Rogue Domain Controller T1207

Tactic: Defense Impairment

Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.

Events covered

8 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

These 13 rules share fields, values, and exclusions.

Fields filtered most (19 distinct)

These fields appear most often in rule filters.

FieldRulesHowSample values
EventID5eq 55136, 4742, 5137, 5141, 9212
Channel4eq 4, in 4
eventtype4eq 4
Codename3eq 3DCShadow
MessageType3eq 32
AttributeLDAPDisplayName2eq 2serviceprincipalname
AttributeValue2starts_with 2GC/, e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2/, gc/
ServicePrincipalNames2contains 1, in 1*e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2/*, *gc/*, gc/
short_lived2eq 2true
All_Traffic.app1in 1*drsr*, ad drs, ms-dc-replication
ObjectClass1eq 1domaindns
ObjectDN1contains 1cn=servers,cn=default-first-site-name,cn=sites,cn=configuration
Properties1contains 11131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2, 9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2
SecurityIndicatorName1eq 1Evidence of Mimikatz DCShadow attack
SubjectUserName1ends_with 1$

Top indicator values (35 distinct)

These values appear most often in rule predicates.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
Codenameeq
DCShadow
33
MessageTypeeq
2
321
AttributeLDAPDisplayNameeq
serviceprincipalname
29
EventIDeq
5136
245
EventIDeq
4742
16
EventIDeq
5137
114
EventIDeq
5141
14
EventIDeq
9212
15
short_livedeq
true
24
All_Traffic.appin
*drsr*
1
All_Traffic.appin
ad drs
1
All_Traffic.appin
ms-dc-replication
1
AttributeValuestarts_with
GC/
12
AttributeValuestarts_with
e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2/
1
AttributeValuestarts_with
gc/
1
ObjectClasseq
domaindns
14
ObjectDNcontains
cn=servers,cn=default-first-site-name,cn=sites,cn=configuration
1
Propertiescontains
1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
1
Propertiescontains
9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2
13
SecurityIndicatorNameeq
Evidence of Mimikatz DCShadow attack
1
ServicePrincipalNamescontains
gc/
12
ServicePrincipalNamesin
*e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2/*
1
ServicePrincipalNamesin
*gc/*
1
SubjectUserNameends_with
$
15
aceControlAccessRightseq
1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
1
aceControlAccessRightseq
1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
1
aceControlAccessRightseq
9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2
1
aceControlAccessRightseq
add/remove replica in domain
1
aceControlAccessRightseq
manage replication topology
1
aceControlAccessRightseq
replication synchronization
1

Exclusions (2 distinct)

These values appear most often in top-level exclusions.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
SubjectUserNameends_with
$
1
new_aceeq
old_values
1

Rules under this technique

These vendors publish rules tagged with this technique.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 3 rules

Splunk 6 rules

Kusto 4 rules