Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility T1560.001
Tactic: Collection
Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.
Events covered
6 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Sysmon | Event ID 11 | FileCreate |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
| ESF | exec | Process Execution (Notify) |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
| Sysmon-for-Linux | Event ID 1 | Process Create |
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 35 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (28 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (408 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.
Exclusions (50 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 18 rules
- 7Zip Compressing Dump Files
- APT31 Judgement Panda Activity
- Cisco Stage Data
- Compress Data and Lock With Password for Exfiltration With 7-ZIP
- Compress Data and Lock With Password for Exfiltration With WINZIP
- Compressed File Creation Via Tar.EXE
- Compressed File Extraction Via Tar.EXE
- Data Compressed
- Disk Image Mounting Via Hdiutil - MacOS
- Files Added To An Archive Using Rar.EXE
- LiteLLM / TeamPCP Supply Chain Attack Indicators
- macOS Data Compression Tools
- Password Protected Compressed File Extraction Via 7Zip
- Potentially Suspicious Compression Tool Parameters
- Rar Usage with Password and Compression Level
- Suspicious Manipulation Of Default Accounts Via Net.EXE
- Winrar Compressing Dump Files
- WinRAR Execution in Non-Standard Folder
Elastic 7 rules
- Encrypting Files with WinRar or 7z
- File Compressed or Archived into Common Format by Unsigned Process
- GenAI Process Performing Encoding/Chunking Prior to Network Activity
- PowerShell Script with Archive Compression Capabilities
- Sensitive File Compression Detected via Defend for Containers
- Sensitive Files Compression
- Sensitive Files Compression Inside A Container
Splunk 8 rules
- 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path
- Anomalous usage of 7zip
- Detect Renamed 7-Zip
- Detect Renamed WinRAR
- IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation
- Utility Archive Data (PowerShell)
- Utility Archive Data (Windows Event Log)
- Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar