.EXE
- AD Privileged Users or Groups Reconnaissance
- ADExplorer Writing Complete AD Snapshot Into .dat File
- AWS STS GetCallerIdentity Enumeration Via TruffleHog
- BloodHound Collection Files
- Chopper Webshell Process Pattern
- Cisco Collect Data
- Discovery Using AzureHound
- Domain group enumeration
- Group discovery (command)
- HackTool - Bloodhound/Sharphound Execution
- HackTool - SOAPHound Execution
- HackTool - winPEAS Execution
- Hacktool Ruler
- Local Accounts Discovery
- Local domain group enumeration
- Local System Accounts Discovery - Linux
- Local System Accounts Discovery - MacOs
- Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - PoshModule
- Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ProcessCreation
- Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ScriptBlock
- Net.EXE Execution
- Network Reconnaissance Activity
- Potential Active Directory Reconnaissance/Enumeration Via LDAP
- Potential AD User Enumeration From Non-Machine Account
- Potential Pikabot Discovery Activity
- Potentially Suspicious EventLog Recon Activity Using Log Query Utilities
- PUA - AdFind Suspicious Execution
- PUA - AdFind.EXE Execution
- PUA - Seatbelt Execution
- PUA - Suspicious ActiveDirectory Enumeration Via AdFind.EXE
- RBAC Permission Enumeration Attempt
- Reconnaissance Activity
- Renamed AdFind Execution
- Role Enumeration
- SharpHound host enumeration over Kerberos
- SharpHound Recon Account Discovery
- Suspicious Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer
- Suspicious Group And Account Reconnaissance Activity Using Net.EXE
- Suspicious Reconnaissance Activity Using Get-LocalGroupMember Cmdlet
- Suspicious SPN enumeration previous to Kerberoasting attack (native commands)
- Suspicious SPN enumeration previous to Kerberoasting attack (PowerShell)
- Suspicious Use of PsLogList
- Uncommon Connection to Active Directory Web Services
- User Enumeration
- User properties enumeration via commandline
- Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords
- Webshell Hacking Activity Patterns
Elastic 27 rules
- Account Discovery Command via SYSTEM Account
- Account or Group Discovery via Built-In Tools
- Active Directory Discovery using AdExplorer
- AdFind Command Activity
- AWS Account Discovery By Rare User
- AWS Discovery API Calls via CLI from a Single Resource
- AWS EC2 Role GetCallerIdentity from New Source AS Organization
- AWS IAM Principal Enumeration via UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
- AWS STS GetCallerIdentity API Called for the First Time
- Deprecated - PowerShell Script with Discovery Capabilities
- Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities
- Entra ID Sign-in BloodHound Suite User-Agent Detected
- Entra ID Sign-in TeamFiltration User-Agent Detected
- Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE
- Enumeration of Administrator Accounts
- Enumeration of Users or Groups via Built-in Commands
- Microsoft Graph Multi-Category Reconnaissance Burst
- Mounting Hidden or WebDav Remote Shares
- Potential Enumeration via Active Directory Web Service
- Potential Meterpreter Reverse Shell
- Potential PowerShell HackTool Script by Function Names
- PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions
- Suspicious Access to LDAP Attributes
- Suspicious JetBrains TeamCity Child Process
- Unusual User Privilege Enumeration via id
- Windows Account or Group Discovery
- Windows System Network Connections Discovery
Splunk 77 rules
- Adfind Commands (PowerShell)
- Adfind Commands (Sysmon)
- Adfind Commands (Windows Event Log)
- Adfind Execution (EDR)
- Adfind Execution (PowerShell)
- Adfind Execution (Sysmon)
- Adfind Execution (Windows Event Log)
- AdsiSearcher Account Discovery
- Azure AD AzureHound UserAgent Detected
- Azure AD Service Principal Enumeration
- Common Active Directory Commands (PowerShell)
- Common Active Directory Commands (Sysmon)
- Common Active Directory Commands (Windows Event Log)
- Common Exchange Recon cmdlets (PowerShell)
- Common Recon Commands in Short Burst (Sysmon)
- Common Recon Commands in Short Burst (Windows Event Log)
- Common Reconnaissance Commands (PowerShell)
- Common Reconnaissance Commands (Sysmon)
- Common Reconnaissance Commands (Windows Event Log)
- CSVDE Export Active Directory (PowerShell)
- CSVDE Export Active Directory (Sysmon)
- CSVDE Export Active Directory (Windows Event Log)
- Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments
- Detect AzureHound File Modifications
- Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments
- Detect SharpHound File Modifications
- Detect SharpHound Usage
- Disabled Pre-Authentication Accounts Discovery - PowerShell (PowerShell)
