Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate Token T1134.003

Tactics: Stealth, Privilege Escalation

Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the `LogonUser` function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use `SetThreadToken` to assign the token to a thread.

Events covered

3 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 7 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (20 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine3contains 3 /file:, /machine, /mkfile:, adduser , binary:
Image3ends_with 2, starts_with 1\sharpdpapi.exe, \sharpimpersonation.exe, c:\
LogonProcessName2starts_with 2Advapi, seclogo
OriginalFileName2eq 2sharpdpapi.exe, sharpimpersonation.exe
AwsSecurityFindingGeneratorId1eq 1security-control/IAM.4
ComplianceSecurityControlId1eq 1IAM.4
ComplianceStatus1eq 1FAILED
EventType1eq 1logged-in
Hashes1contains 1imphash=0a358ffc1697b7a07d0e817ac740df62, md5=9520714ab576b0ed01d1513691377d01, sha256=e81cc96e2118dc4fbfe5bad1604e0ac7681960143e2101e1a0...
LogonType1eq 1Interactive
RecordState1eq 1ACTIVE
SubjectUserSid1starts_with 1S-1-12-, S-1-5-21
TargetUserSid1starts_with 1S-1-12-, S-1-5-21
event.outcome1eq 1success
event.type1eq 1start

Top indicator values (55 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
AwsSecurityFindingGeneratorIdeq
security-control/IAM.4
1
CommandLinecontains
/file:
1
CommandLinecontains
/machine
1
CommandLinecontains
/mkfile:
1
CommandLinecontains
/password:
1
CommandLinecontains
/pvk:
1
CommandLinecontains
/server:
1
CommandLinecontains
/target:
1
CommandLinecontains
/unprotect
1
CommandLinecontains
adduser
1
CommandLinecontains
backupkey
1
CommandLinecontains
binary:
1
CommandLinecontains
blob
1
CommandLinecontains
certificates
1
CommandLinecontains
credentials
1
CommandLinecontains
exec
13
CommandLinecontains
keepass
1
CommandLinecontains
list
12
CommandLinecontains
masterkeys
1
CommandLinecontains
rdg
1
CommandLinecontains
shellcode:
1
CommandLinecontains
technique:createprocessasuserw
1
CommandLinecontains
technique:impersonateloggedonuser
1
CommandLinecontains
user:
1
CommandLinecontains
vaults
1
CommandLinecontains
{
1
CommandLinecontains
impersonate.exe
1
CommandLinecontains
}:
1
ComplianceSecurityControlIdeq
IAM.4
1
ComplianceStatuseq
FAILED
18

Exclusions (8 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
Imagewildcard
?:\program files (x86)\*.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\*.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\wininit.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\winlogon.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\syswow64\inetsrv\w3wp.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\syswow64\msiexec.exe
1
SubjectUserSidstarts_with
winlog.event_data.TargetUserSid
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 3 rules

Elastic 2 rules

Kusto 2 rules