Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft T1134.001
Tactics: Stealth, Privilege Escalation
Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`. The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.
Events covered
11 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Sysmon | Event ID 10 | ProcessAccess |
| Sysmon | Event ID 17 | PipeEvent (Pipe Created) |
| Sysmon | Event ID 18 | PipeEvent (Pipe Connected) |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4624 | An account was successfully logged on. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4697 | A service was installed in the system. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5447 | A Windows Filtering Platform filter has been changed. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5449 | A Windows Filtering Platform provider context has been changed. |
| Defender-DeviceProcessEvents | ProcessCreated | Process created |
| Service-Control-Manager | Event ID 7045 | A service was installed in the system. |
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 23 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (44 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (155 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.
Exclusions (39 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 10 rules
- Anonymous login (RottenPotatoNG)
- HackTool - Impersonate Execution
- HackTool - Koh Default Named Pipe
- HackTool - NoFilter Execution
- HackTool - SharpDPAPI Execution
- HackTool - SharpImpersonation Execution
- Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - Security
- Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - System
- Potential Access Token Abuse
- Potential Meterpreter/CobaltStrike Activity
Elastic 7 rules
- First Time Seen NewCredentials Logon Process
- Permission Theft - Detected - Elastic Endgame
- Permission Theft - Prevented - Elastic Endgame
- PowerShell Script with Token Impersonation Capabilities
- Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation
- Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation
- Process Created with a Duplicated Token
Splunk 4 rules
- Runas Execution in CommandLine
- Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle
- Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path
- Windows Handle Duplication in Known UAC-Bypass Binaries