Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy T1090.003

Tactic: Command & Control

Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.

Events covered

6 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 13 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (26 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
graph.metadata.entity_type4eq 4IP_ADDRESS, FILE
graph.metadata.product_name4eq 4GCTI Feed, Google Safe Browsing, VirusTotal Relationships
graph.metadata.source_type4eq 4GLOBAL_CONTEXT
graph.metadata.threat.threat_feed_name4eq 4Tor Exit Nodes, Benign Binaries
graph.metadata.vendor_name3eq 3Google Cloud Threat Intelligence, VirusTotal
process_name3eq 3proxychains, tor.exe
EventType2in 2ProcessRollup2, exec, exec_event
Image2contains 1, ends_with 1\\bravesoftware\\brave-browser, \\tor-, \tor browser\browser\firefox.exe, \tor.exe
QueryName2ends_with 2.hiddenservice.net, .onion, .onion.ca
event.type2eq 2start
host.os.type2eq 2
All_Traffic.action1in 1allow, allowed
All_Traffic.app1eq 1tor
Description1eq 1Tor Browser
EventID1regex_match 1TorIPCaller|TorRelay|TorClient

Top indicator values (115 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
graph.metadata.entity_typeeq
IP_ADDRESS
410
graph.metadata.entity_typeeq
FILE
317
graph.metadata.product_nameeq
GCTI Feed
48
graph.metadata.source_typeeq
GLOBAL_CONTEXT
420
graph.metadata.threat.threat_feed_nameeq
Tor Exit Nodes
47
graph.metadata.vendor_nameeq
Google Cloud Threat Intelligence
34
EventTypein
ProcessRollup2
2117
EventTypein
exec
2171
EventTypein
exec_event
2139
EventTypein
executed
288
EventTypein
process_started
274
EventTypein
start
2134
QueryNameends_with
.hiddenservice.net
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.ca
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.cab
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.casa
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.city
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.direct
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.dog
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.glass
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.gq
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.ink
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.it
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.link
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.lt
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.lu
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.nu
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.pet
22
QueryNameends_with
.onion.plus
22

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 3 rules

Elastic 2 rules

Splunk 3 rules

YARA-L 5 rules