Credentials from Password Stores T1555
Tactic: Credential Access
Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.
Events covered
19 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Sysmon | Event ID 7 | Image loaded |
| Sysmon | Event ID 8 | CreateRemoteThread |
| Sysmon | Event ID 11 | FileCreate |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4656 | A handle to an object was requested. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4662 | An operation was performed on an object. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4663 | An attempt was made to access an object. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5145 | A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5382 | Vault credentials were read. |
| Defender-DeviceEvents | any | Defender event (any) |
| Defender-DeviceProcessEvents | ProcessCreated | Process created |
| ESF | exec | Process Execution (Notify) |
| ESF | open | File Open (NOTIFY) |
| ESF | create | File or Directory Create (NOTIFY) |
| ESF | write | File Write (NOTIFY) |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4103 | Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData. |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
| PowerShell | Event ID 800 | Event ID 800 |
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 98 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (113 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (662 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.
Exclusions (66 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 28 rules
- Access To Browser Credential Files By Uncommon Applications - Security
- Access to Browser Login Data
- Azure Active Directory Connect credentials dump via network share
- Credentials (protected by DPAPI) dump via network share
- Credentials from Password Stores - Keychain
- DPAPI Backup Keys And Certificate Export Activity IOC
- Dump Credentials from Windows Credential Manager With PowerShell
- EC2 Password Data Retrieved
- Enumerate Credentials from Windows Credential Manager With PowerShell
- HackTool - SecurityXploded Execution
- HackTool - WinPwn Execution
- HackTool - WinPwn Execution - ScriptBlock
- macOS Authentication Events
- macOS Suspicious Keychain Access
- Potential Browser Data Stealing
- PUA - AWS TruffleHog Execution
- PUA - WebBrowserPassView Execution
- Remote Thread Created In KeePass.EXE
- SQLite Chromium Profile Data DB Access
- Suspicious Active Directory DPAPI attributes accessed (Mimikatz, DCSync, RiskySPN)
- Suspicious Key Manager Access
- Suspicious Serv-U Process Pattern
- User application credentials dump via network share (DonPapi, Lazagne)
- User browser credentials dump via network share (DonPapi, Lazagne)
- User files dump via network share (DonPapi, Lazagne)
- Vault credentials manager accessed
- Vault credentials manager accessed
- Windows Credential Manager Access via VaultCmd
Elastic 27 rules
- AWS Lateral Movement from Kubernetes SA via AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
- AWS Secrets Manager Rapid Secrets Retrieval
- AWS Systems Manager SecureString Parameter Request with Decryption Flag
- Azure Key Vault Excessive Secret or Key Retrieved
- Azure Key Vault Unusual Secret Key Usage
- Azure Storage Account Keys Accessed by Privileged User
- Browser Process Spawned from an Unusual Parent
- Creation or Modification of Domain Backup DPAPI private key
- Credential Access via TruffleHog Execution
- Dumping of Keychain Content via Security Command
- First Time Python Accessed Sensitive Credential Files
- First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager
- GenAI Process Accessing Sensitive Files
- Keychain CommandLine Interaction via Unsigned or Untrusted Process
- Keychain Password Retrieval via Command Line
- Multiple Cloud Secrets Accessed by Source Address
- Multiple Vault Web Credentials Read
- Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility
- Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script
- Potential Secret Scanning via Gitleaks
- Potential Veeam Credential Access Command
- PowerShell Script with Veeam Credential Access Capabilities
- Searching for Saved Credentials via VaultCmd
- Suspicious Web Browser Sensitive File Access
- SystemKey Access via Command Line
- Veeam Backup Library Loaded by Unusual Process
- Wireless Credential Dumping using Netsh Command
Splunk 16 rules
- Browser Credential File Accessed - Windows (Windows Event Log)
- Linux Auditd Find Credentials From Password Managers
- Linux Auditd Find Credentials From Password Stores
- MacOS Keychains Dumped
- MCP Postgres Suspicious Query
- Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir
- Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir
- Possible Browser Pass View Parameter
- Stored Credentials from Web Browsers - Windows (PowerShell)
- Windows Credentials Access via VaultCli Module
- Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Copied in TEMP Dir
- Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation
- Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion
- Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query
- Windows Credentials from Web Browsers Saved in TEMP Folder
- Windows Password Managers Discovery
Kusto 14 rules
- API - Password Cracking
- Azure secure score PW age policy new
- Credential added after admin consented to Application
- Detect Suspicious ncrypt.dll usage by CLI tool or unknown process
- Detect Suspicious ncrypt.dll usage by process requesting Entra ID Nonce
- Detect Suspicious ncrypt.dll usage on admin device with RDP connections to non TPM protected device
- Detect Suspicious ncrypt.dll usage with RDP connections to unmanaged or non TPM protected device
- Highly Sensitive Password Accessed
- Modified domain federation trust settings
- NRT Modified domain federation trust settings
- Powershell Empire Cmdlets Executed in Command Line
- PRT Credential Stealing
- Sentinel One - User viewed agent's passphrase
- Trust Monitor Event
YARA-L 4 rules
- AWS API Gateway Keys Accessed
- AWS EC2 Get Windows Admin Password
- GCP Service API Key Retrieved
- Recon Credential Theft CISA Report
Panther 9 rules
- AWS Decrypt SSM Parameters
- AWS EC2 Many Password Read Attempts
- Azure Key Vault Certificate Accessed
- Azure Key Vault Key Accessed or Recovered
- Azure Key Vault Secret Accessed or Recovered
- Databricks Repeated Access to Secrets
- Okta SWA Bulk Access, New Source, and Credential Extraction - Behavioral
- Okta SWA Off-Hours Credential Access - Behavioral
- Unusual 1Password Client Detected