Event Triggered Execution: Change Default File Association T1546.001

Tactics: Privilege Escalation, Persistence

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

Events covered

5 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 7 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (8 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine4contains 4, in 1 add , * sp *, *HKCR\\*, .exe=exefile, \ms-settings\shell\open\command
OriginalFileName4eq 4cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.dll, powershell_ise.exe, reg.exe
Image3ends_with 3\cmd.exe, \powershell.exe, \pwsh.exe, \reg.exe
Details2contains 2, eq 1%appdata%, %localappdata%, %temp%, (Empty), \software\classes\{
TargetObject2contains 1, ends_with 1\shell\open\command\, classes\exefile\shell\open\command\(default), classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default), classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\delegateexecute
EventType1eq 1SetValue
process_name1eq 1powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe, pwsh.exe
registry_path1contains 1, in 1*HKCR\\*, *HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\*, \\shell\\open\\command\\

Top indicator values (56 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
Imageends_with
\cmd.exe
2130
OriginalFileNameeq
cmd.exe
265
OriginalFileNameeq
powershell.exe
2120
OriginalFileNameeq
pwsh.dll
2112
OriginalFileNameeq
reg.exe
242
CommandLinecontains
add
114
CommandLinecontains
.exe=exefile
1
CommandLinecontains
\\shell\\open\\command
1
CommandLinecontains
\ms-settings\shell\open\command
1
CommandLinecontains
add
134
CommandLinecontains
assoc
1
CommandLinecontains
assoc
1
CommandLinecontains
exefile
1
CommandLinecontains
new-itemproperty
17
CommandLinecontains
ni
12
CommandLinecontains
notepad.exe
1
CommandLinecontains
set-itemproperty
17
CommandLinecontains
sp
12
CommandLinein
* sp *
1
CommandLinein
*HKCR\\*
1
CommandLinein
*HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\*
1
CommandLinein
*New-ItemProperty*
1
CommandLinein
*Set-ItemProperty*
1
Detailscontains
%appdata%
14
Detailscontains
%localappdata%
1
Detailscontains
%temp%
15
Detailscontains
%tmp%
15
Detailscontains
\$recycle.bin\
1
Detailscontains
\appdata\local\temp\
18
Detailscontains
\contacts\
14

Exclusions (4 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
CommandLinecontains
.exe=exefile
1
CommandLinein
*\\Applications\\notepad.exe\\*
1
CommandLinein
*\\WindowsApps\\Microsoft.WindowsNotepad*
1
Detailseq
(Empty)
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 5 rules

Splunk 2 rules