User Execution T1204

Tactic: Execution

An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.

Events covered

46 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation
SysmonEvent ID 3Network connection
SysmonEvent ID 7Image loaded
SysmonEvent ID 10ProcessAccess
SysmonEvent ID 11FileCreate
SysmonEvent ID 12RegistryEvent (Object create and delete)
SysmonEvent ID 13RegistryEvent (Value Set)
SysmonEvent ID 14RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename)
SysmonEvent ID 22DNSEvent (DNS query)
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4656A handle to an object was requested.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4663An attempt was made to access an object.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4688A new process has been created.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5156The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.
Defender-DeviceEventsCreateRemoteThreadApiCallCreateRemoteThread API call
Defender-DeviceEventsQueueUserApcRemoteApiCallRemote APC queued (QueueUserApc)
Defender-DeviceEventsSetThreadContextRemoteApiCallRemote thread context change (SetThreadContext)
Defender-DeviceFileEventsanyFile activity
Defender-DeviceFileEventsFileCreatedFile created
Defender-DeviceFileEventsFileRenamedFile renamed
Defender-DeviceImageLoadEventsanyImage load
Defender-DeviceNetworkEventsanyNetwork activity
Defender-DeviceNetworkEventsConnectionSuccessConnection succeeded
Defender-DeviceProcessEventsanyProcess activity
Defender-DeviceProcessEventsProcessCreatedProcess created
Defender-MessageEventsanyTeams message processed
Defender-MessageUrlInfoanyTeams message URL observed
ESFexecProcess Execution
ESFforkProcess Fork
ESFcreateFile or Directory Create
ESFwriteFile Write
AppLockerEvent ID 8003RuleAndFileData.FilePath was allowed to run but would have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy were enforced.
AppLockerEvent ID 8004FilePathBuffer was prevented from running.
AppLockerEvent ID 8006FilePathBuffer was allowed to run but would have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy were enforced.
AppLockerEvent ID 8007FilePathBuffer was prevented from running.
AppLockerEvent ID 8021PackageBuffer was allowed to run but would have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy were enforced.
AppLockerEvent ID 8022PackageBuffer was prevented from running.
AppLockerEvent ID 8024PackageBuffer was allowed to run but would have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy were enforced.
AppLockerEvent ID 8025PackageBuffer was prevented from running.
AppXDeployment-ServerEvent ID 400Deployment DeploymentOperation operation with target volume MountPoint on Package PackageFullName from: Path finished successfully.
AppXDeployment-ServerEvent ID 603Started deployment DeploymentOperation operation on a package with main parameter Path and Options Flags and FlagsHigh.
AppXDeployment-ServerEvent ID 854Successfully added the following uri(s) to be processed: Path.
AppXDeployment-ServerEvent ID 855Finished resolving action lists.
AppxPackagingOMEvent ID 171The reader was created successfully for app package packageFullName.
PowerShellEvent ID 4103Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData.
PowerShellEvent ID 4104Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal).
Sysmon-for-LinuxEvent ID 1Process Create

Authoring guide

These 329 rules share fields, values, and exclusions.

Fields filtered most (172 distinct)

These fields appear most often in rule filters.

