Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager T1555.004
Tactic: Credential Access
Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).
Events covered
10 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Sysmon | Event ID 7 | Image loaded |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4662 | An operation was performed on an object. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5145 | A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5382 | Vault credentials were read. |
| Defender-DeviceEvents | any | Defender event (any) |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4103 | Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData. |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
| PowerShell | Event ID 800 | Event ID 800 |
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 15 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (33 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (90 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.
Exclusions (5 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 6 rules
- Credentials (protected by DPAPI) dump via network share
- Suspicious Active Directory DPAPI attributes accessed (Mimikatz, DCSync, RiskySPN)
- Suspicious Key Manager Access
- Vault credentials manager accessed
- Vault credentials manager accessed
- Windows Credential Manager Access via VaultCmd
Elastic 4 rules
- Multiple Vault Web Credentials Read
- Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility
- Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script
- Searching for Saved Credentials via VaultCmd
Splunk 1 rule
Kusto 4 rules
- Detect Suspicious ncrypt.dll usage by CLI tool or unknown process
- Detect Suspicious ncrypt.dll usage by process requesting Entra ID Nonce
- Detect Suspicious ncrypt.dll usage on admin device with RDP connections to non TPM protected device
- Detect Suspicious ncrypt.dll usage with RDP connections to unmanaged or non TPM protected device