Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging T1562.002

Tactic: Stealth

Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more. This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.

Events covered

8 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 12 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (17 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
event.type4eq 4start, change
OriginalFileName3eq 3, in 2powershell.exe, appcmd.exe, auditpol.exe, logman.exe, powershell_ise.exe
process.args3eq 2, starts_with 1, wildcard 1/dontLog*:*True, /e:false, /success:disable, Clear-EventLog, Disabled
process_name3eq 3powershell.exe, appcmd.exe, auditpol.exe, logman.exe, powershell_ise.exe
CommandLine2contains 2/e:false, /ms:, clear, disable
Image2ends_with 2\auditpol.exe, \wevtutil.exe
action_id2eq 2AL, DR
class_type2eq 2A, DA, SA
statement2contains 2state = off
AuditPolicyChanges1contains 1%%8448, %%8450
AuditPolicyChangesDescription1eq 1, in 1Success Added, Success removed
Details1eq 10, 0x00000000
EventId1eq 159207
PropertyName1eq 1AuditFilter
SubCategory1in 1Audit Policy Change, Logon, Other System Events

Top indicator values (57 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
event.typeeq
start
3606
OriginalFileNamein
powershell.exe
217
OriginalFileNamein
powershell_ise.exe
29
OriginalFileNamein
pwsh.dll
210
action_ideq
AL
22
action_ideq
DR
22
process_nameeq
powershell.exe
2104
process_nameeq
powershell_ise.exe
250
process_nameeq
pwsh.exe
262
statementcontains
state = off
22
AuditPolicyChangescontains
%%8448
13
AuditPolicyChangescontains
%%8450
13
AuditPolicyChangesDescriptioneq
Success removed
1
AuditPolicyChangesDescriptionin
Success Added
1
AuditPolicyChangesDescriptionin
Success removed
1
CommandLinecontains
/e:false
12
CommandLinecontains
/ms:
1
CommandLinecontains
clear
14
CommandLinecontains
disable
113
Detailseq
0
112
Detailseq
0x00000000
143
EventIdeq
59207
1
Imageends_with
\auditpol.exe
13
Imageends_with
\wevtutil.exe
19
OriginalFileNameeq
appcmd.exe
17
OriginalFileNameeq
auditpol.exe
110
OriginalFileNameeq
logman.exe
12
OriginalFileNameeq
wevtutil.exe
17
PropertyNameeq
AuditFilter
1
SubCategoryin
Audit Policy Change
1

Exclusions (13 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
Esql.winlog_AuditPolicyChangesDescription_valuescontains
success added
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files (x86)\n-able...
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\trend micro\cloud endpoint\cloudendpointservice.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\deviceenroller.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\omadmclient.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\svchost.exe
1
Imagewildcard
\device\harddiskvolume*\program files (x86)\n-able...
1
Imagewildcard
\device\harddiskvolume*\program files\trend micro\cloud...
1
Imagewildcard
\device\harddiskvolume*\windows\system32\deviceenroller.exe
1
Imagewildcard
\device\harddiskvolume*\windows\system32\omadmclient.exe
1
Imagewildcard
\device\harddiskvolume*\windows\system32\svchost.exe
1
SubjectUserNameends_with
$
1
parent_process_nameeq
iissetup.exe
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 6 rules

Elastic 5 rules

Kusto 1 rule