Dynamic Resolution T1568
Tactic: Command & Control
Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.
Events covered
10 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 34 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (60 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (409 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.
Exclusions (104 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 6 rules
- Axios NPM Compromise Malicious C2 Domain DNS Query
- Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service - Linux
- Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated
- DNS Resolution Failure Spike
- Download from Suspicious Dyndns Hosts
- macOS DNS Query Tools for C2
Elastic 10 rules
- Cobalt Strike Command and Control Beacon
- Connection to Commonly Abused Web Services
- DNS to Commonly Abused Web Services
- Halfbaked Command and Control Beacon
- Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request Predicted to be a DGA Domain
- Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request With a High DGA Probability Score
- Machine Learning Detected DGA activity using a known SUNBURST DNS domain
- Possible FIN7 DGA Command and Control Behavior
- Potential DGA Activity
- Unusual DNS Activity
Kusto 17 rules
- Abnormal Deny Rate for Source IP
- CiscoISE - Device changed IP in last 24 hours
- Corelight - C2 DGA Detected Via Repetitive Failures
- Detect DNS queries reporting multiple errors from different clients - Anomaly Based (ASIM DNS Solution)
- Detect DNS queries reporting multiple errors from different clients - Static threshold based (ASIM DNS Solution)
- Detect excessive NXDOMAIN DNS queries - Anomaly based (ASIM DNS Solution)
- Detect excessive NXDOMAIN DNS queries - Static threshold based (ASIM DNS Solution)
- Excessive NXDOMAIN DNS Queries
- Excessive NXDOMAIN DNS Queries (ASIM DNS Schema)
- Possible contact with a domain generated by a DGA
- Potential communication with a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) based hostname (ASIM Web Session schema)
- Potential DGA detected
- Potential DGA detected (ASIM DNS Schema)
- Potential DGA(Domain Generation Algorithm) detected via Repetitive Failures - Anomaly based (ASIM DNS Solution)
- Potential DGA(Domain Generation Algorithm) detected via Repetitive Failures - Static threshold based (ASIM DNS Solution)
- RecordedFuture Threat Hunting Domain All Actors
- RecordedFuture Threat Hunting IP All Actors