FieldRulesHowSample values
process_basename86eq 69, in 21, starts_with 13, wildcard 9, contains 2, regex_match 2, ends_with 1, ne 1cmd.exe, base64, bash, powershell.exe, cscript.exe
EventType73eq 67, in 8, ne 4exec, start, creation, ProcessRollup2, deletion
event.type58eq 57, ne 2start, creation, deletion, denied, allowed
CommandLine56contains 33, regex_match 12, wildcard 12, in 5, ends_with 3, match 2, eq 1, length_compare 1#, (?i)DavWWWRoot, (?i)PCWDiagnostic|invoke, (?i)cab|diagcab, *@SSL\*
Image54ends_with 30, wildcard 10, starts_with 8, contains 7, in 3, is_not_null 2, regex_match 2, eq 1\excel.exe, \mspub.exe, ?:\Users\*\Downloads\*, \onenote.exe, ?:\ProgramData\*
EventID46eq 42, in 3, regex_match 11, 4688, 4104, malicious_file, 4663
process.args38eq 21, wildcard 19, in 14, starts_with 11, contains 9, ends_with 2, regex_match 1*-*d*, *Base64.decode64*, *b64decode*, -a, -base64
ParentImage36ends_with 17, contains 8, is_not_null 4, eq 3, wildcard 2, in 1, match 1, starts_with 1, \explorer.exe, \, \EQNEDT32.EXE, \EXCEL.EXE
parent_process_basename30eq 27, in 3explorer.exe, 7zFM.exe, cmd.exe, Bandizip.exe, winrar.exe
TargetFilename20wildcard 10, contains 7, ends_with 4, in 1, regex_match 1, starts_with 1.bat, .cmd, .dll, /Users/Shared/*, /dev/shm/*
parent_process_name17regex_match 14, ends_with 1, eq 1, in 1((?i)(powershell\.exe)|(cmd\.exe)|(services\.exe)|(dllhos..., (?i)((WINWORD\.EXE)|(EXCEL\.EXE)|(POWERPNT\.EXE)|(MSACCES..., (?i)(Microsoft..., (?i)(winrar|rar|7z.*|peazip|powerarc|bandizip|zipware|win..., (?i)explorer\.exe
OriginalFileName16eq 14, wildcard 2Cmd.Exe, PowerShell.EXE, powershell_ise.EXE, AutoIt*.exe, popupwrapper.exe
process.args_count16ge 6, eq 5, le 3, gt 1, lt 12, 1, 4, 3, 5
process_name16regex_match 14, in 2(?i)(cmd|(c|w)script|mshta|powershell|pwsh)\.exe, (?i)(powershell(_ise?)|pwsh|cmd|wscript|cscript|regsvr32|..., (?i)C:\x5cUsers\x5c.+\x5cDownloads\x5c.+\.exe, (?i)Temp|Downloads|Appdata, (?i)msdt.exe
file.extension15eq 13, in 2lnk, exe, url, appinstaller, application

Top indicator values (2559 distinct)

These values appear most often in rule predicates.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
event.typeeq
start
481036
event.typeeq
creation
748
EventTypeeq
start
27388
EventTypeeq
exec
26547
process_basenameeq
powershell.exe
20187
process_basenameeq
cmd.exe
19122
process_basenameeq
mshta.exe
1684
process_basenameeq
wscript.exe
1484
process_basenameeq
openssl
1224
process_basenameeq
cscript.exe
1168
process_basenameeq
pwsh.exe
1178
process_basenameeq
rundll32.exe
10123
process_basenameeq
msiexec.exe
945
parent_process_basenameeq
explorer.exe
1550
parent_process_basenameeq
7zFM.exe
712
parent_process_basenameeq
WinRAR.exe
715
EventIDeq
1
12226
EventIDeq
4688
12284
process.argseq
-c
991
process.argseq
-e
842
process.argseq
base64
77
process.argsin
-d
914
process.argsin
-base64
811
process_basenamein
bash
9181
process_basenamein
sh
9180
process_basenamein
zsh
9180
spaneq
10s
99
process_basenamestarts_with
python*
855
Imageends_with
\excel.exe
716
countgt
5
714

Exclusions (975 distinct)

These values appear most often in top-level exclusions.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
process.code_signature.trustedeq
true
9
process_basenameeq
rundll32.exe
7
process_basenameeq
cmd.exe
6
process_basenameeq
powershell.exe
4
Imagewildcard
?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe
5
Imagewildcard
?:\Program Files\*.exe
5
parent_process_basenameeq
zsh
3
parent_process_basenamestarts_with
python*
3
CommandLinecontains
*$CFFIXED_USER_HOME/.zoteroIntegrationPipe*
2
CommandLineeq
/usr/bin/perl /usr/bin/shasum -a 256
2
CurrentDirectorywildcard
/opt/zeek
2
CurrentDirectorywildcard
/proc/self/fd/*/usr/local/zeek
2
CurrentDirectorywildcard
/usr/local/zeek
2
CurrentDirectorywildcard
/usr/local/zeek_old_install
2
CurrentDirectorywildcard
/var/lib/docker/overlay2/*/opt/zeek
2

Rules under this technique

These vendors publish rules tagged with this technique.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 61 rules

Elastic 113 rules

Splunk 96 rules

Kusto 42 rules

YARA-L 5 rules

Panther 12 rules