Software Extensions: Browser Extensions T1176.001

Tactic: Persistence

Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality to and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly via a local file or custom URL or through a browser's app store - an official online platform where users can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific web browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's permissions previously granted. Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners. Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.

Events covered

4 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 5 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (11 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine3contains 3--load-extension=, -extoff
Image2ends_with 2\brave.exe, \chrome.exe, \msedge.exe
process_name2eq 1, in 1brave browser, google chrome, iexplore.exe, microsoft edge
EventType1eq 1exec
OriginalFileName1eq 1iexplore.exe
ParentImage1ends_with 1\cmd.exe, \cscript.exe, \mshta.exe
TargetFilename1wildcard 1?:\users\*\appdata\local\*\*\user data\webstore downloads\*, ?:\users\*\appdata\roaming\*\profiles\*\extensions\*.xpi
event.type1eq 1creation
file.name1ends_with 1.crx, .xpi
host.os.type1eq 1
process.args1starts_with 1--load-extension=/

Top indicator values (27 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
CommandLinecontains
--load-extension=
22
CommandLinecontains
-extoff
1
Imageends_with
\brave.exe
211
Imageends_with
\chrome.exe
213
Imageends_with
\msedge.exe
214
Imageends_with
\opera.exe
211
Imageends_with
\vivaldi.exe
211
EventTypeeq
exec
1171
OriginalFileNameeq
iexplore.exe
1
ParentImageends_with
\cmd.exe
120
ParentImageends_with
\cscript.exe
117
ParentImageends_with
\mshta.exe
113
ParentImageends_with
\powershell.exe
124
ParentImageends_with
\pwsh.exe
121
ParentImageends_with
\regsvr32.exe
111
ParentImageends_with
\rundll32.exe
115
ParentImageends_with
\wscript.exe
119
TargetFilenamewildcard
?:\users\*\appdata\local\*\*\user data\webstore downloads\*
1
TargetFilenamewildcard
?:\users\*\appdata\roaming\*\profiles\*\extensions\*.xpi
1
event.typeeq
creation
145
file.nameends_with
.crx
1
file.nameends_with
.xpi
1
process.argsstarts_with
--load-extension=/
1
process_nameeq
iexplore.exe
14
process_namein
brave browser
1
process_namein
google chrome
12
process_namein
microsoft edge
12

Exclusions (6 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
ParentImagewildcard
/applications/cypress.app/contents/macos/cypress
1
ParentImagewildcard
/applications/google chrome.app/contents/macos/google chrome
1
ParentImagewildcard
/opt/homebrew/caskroom/chromedriver/*/chromedriver
1
ParentImagewildcard
/users/*/library/caches/cypress/*/cypress.app/contents/macos/cypress
1
ParentImagewildcard
/usr/local/bin/chromedriver
1
process.argswildcard
--load-extension=/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Cypress/*
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 2 rules

Elastic 2 rules

Splunk 1 rule