Brute Force T1110

Tactic: Credential Access

Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.

Events covered

24 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation
SysmonEvent ID 3Network connection
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4624An account was successfully logged on.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4625An account failed to log on.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4634An account was logged off.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4648A logon was attempted using explicit credentials.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4688A new process has been created.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4723An attempt was made to change an account's password.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4724An attempt was made to reset an account's password.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4768A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4771Kerberos pre-authentication failed.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4776The domain controller attempted to validate the credentials for an account.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5152The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a packet.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5154The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted an application or service to listen on a port for incoming connections.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5155The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked an application or service from listening on a port for incoming connections.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5156The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5157The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a connection.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5158The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a bind to a local port.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5159The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a bind to a local port.
Defender-DeviceLogonEventsLogonSuccessLogon succeeded
Defender-DeviceLogonEventsLogonFailedLogon failed
MSSQLSERVEREvent ID 18456Event ID 18456
MSSQLSERVEREvent ID 33205Event ID 33205
PowerShellEvent ID 4104Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal).

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 298 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (360 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
sourcetype46eq 45, in 1aws:cloudtrail, azure:monitor:aad, crowdstrike:identities, o365:management:activity, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational
EventID44eq 40, in 3, regex_match 14625, 8004, 4624, 4768, 4776
EventType34eq 24, in 9, starts_with 7, contains 1user.authentication., user.session.start, ssh_login, user_login, logon-failed
MessageType24eq 240, 2
Channel23eq 23, in 17
data_stream.dataset21eq 20, in 1okta.system, azure.signinlogs, o365.audit, aws.cloudtrail, azure.identity_protection
Status20eq 17, in 2, contains 10x6, 403, Success, 0x12, 0x18
eventtype19eq 19, contains 1, starts_with 1
Codename18eq 18codeNameList, Password Guessing, Password Spraying
src_ip16eq 7, is_not_null 5, ne 5, cidr_match 3-, %domain_controllers_ips%, 10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.1
aws::eventName15eq 15ConsoleLogin, GetPasswordData, ModifyDBInstance, AssumeRole, GetObject
isOutlier14eq 141
LogonType13eq 12, ne 1Network, Interactive, RemoteInteractive, Unlock
TargetUserName12ne 10, eq 2*$, %account_allowed_proxy%, Administrator
event.category12eq 12authentication, process

Top indicator values (918 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
MessageTypeeq
0
1515
MessageTypeeq
2
921
isOutliereq
1
1428
Codenameeq
codeNameList
1212
EventIDeq
4625
1215
EventIDeq
4768
413
EventIDeq
4776
45
TargetUserNamene
*$
1014
event.categoryeq
authentication
1031
LogonTypeeq
Network
940
aws::eventNameeq
ConsoleLogin
927
data_stream.dataseteq
okta.system
948
data_stream.dataseteq
azure.signinlogs
530
event.outcomeeq
failure
916
unique_accountsgt
30
99
EventTypeeq
user.session.start
78
EventTypestarts_with
user.authentication.
78
sourcetypeeq
aws:cloudtrail
759
sourcetypeeq
azure:monitor:aad
747
sourcetypeeq
crowdstrike:identities
66
sourcetypeeq
o365:management:activity
680
sourcetypeeq
XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational
55
okta::outcome.reasonin
INVALID_CREDENTIALS
66
okta::outcome.reasonin
LOCKED_OUT
55
security_result.actioneq
BLOCK
617
Operationeq
UserLoginFailed
58
Workloadeq
AzureActiveDirectory
531
categoryeq
SignInLogs
512
properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeededeq
false
55
properties.status.errorCodeeq
50126
55

Exclusions (198 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
src_ipcidr_match
10.0.0.0/8
4
src_ipcidr_match
127.0.0.0/8
4
src_ipcidr_match
169.254.0.0/16
4
src_ipcidr_match
172.16.0.0/12
4
src_ipcidr_match
192.168.0.0/16
4
src_ipeq
%domain_controllers_ips%
3
Locationcontains
<countries you do operate out of e,g gb, use or for multiple>
2
Statusin
0xc000005e
2
Statusin
0xc00000dc
2
Statusin
0xc0000133
2
Statusin
0xc000015b
2
Statusin
0xc0000192
2
TO_IP(source.ip)cidr_match
127.0.0.0/8
2
TO_IP(source.ip)cidr_match
::1
2
azure.identityprotection.properties.risk_statein
confirmedSafe
2

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 40 rules

Elastic 39 rules

Splunk 76 rules

Kusto 96 rules

YARA-L 14 rules

Panther 33 rules