Steal Application Access Token T1528

Tactic: Credential Access

Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.

Events covered

7 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 73 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (154 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
data_stream.dataset19eq 17, in 2azure.signinlogs, o365.audit, azure.auditlogs, google_workspace.login, azure.activitylogs
EventType13eq 8, in 4, starts_with 1exec, UserLoggedIn, exec_event, executed, Add registered users to device.
sourcetype8eq 8azure:monitor:aad, o365:management:activity, o365:graph:api
event.outcome7eq 6, in 1success, Success
OperationName5eq 5, contains 1Add OAuth2PermissionGrant, Add delegated permission grant, Add service principal, Remove service principal, Update device
event.category5eq 5authentication, process
event.type5eq 5start, access, change
host.os.type5eq 4, in 1
CommandLine4contains 3, is_not_null 1, regex_match 1 "eyj0ex", "eyjhbg", 'eyj0ex', .*(config-helper\s.*--format|auth\s+print-access-token|au..., /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
azure_ad::app_id4eq 2, in 200b41c95-dab0-4487-9791-b9d2c32c80f2, 04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46, 0ec893e0-5785-4de6-99da-4ed124e5296c, 29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e
azure_ad::user_type4eq 4Member
displayName4eq 4, is_not_null 3AppAddress, ConsentAction.Permissions, CloudDisplayName, Included Updated Properties, IsCompliant
process.args4eq 2, in 2, ends_with 1, starts_with 1, wildcard 1*/.aws/cli/cache/*.json, */.aws/sso/cache/*.json, *confluence/conf/server.xml ..., --as, --as-group
process_name4eq 2, contains 1, in 1, starts_with 1., \microsoft\teams\current\teams.exe, awk, base64, bash
type4eq 4ServicePrincipal, Device

Top indicator values (525 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
data_stream.dataseteq
azure.signinlogs
830
data_stream.dataseteq
o365.audit
445
event.outcomeeq
success
6251
azure_ad::user_typeeq
Member
410
sourcetypeeq
azure:monitor:aad
447
sourcetypeeq
o365:management:activity
380
Categoryeq
ApplicationManagement
312
EventTypein
exec
3171
GrantConsentTypene
AllPrincipals
33
Operationeq
Consent to application.
34
OperationNameeq
Add OAuth2PermissionGrant
33
OperationNameeq
Add delegated permission grant
33
OperationNameeq
Add service principal
33
OperationNameeq
Consent to application
35
Workloadeq
AzureActiveDirectory
331
azure_ad::logged_by_serviceeq
Core Directory
39
azure_ad::modified_properties_newcontains
addresstype
33
azure_ad::modified_properties_newgt
0
35
displayNameeq
AppAddress
35
displayNameeq
ConsentAction.Permissions
35
event.categoryeq
authentication
331
event.typeeq
start
3606
typeeq
ServicePrincipal
37
ConsentFullcontains
files.read
22
ConsentFullcontains
files.read.all
22
ConsentFullcontains
mail.read
22
ConsentFullcontains
mail.send
22
ConsentFullcontains
offline_access
22
ConsentFullcontains
user.read
22
EVENT_TYPEin
ApiConnectedApp
22

Exclusions (86 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
AppIdin
cb1056e2-e479-49de-ae31-7812af012ed8
1
AppIdin
cf6d7e68-f018-4e0a-a7b3-126e053fb88d
1
CommandLinecontains
/bin/test
1
CommandLineeq
/usr/bin/coreutils --coreutils-prog-shebang=cat /usr/bin/cat...
1
CurrentDirectoryeq
/opt/cni/bin
1
CurrentDirectorystarts_with
/home/runner/_work/
1
CurrentDirectorywildcard
/opt/cni/bin
1
CurrentDirectorywildcard
/run/containerd/io.containerd.runtime.v2.task/k8s.io/*/opt/cni/bin
1
Imageends_with
\browsercore.exe
1
Imageends_with
\microsoft\teams\current\teams.exe
1
ParentCommandLineeq
runc init
1
ParentCommandLineeq
sh /install-cni.sh
1
ResultTypeeq
0
1
aws::userAgenteq
Windows-AzureAD-Authentication-Provider/1.0
1
azure.signinlogs.properties.client_app_usedeq
Browser
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 15 rules

Elastic 25 rules

Splunk 8 rules

Kusto 14 rules

Panther 11 rules