BITS Jobs T1197

Tactics: Stealth, Persistence, Execution

Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute code and perform various background tasks. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.

Events covered

9 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 35 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (32 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine14contains 9, regex_match 3, in 2 /addfile , /create , /transfer , (\s+\-[Nvw]+\s+\d+?.*?(((\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3})|(\w?\wtps?..., *addfile*
OriginalFileName10eq 10bitsadmin.exe, powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe, pwsh.dll
Image9ends_with 7, eq 1, is_not_null 1\bitsadmin.exe, c:\program files\google\chrome\application\chrome.exe, c:\windows\system32\aitstatic.exe, c:\windows\system32\bitsadmin.exe
process_name7eq 7, in 1bitsadmin.exe, powershell.exe, certoc.exe, certutil.exe, curl.exe
EventID4eq 41, 4103, 4104, 4688
RemoteName4contains 4.azureedge.net/, .com, .com/, .githubusercontent.com, .sfx.ms/
LocalName2contains 2, ends_with 1.bat, .dll, .exe, \desktop\, c:\perflogs\
Type2eq 2
c-useragent2starts_with 2Microsoft BITS/
cs-host2ends_with 2.com, .net, .org, 1, 2
event.type2eq 2start
processPath2ends_with 2\bitsadmin.exe, \powershell.exe, \pwsh.exe
process_arguments2contains 1, regex_match 1(?i)(?<!\w)-(?:[a-z]*k[a-z]*|-(insecure|proxy-insecure|do..., -s bits
sourcetype2eq 2cisco:nvm:flowdata
EventData1contains 1-source, ftp://, http://

Top indicator values (367 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
OriginalFileNameeq
bitsadmin.exe
912
Imageends_with
\bitsadmin.exe
729
CommandLinecontains
/addfile
55
CommandLinecontains
/create
515
CommandLinecontains
/transfer
55
CommandLinecontains
/addfile
22
CommandLinecontains
/transfer
22
CommandLinecontains
%comspec%
16
CommandLinecontains
%programdata%
14
CommandLinecontains
%public%
17
CommandLinecontains
%temp%
116
CommandLinecontains
%tmp%
115
CommandLinecontains
.7z
12
CommandLinecontains
.asax
1
CommandLinecontains
.ashx
1
CommandLinecontains
.asmx
1
CommandLinecontains
.asp
1
CommandLinecontains
.aspx
12
CommandLinecontains
.bat
111
CommandLinecontains
.cfm
1
CommandLinecontains
.cgi
1
process_nameeq
bitsadmin.exe
314
process_nameeq
powershell.exe
2104
process_nameeq
svchost.exe
211
CommandLinein
*addfile*
22
CommandLineregex_match
(\s+\-[Nvw]+\s+\d+?.*?(((\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3})|(\w?\wtps?\:(\/\/|\x5c\x5c)))\...
22
EventIDeq
1
2237
c-useragentstarts_with
Microsoft BITS/
22
event.typeeq
start
2606
sourcetypeeq
cisco:nvm:flowdata
214

Exclusions (87 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
CommandLinecontains
://7-
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\directxdatabaseupdater.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\werfault.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\werfaultsecure.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\wermgr.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\program files\google\chrome\application\chrome.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\system32\aitstatic.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\system32\bitsadmin.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\system32\desktopimgdownldr.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\system32\deviceenroller.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\system32\mdmappinstaller.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\system32\ofdeploy.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\system32\recoverydrive.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\system32\speech_onecore\common\speechmodeldownload.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\syswow64\bitsadmin.exe
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 19 rules

Elastic 4 rules

Splunk 11 rules

Kusto 1 rule