Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider T1547.005

Tactics: Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.

Events covered

6 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 7 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (14 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine2contains 2, in 1 query , *LsaCfgFlags*, *RunAsPPL*, -encodedcommand
Image2eq 2, is_null 1?:\windows\system32\lsass.exe, c:\windows\system32\msiexec.exe, c:\windows\syswow64\msiexec.exe
TargetObject2ends_with 1, wildcard 1*\system\*controlset*\control\lsa\osconfig\security packages, *\system\*controlset*\control\lsa\security packages, \control\lsa\osconfig\security packages, \control\lsa\security packages
process_name2eq 2lsass.exe, reg.exe
EfectiveCommand1regex_match 1regexEmpire
EventData1contains 1-encodedcommand, powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe
EventID1eq 14688
EventType1eq 1load
OriginalFileName1eq 1reg.exe
ScriptBlockText1in 1add-constraineddelegationbackdoor, add-domaingroupmember, add-domainobjectacl
event.category1eq 1process
event.type1eq 1change
file.name1eq 1mimilsa.log
registry_value_name1eq 1Security Packages

Top indicator values (375 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
CommandLinecontains
query
14
CommandLinecontains
-encodedcommand
13
CommandLinecontains
\\system\\currentcontrolset\\control\\lsa
1
CommandLinein
*LsaCfgFlags*
1
CommandLinein
*RunAsPPL*
1
EfectiveCommandregex_match
regexEmpire
1
EventDatacontains
-encodedcommand
1
EventDatacontains
powershell.exe
1
EventDatacontains
powershell_ise.exe
1
EventDatacontains
pwsh.exe
1
EventIDeq
4688
1313
EventTypeeq
load
19
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\lsass.exe
12
Imageeq
c:\windows\system32\msiexec.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\syswow64\msiexec.exe
1
OriginalFileNameeq
reg.exe
142
ScriptBlockTextin
add-constraineddelegationbackdoor
1
ScriptBlockTextin
add-domaingroupmember
1
ScriptBlockTextin
add-domainobjectacl
1
ScriptBlockTextin
add-exfiltration
1
ScriptBlockTextin
add-netuser
1
ScriptBlockTextin
add-persistence
1
ScriptBlockTextin
add-regbackdoor
1
ScriptBlockTextin
add-remoteconnection
1
ScriptBlockTextin
add-scrnsavebackdoor
1
ScriptBlockTextin
add-servicedacl
1
ScriptBlockTextin
add-win32type
12
ScriptBlockTextin
convert-adname
1
ScriptBlockTextin
convert-ldapproperty
1
ScriptBlockTextin
convertfrom-ldaplogonhours
1

Exclusions (96 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
EventDatacontains
gc_service.exe
1
EventDatacontains
gc_worker.exe
1
Hasheseq
0f77a3826d7a5cd0533990be0269d951a88a5c277bc47cff94553330b715ec61
1
Hasheseq
1181542d9cfd63fb00c76242567446513e6773ea37db6211545629ba2ecf26a1
1
Hasheseq
26be2e4383728eebe191c0ab19706188f0e9592add2e0bf86b37442083ae5e12
1
Hasheseq
4aca034d3d85a9e9127b5d7a10882c2ef4c3e0daa3329ae2ac1d0797398695fb
1
Hasheseq
4af1fee3369d9a993a84f54eafb72a661633c33e9e12fb3dd151a6a2cddbd404
1
Hasheseq
811a03a5d7c03802676d2613d741be690b3461022ea925eb6b2651a5be740a4c
1
Hasheseq
86031e69914d9d33c34c2f4ac4ae523cef855254d411f88ac26684265c981d95
1
Hasheseq
9367e78b84ef30cf38ab27776605f2645e52e3f6e93369c674972b668a444faa
1
Hasheseq
d46cc934765c5ecd53867070f540e8d6f7701e834831c51c2b0552aba871921b
1
Hasheseq
ed6e735aa6233ed262f50f67585949712f1622751035db256811b4088c214ce3
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\system32\msiexec.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\syswow64\msiexec.exe
1
Imagewildcard
\device\harddiskvolume*\windows\system32\msiexec.exe
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 1 rule

Elastic 4 rules

Splunk 1 rule

Kusto 1 rule