- Disabled Pre-Authentication Accounts Discovery - PowerShell (Sysmon)
- Disabled Pre-Authentication Accounts Discovery - PowerShell (Windows Event Log)
- Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery
- Domain Account Discovery with Wmic
- Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram
- Get ADUser with PowerShell
- Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block
- Get DomainUser with PowerShell
- Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block
- GetLocalUser with PowerShell
- GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block
- GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell
- GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block
- GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell
- GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block
- IcedID Discovery Commands (EDR)
- IcedID Discovery Commands (Sysmon)
- IcedID Discovery Commands (Windows Event Log)
- Local Account Discovery With Wmic
- Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol
- Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications
- Okta Unauthorized Access to Application
- Potential PowerShell Post-Exploitation Activity (Sysmon)
- Potential PowerShell Post-Exploitation Activity (Windows Event Log)
- PowerHuntShares Commands (PowerShell)
- PowerHuntShares Commands (Sysmon)
- PowerHuntShares Commands (Windows Event Log)
- SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object
- SharpHound Enumeration (Windows Event Log)
- SharpHound Keywords (PowerShell)
- User_Domain Enumeration Tool - Windows (PowerShell)
- User_Domain Enumeration Tool - Windows (Sysmon)
- User_Domain Enumeration Tool - Windows (Windows Event Log)
- Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account
- Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name
- Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire
- Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity
- Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity
- Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer
- Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU
- Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl
- Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain
- Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess
- Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery
- Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery
- Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution
- Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts
- Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic
- Windows User Discovery Via Net
Kusto 34 rules
- ADWS Connection from Process Injection Target
- ADWS Connection from Unexpected Binary
- AFD WAF - Path Traversal Attack
- API - Account Takeover
- API - Rate limiting
- App GW WAF - Path Traversal Attack
- Copilot - Plugin Tampering (Enable and Disable Within 5 Minutes)
- Cross-tenant Access Settings Organization Added
- Cross-tenant Access Settings Organization Deleted
- Cross-tenant Access Settings Organization Inbound Collaboration Settings Changed
- Cross-tenant Access Settings Organization Inbound Direct Settings Changed
- Cross-tenant Access Settings Organization Outbound Collaboration Settings Changed
- Cross-tenant Access Settings Organization Outbound Direct Settings Changed
- Detect Suspicious Commands Initiated by Webserver Processes
- External guest invitation followed by Microsoft Entra ID PowerShell signin
- GCP IAM - Service Account Enumeration
- Guest accounts added in Entra ID Groups other than the ones specified
- Highly Sensitive Password Accessed
- Hunt for ADWS requests from unknown devices
- Large number of AD objects accessed by user
- LDAP reconnaissance via search filters
- Powershell Empire Cmdlets Executed in Command Line
- Probable AdFind Recon Tool Usage
- Sensitive Data Discovered in the Last 24 Hours
- Sensitive Data Discovered in the Last 24 Hours - Customized
- Snowflake - Possible privileges discovery activity
- SonicWall - Allowed SSH, Telnet, and RDP Connections
- Unauthorized user access across AWS and Azure
- Vectra Account's Behaviors
- Vectra AI Detect - Detections with High Severity
- Vectra AI Detect - Suspected Compromised Account
- Vectra AI Detect - Suspected Compromised Host
- Vectra AI Detect - Suspicious Behaviors by Category
- Vectra Host's Behaviors
YARA-L 1 rule
Panther 8 rules
- Anthropic Excessive Chat Access Failures
- AppOmni Alert Passthrough
- AWS CloudTrail Account Discovery
- AWS STS GetCallerIdentity via TruffleHog
- Azure Key Vault Key Accessed or Recovered
- Databricks Repeated Unauthorized Unity Catalog Requests
- GSuite Calendar Has Been Made Public
- GSuite Workspace Calendar External Sharing Setting Change