Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery T1518.001

Tactic: Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Events covered

6 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 19 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (17 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine13contains 6, match 3, regex_match 3, ends_with 1(?i)\s+AntiVirusProduct\s+, (?i)\w+(\.exe)?\x22?\s+(avira|cb|cylance|defender|kaspers..., auditbeat, 385201, avira
EventID6eq 64688, 4103, 4104, 1
Image6ends_with 5, eq 1/csrutil, \find.exe, \findstr.exe, /egrep, /grep
process_name5eq 2, match 2, in 1(?i)\x5cwindows\x5csystem32\x5cfindstr\.exe|\x5cwindows\x..., pgrep, egrep, grep, htop
OriginalFileName3eq 3find.exe, findstr.exe, wmic.exe
event.type3eq 3start
ScriptBlockText2contains 1, eq 1, in 1, match 1.getgporeport(), ::getipglobalproperties(), ::getprocesses, \*avira\*, \*carbonblack\*
Type2eq 2
event.category2eq 2process
process.args2eq 1, wildcard 1/namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2, 360Sec*, Avast*, Avira*, Get
ContextInfo1contains 1get-netfirewallrule, show-netfirewallrule
EfectiveCommand1regex_match 1regexEmpire
EventData1contains 1-encodedcommand, powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe
EventType1in 1exec, exec_event
Payload1contains 1get-netfirewallrule, show-netfirewallrule

Top indicator values (251 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
CommandLinematch
(?i)\w+(\.exe)?\x22?\s+(avira|cb|cylance|defender|kaspersky|kes|mc|sec|sentin...
33
CommandLineregex_match
(?i)\s+AntiVirusProduct\s+
33
EventIDeq
4688
3313
EventIDeq
4103
2105
EventIDeq
4104
2268
event.typeeq
start
3606
CommandLinecontains
auditbeat
23
CommandLinecontains
falcond
22
CommandLinecontains
filebeat
23
CommandLinecontains
nessusd
22
CommandLinecontains
osqueryd
22
CommandLinecontains
packetbeat
23
CommandLinecontains
td-agent
23
CommandLinecontains
385201
1
CommandLinecontains
-encodedcommand
13
CommandLinecontains
blockblock
1
CommandLinecontains
cbagentd
1
CommandLinecontains
cbdefense
1
CommandLinecontains
disable
113
CommandLinecontains
little
1
CommandLinecontains
lulu
1
CommandLinecontains
santad
1
CommandLinecontains
snitch
1
Imageends_with
/csrutil
22
Imageends_with
\find.exe
28
Imageends_with
\findstr.exe
212
OriginalFileNameeq
find.exe
27
OriginalFileNameeq
findstr.exe
212
event.categoryeq
process
2128
process_namematch
(?i)\x5cwindows\x5csystem32\x5cfindstr\.exe|\x5cwindows\x5csyswow64\x5cfind\.exe
22

Exclusions (34 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
CommandLineeq
grep --color=auto ESET Command-line scanner, version %s -A2
1
CommandLineeq
grep -i McAfee Web Gateway Core version:
1
CommandLineeq
grep ESET Command-line scanner, version %s -A2
1
EventDatacontains
gc_service.exe
1
EventDatacontains
gc_worker.exe
1
ParentCommandLinewildcard
bash -c perl -pe 's/[^ -~]/\n/g' < /opt/eset/esets/sbin/esets_scan | grep...
1
ParentCommandLinewildcard
sh -c printf "command_start_%s"*; perl -pe 's/[^ -~]/\n/g' <...
1
ParentImagecontains
gc_service.exe
1
ParentImagecontains
gc_worker.exe
1
ParentImageeq
/usr/bin/check_mk_agent
1
ParentImageeq
/usr/bin/pmlogctl
1
ParentImageeq
/usr/libexec/pcp/bin/pmlogger_check
1
ParentImageeq
/usr/libexec/pcp/bin/pmlogger_daily
1
ParentImagestarts_with
/opt/gitlab/
1
ParentImagewildcard
/library/application support/*
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 8 rules

Elastic 4 rules

Splunk 6 rules

Kusto 1 rule