Impair Defenses T1562

Tactic: Stealth

Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.

Events covered

37 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation
SysmonEvent ID 3Network connection
SysmonEvent ID 5Process terminated
SysmonEvent ID 12RegistryEvent (Object create and delete)
SysmonEvent ID 13RegistryEvent (Value Set)
SysmonEvent ID 14RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename)
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4624An account was successfully logged on.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4656A handle to an object was requested.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4657A registry value was modified.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4660An object was deleted.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4663An attempt was made to access an object.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4670Permissions on an object were changed.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4688A new process has been created.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4689A process has exited.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4719System audit policy was changed.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4738A user account was changed.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4950A Windows Firewall setting has changed.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5123A configuration entry changed in the OCSP Responder Service.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5152The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a packet.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5157The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a connection.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5447A Windows Filtering Platform filter has been changed.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5448A Windows Filtering Platform provider has been changed.
Defender-DeviceProcessEventsanyProcess activity (any)
Defender-DeviceRegistryEventsRegistryKeyDeletedRegistry key deleted
Defender-DeviceRegistryEventsRegistryValueSetRegistry value set
Defender-DeviceRegistryEventsRegistryValueDeletedRegistry value deleted
Defender-DeviceRegistryEventsRegistryKeyRenamedRegistry key renamed
ESFexecProcess Execution (Notify)
MSSQLSERVEREvent ID 33205Event ID 33205
PowerShellEvent ID 4103Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData.
PowerShellEvent ID 4104Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal).
Windows-DefenderEvent ID 3002ProductName Real-Time Protection feature has encountered an error and failed.
Windows-DefenderEvent ID 5007Product Name Configuration has changed.
Windows-Firewall-With-Advanced-SecurityEvent ID 2003A Windows Defender Firewall setting in the Profiles profile has changed.
Windows-Firewall-With-Advanced-SecurityEvent ID 2004A rule has been added to the Windows Defender Firewall exception list.
Windows-Firewall-With-Advanced-SecurityEvent ID 2005A rule has been modified in the Windows Defender Firewall exception list.
PowerShellEvent ID 800Event ID 800

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 468 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (306 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
EventType107eq 60, in 33, wildcard 11, ne 5, ends_with 3exec, ProcessRollup2, exec_event, deletion, CHANGE_APPLICATION_SETTING
data_stream.dataset80eq 80aws.cloudtrail, o365.audit, gcp.audit, okta.system, azure.activitylogs
event.outcome60eq 53, in 7success, Success
EventID55eq 52, regex_match 3, in 14688, 4104, 1, 4103, 4656
event.type50eq 44, in 5, ne 1start, change, process_started, deletion, creation
aws::eventName47eq 28, in 21DeleteTrail, AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress, AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress, CreateNetworkAclEntry, DeleteFlowLogs
Provider_Name45eq 41, in 4Exchange, ec2.amazonaws.com, cloudtrail.amazonaws.com, bedrock.amazonaws.com, MicrosoftTeams
process_name39eq 28, in 7, match 3, starts_with 2, is_not_null 1, regex_match 1, wildcard 1chkconfig, powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe, pwsh.exe, (?i)cmd|powershell|netsh|net1?|sc.exe|reg.exe
process.args29eq 19, in 7, wildcard 5, contains 3, starts_with 3disable, -c, advfirewall, firewall, *.EndpointSecurity
host.os.type27eq 26, in 1
event.category25eq 22, in 3web, process, iam, BACKUP_AND_RESTORE, configuration
aws::eventSource24eq 21, in 1, ne 1, wildcard 1cloudtrail.amazonaws.com, s3.amazonaws.com, rds.amazonaws.com, bedrock.amazonaws.com, apigateway.amazonaws.com
CommandLine22contains 21, starts_with 2, regex_match 1advfirewall, firewall, -enc, a, d
DataSource20eq 20ABAP_CHANGES, CHANGEDOC_GENERIC, CHANGEDOC_SECURITY_P, CHANGEDOC_USOBT_C, CHANGEDOC_USOBX_C
Details20eq 14, contains 4, in 2, is_not_null 20x00000000, 0x00000001, 0, 1, 0x00000004

Top indicator values (2027 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
event.outcomeeq
success
53251
data_stream.dataseteq
aws.cloudtrail
31141
data_stream.dataseteq
o365.audit
1345
data_stream.dataseteq
gcp.audit
1123
data_stream.dataseteq
okta.system
948
data_stream.dataseteq
azure.activitylogs
834
event.typeeq
start
28606
event.typeeq
change
1577
security_result.actioneq
ALLOW
17102
data.typeeq
sapi
1418
EventTypein
exec
13171
EventTypein
ProcessRollup2
12117
EventTypein
exec_event
12139
EventTypein
start
12134
EventTypein
executed
788
EventTypein
process_started
774
resultTypein
Succeeded
1251
resultTypein
Success
1251
event.categoryeq
web
1120
Provider_Nameeq
Exchange
1019
Provider_Nameeq
ec2.amazonaws.com
619
EventIDeq
4688
9313
EventIDeq
4104
6268
aws::eventSourceeq
s3.amazonaws.com
717
event.outcomein
Success
737
event.outcomein
success
738
statuseq
SUCCESS
716
Detailseq
0
612
Detailseq
0x00000000
643
Detailseq
1
613

Exclusions (225 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
user.ideq
S-1-5-18
4
aws::errorCodeeq
AccessDenied
3
aws::userAgenteq
AWS Internal
3
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\deviceenroller.exe
2
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\omadmclient.exe
2
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\svchost.exe
2
Imagewildcard
\device\harddiskvolume*\windows\system32\deviceenroller.exe
2
Imagewildcard
\device\harddiskvolume*\windows\system32\svchost.exe
2
data.details.response.body.shields{}eq
block
2
responseStatus.codege
1
2
responseStatus.codege
400
2
responseStatus.codele
16
2
usernamein
aksService
2
usernamein
masterclient
2
usernamestarts_with
system:
2

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 55 rules

Elastic 145 rules

Splunk 25 rules

Kusto 103 rules

YARA-L 36 rules

Panther 104 rules