Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking T1574.008

Tactics: Stealth, Execution

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.

Events covered

4 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 6 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (14 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
Image3ends_with 2, eq 1, starts_with 1\\appdata\\local\\microsoft\\windowsapps\\get-variable.exe, \regsvr32.exe, c:\windows\system32\, c:\windows\system32\regsvr32.exe, c:\windows\syswow64\
CommandLine2contains 2, starts_with 1-encodedcommand, \contextmenu\nppshell.dll, regsvr32 /s
DLLDirectory1in 1c:\\windows\\, c:\\windows\\system32\\, c:\\windows\\syswow64\\
DeviceId1eq 1WinDevices
EfectiveCommand1regex_match 1regexEmpire
EventData1contains 1-encodedcommand, powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe
EventID1eq 14688
GlobalPrevalence1is_null 1, lt 1200
ParentCommandLine1contains 1-outputpath, cmd.exe /c, roamdiag.cmd
ProcessDir1contains 1, in 1appdata, c:\\windows, c:\\windows\\system32
diff1ne 1[]
event.type1eq 1start
parent_process_name1eq 1WorkFolders.exe
process_name1eq 1control.exe

Top indicator values (35 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
CommandLinecontains
-encodedcommand
13
CommandLinecontains
\contextmenu\nppshell.dll
1
CommandLinestarts_with
regsvr32 /s
1
DLLDirectoryin
c:\\windows\\
1
DLLDirectoryin
c:\\windows\\system32\\
1
DLLDirectoryin
c:\\windows\\syswow64\\
1
DLLDirectoryin
c:\\windows\\winsxs\\
1
DeviceIdeq
WinDevices
1
EfectiveCommandregex_match
regexEmpire
1
EventDatacontains
-encodedcommand
1
EventDatacontains
powershell.exe
1
EventDatacontains
powershell_ise.exe
1
EventDatacontains
pwsh.exe
1
EventIDeq
4688
1313
GlobalPrevalencelt
200
14
Imageends_with
\\appdata\\local\\microsoft\\windowsapps\\get-variable.exe
1
Imageends_with
\regsvr32.exe
165
Imageeq
c:\windows\system32\regsvr32.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\syswow64\regsvr32.exe
1
Imagestarts_with
c:\windows\system32\
1
Imagestarts_with
c:\windows\syswow64\
1
ParentCommandLinecontains
-outputpath
1
ParentCommandLinecontains
cmd.exe /c
1
ParentCommandLinecontains
roamdiag.cmd
1
ProcessDircontains
appdata
1
ProcessDircontains
program files
1
ProcessDircontains
users
1
ProcessDirin
c:\\windows
1
ProcessDirin
c:\\windows\\system32
1
ProcessDirin
c:\\windows\\syswow64
1

Exclusions (12 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
EventDatacontains
gc_service.exe
1
EventDatacontains
gc_worker.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\system32\regsvr32.exe
1
Imageeq
c:\windows\syswow64\regsvr32.exe
1
Imagestarts_with
c:\windows\system32\
1
Imagestarts_with
c:\windows\syswow64\
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\control.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\syswow64\control.exe
1
Imagewildcard
\device\harddiskvolume*\windows\system32\control.exe
1
Imagewildcard
\device\harddiskvolume*\windows\syswow64\control.exe
1
ParentImagecontains
gc_service.exe
1
ParentImagecontains
gc_worker.exe
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Platform (all)
Domain (all)

Sigma 2 rules

Elastic 1 rule

Splunk 1 rule

Kusto 2 rules