Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks T1497.001

Tactics: Stealth, Discovery

Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Events covered

4 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 8 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (14 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine5contains 3, match 2, wildcard 1(?i)whoami|systeminfo|ipconfig|arp|nltest|dclist|domain_t..., *csrutil*status*, enabled, hw., kern.
event.type3eq 3start
process_name3match 2, in 1(?i)(whoami|systeminfo|ipconfig|arp|nltest|tasklist|net1?..., egrep, grep
EventID2eq 21, 4688
EventType2eq 1, in 1exec, ProcessRollup2, exec_event
Image2ends_with 2/sysctl, /system_profiler
dc_process2gt 23
dc_process_name2gt 21
host.os.type2eq 2
process.args2in 1, starts_with 1/proc/ide/hd0/model, /proc/scsi/scsi, /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version, Manufacturer, parallels
ParentImage1ne 1, wildcard 1/*.app/*, /applications/*.app/*, /library/application...
ScriptBlockText1contains 1get-wmiobject, gwmi, msacpi_thermalzonetemperature
Type1eq 1
user.id1ne 10

Top indicator values (46 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
event.typeeq
start
3606
CommandLinematch
(?i)whoami|systeminfo|ipconfig|arp|nltest|dclist|domain_trusts|tasklist|quser...
22
dc_processgt
3
24
dc_process_namegt
1
22
process_namematch
(?i)(whoami|systeminfo|ipconfig|arp|nltest|tasklist|net1?|quser|tasklist|nets...
22
CommandLinecontains
enabled
12
CommandLinecontains
hw.
1
CommandLinecontains
kern.
1
CommandLinecontains
machdep.
1
CommandLinecontains
spapplicationsdatatype
1
CommandLinecontains
sphardwaredatatype
1
CommandLinecontains
spnetworkdatatype
1
CommandLinecontains
spusbdatatype
1
CommandLinecontains
sysctl
1
CommandLinecontains
system_profiler
1
CommandLinewildcard
*csrutil*status*
1
EventIDeq
1
1237
EventIDeq
4688
1313
EventTypeeq
exec
1171
EventTypein
ProcessRollup2
1117
EventTypein
exec
1171
EventTypein
exec_event
1139
EventTypein
process_started
174
EventTypein
start
1134
Imageends_with
/sysctl
1
Imageends_with
/system_profiler
1
ParentImagene
/library/application support/mosyle/mosylemdm.app/contents/macos/mosylemdm
1
ParentImagewildcard
/*.app/*
1
ParentImagewildcard
/applications/*.app/*
1
ParentImagewildcard
/volumes/*.app/*
1

Exclusions (15 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
CommandLinematch
(?i)\x5cSplunkUniversalForwarder\x5c(etc|bin)\x5c
2
usermatch
\$$
2
CurrentDirectoryeq
/home/qualys
1
ParentImagein
/applications/docker.app/contents/macos/docker
1
ParentImagein
/opt/emby-server/system/embyserver
1
ParentImagein
/usr/libexec/kcare/virt-what
1
ParentImagein
/usr/libexec/valgrind/memcheck-amd64-linux
1
ParentImagein
/usr/sara/sbin/sys2ganglia
1
ParentImagein
/usr/sara/sbin/sys2prometheus
1
ParentImagein
/var/lib/cfengine3/modules/init_node
1
parent_processmatch
(?i)\x5cSplunkUniversalForwarder\x5c(etc|bin)\x5c
1
parent_process_namein
LinkManager.exe
1
parent_process_namein
saposcol
1
parent_process_namein
svc_snow_discovery
1
usereq
root
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 3 rules

Elastic 3 rules

Splunk 2 rules