Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing T1134.004

Tactics: Stealth, Privilege Escalation

Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use. This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.

Events covered

2 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 6 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (14 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine2contains 2 -spawnto , /root,, explorer.exe, ppid-spoof, ppid_spoof
Image2ends_with 1, wildcard 1?:\programdata\*.exe, ?:\users\*.exe, ?:\windows\microsoft.net\*.exe, \selectmyparent.exe
OriginalFileName2contains 1, eq 1cmstp.exe, cscript.exe, eqnedt32.exe, ppid-spoof, ppid_spoof
event.type2eq 2start
parent_process_name2eq 1, in 1, is_not_null 1SearchProtocolHost.exe, autochk.exe, conhost.exe, cscript.exe, wscript.exe
process.parent.Ext.real.pid2gt 20
process_name2eq 1, in 1autochk.exe, certutil.exe, cmd.exe, consent.exe, csrss.exe
Description1eq 1SelectMyParent
EventType1eq 1start
Hashes1contains 1imphash=04d974875bd225f00902b4cad9af3fbc, imphash=89059503d7fbf470e68f7e63313da3ad, imphash=a782af154c9e743ddf3f3eb2b8f3d16e
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name1ne 1system
process.code_signature.exists1eq 1false
process.code_signature.status1eq 1errorBadDigest
user.id1eq 1S-1-5-18

Top indicator values (98 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
event.typeeq
start
2606
process.parent.Ext.real.pidgt
0
22
CommandLinecontains
-spawnto
1
CommandLinecontains
/root,
1
CommandLinecontains
explorer.exe
13
CommandLinecontains
ppid-spoof
1
CommandLinecontains
ppid_spoof
1
CommandLinecontains
ppidspoof
1
CommandLinecontains
spoof-ppid
1
CommandLinecontains
spoof_ppid
1
CommandLinecontains
spoofedppid
1
CommandLinecontains
spoofppid
1
Descriptioneq
SelectMyParent
1
EventTypeeq
start
116
Hashescontains
imphash=04d974875bd225f00902b4cad9af3fbc
1
Hashescontains
imphash=89059503d7fbf470e68f7e63313da3ad
1
Hashescontains
imphash=a782af154c9e743ddf3f3eb2b8f3d16e
1
Hashescontains
imphash=ca28337632625c8281ab8a130b3d6bad
1
Imageends_with
\selectmyparent.exe
12
Imagewildcard
?:\programdata\*.exe
16
Imagewildcard
?:\users\*.exe
14
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\microsoft.net\*.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\tasks\*
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\temp\*.exe
1
OriginalFileNamecontains
ppid-spoof
1
OriginalFileNamecontains
ppid_spoof
1
OriginalFileNamecontains
ppidspoof
1
OriginalFileNamecontains
spoof-ppid
1
OriginalFileNamecontains
spoof_ppid
1
OriginalFileNamecontains
spoofedppid
1

Exclusions (44 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\werfault.exe
2
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\werfaultsecure.exe
2
Imageeq
?:\windows\syswow64\werfault.exe
2
Imageeq
?:\windows\syswow64\werfaultsecure.exe
2
Imageeq
?:\windows\softwaredistribution\download\install\securityhealthsetup.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\magnify.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\mpsigstub.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\narrator.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\osk.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\voiceaccess.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\wermgr.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\syswow64\mpsigstub.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\syswow64\wermgr.exe
1
ParentImageeq
?:\windows\system32\atbroker.exe
1
ParentImageeq
?:\windows\system32\utilman.exe
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 1 rule

Elastic 3 rules

Splunk 2 rules