Azure AD Hybrid Health Service Azure-Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService

3 operations, identified by operationName in the audit log.

operationName	Description
_catch_all	Catch-all for Azure-Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService rules matching the resource provider but no specific operation.
Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/delete	Deletes a service registered with Azure AD Connect Health, removing its monitoring configuration.
Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/servicemembers/action	Registers or updates a service member (agent) within an AD Connect Health monitored service.

_catch_all: Azure AD Hybrid Health Service (catch-all)

Resource provider: Azure-Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService

Description

Catch-all for Azure-Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService rules matching the resource provider but no specific operation.

Fields #

Name	Description
`OperationName`	Localized display name of the ARM operation. Sentinel also exposes OperationNameValue (the uppercase ARM operation string the catalog keys on).
`OperationNameValue`	The ARM operation string (e.g. MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/WRITE). The per-event discriminator; case-insensitive.
`ResourceProvider`	The Azure resource-provider namespace (e.g. Microsoft.Compute).
`ResourceId`	Full ARM resource id the operation acted on.
`Caller`	Identity that initiated the operation (UPN, object id, or service principal).
`CallerIpAddress`	IP address of the caller.
`ActivityStatusValue`	Operation status (Started, Succeeded, Failed, Accepted).
`Level`	Severity level of the activity record (Informational, Warning, Error, Critical).
`Authorization`	RBAC authorization context: the action evaluated, scope, and role assignment.
`Properties`	Operation-specific properties bag; shape varies by operation.
`SubscriptionId`	GUID of the subscription the resource belongs to.
`TimeGenerated`	UTC timestamp when the event was recorded.

References #

Azure resource provider operations reference https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
Azure Monitor AzureActivity table schema https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/azureactivity

Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/delete

Resource provider: Azure-Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService

Description

Deletes a service registered with Azure AD Connect Health, removing its monitoring configuration.

Fields #

Name	Description
`OperationName`	Localized display name of the ARM operation. Sentinel also exposes OperationNameValue (the uppercase ARM operation string the catalog keys on).
`OperationNameValue`	The ARM operation string (e.g. MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/WRITE). The per-event discriminator; case-insensitive.
`ResourceProvider`	The Azure resource-provider namespace (e.g. Microsoft.Compute).
`ResourceId`	Full ARM resource id the operation acted on.
`Caller`	Identity that initiated the operation (UPN, object id, or service principal).
`CallerIpAddress`	IP address of the caller.
`ActivityStatusValue`	Operation status (Started, Succeeded, Failed, Accepted).
`Level`	Severity level of the activity record (Informational, Warning, Error, Critical).
`Authorization`	RBAC authorization context: the action evaluated, scope, and role assignment.
`Properties`	Operation-specific properties bag; shape varies by operation.
`SubscriptionId`	GUID of the subscription the resource belongs to.
`TimeGenerated`	UTC timestamp when the event was recorded.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`CategoryValue`	eq	`Administrative`	3 rules	kusto, sigma
`ResourceProviderValue`	eq	`Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService`	3 rules	kusto, sigma
`_ResourceId`	contains	`adfederationservice`	2 rules	kusto
`azure_ad::operation_name_value`	eq	`Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/delete`	2 rules	kusto, sigma
`ResourceId`	contains	`adfederationservice`	1 rule	sigma

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Azure Active Directory Hybrid Health AD FS Service Delete source medium: This detection uses azureactivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the deletion of an Azure AD Hybrid health AD FS service instance in a tenant. A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server to spoof AD FS signing logs. The health AD FS service can then be deleted after it is not longer needed via HTTP requests to Azure.

Kusto #

Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS Service Delete source medium: This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the deletion of an Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS service instance in a tenant. A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server to spoof AD FS signing logs. The health AD FS service can then be deleted after it is no longer needed via HTTP requests to Azure. More information is available in this blog https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS Suspicious Application source medium: This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify a suspicious application adding a server instance to an Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS service or deleting the AD FS service instance. Usually the Microsoft Entra ID Connect Health Agent application with ID cf6d7e68-f018-4e0a-a7b3-126e053fb88d and ID cb1056e2-e479-49de-ae31-7812af012ed8 is used to perform those operations.↳ also matches Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/servicemembers/action

References #

Azure resource provider operations reference https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
Azure Monitor AzureActivity table schema https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/azureactivity

Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/servicemembers/action

Resource provider: Azure-Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService

Description

Registers or updates a service member (agent) within an AD Connect Health monitored service.

Fields #

Name	Description
`OperationName`	Localized display name of the ARM operation. Sentinel also exposes OperationNameValue (the uppercase ARM operation string the catalog keys on).
`OperationNameValue`	The ARM operation string (e.g. MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/WRITE). The per-event discriminator; case-insensitive.
`ResourceProvider`	The Azure resource-provider namespace (e.g. Microsoft.Compute).
`ResourceId`	Full ARM resource id the operation acted on.
`Caller`	Identity that initiated the operation (UPN, object id, or service principal).
`CallerIpAddress`	IP address of the caller.
`ActivityStatusValue`	Operation status (Started, Succeeded, Failed, Accepted).
`Level`	Severity level of the activity record (Informational, Warning, Error, Critical).
`Authorization`	RBAC authorization context: the action evaluated, scope, and role assignment.
`Properties`	Operation-specific properties bag; shape varies by operation.
`SubscriptionId`	GUID of the subscription the resource belongs to.
`TimeGenerated`	UTC timestamp when the event was recorded.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`CategoryValue`	eq	`Administrative`	4 rules	kusto, sigma
`ResourceProviderValue`	eq	`Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService`	4 rules	kusto, sigma
`_ResourceId`	contains	`adfederationservice`	3 rules	kusto
`azure_ad::operation_name_value`	eq	`Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/servicemembers/action`	3 rules	kusto, sigma
`ResourceId`	contains	`adfederationservice`	1 rule	sigma

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Azure Active Directory Hybrid Health AD FS New Server source medium: This detection uses azureactivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Azure AD Hybrid health AD FS service. A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-prem AD FS server. This can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure.

Kusto #

Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS New Server source medium: This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS service. A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-premises AD FS server. This can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure. More information in this blog: https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
NRT Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS New Server source medium: This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS service. A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-premises AD FS server. This can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure. More information in this blog: https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS Suspicious Application source medium: This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify a suspicious application adding a server instance to an Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS service or deleting the AD FS service instance. Usually the Microsoft Entra ID Connect Health Agent application with ID cf6d7e68-f018-4e0a-a7b3-126e053fb88d and ID cb1056e2-e479-49de-ae31-7812af012ed8 is used to perform those operations.↳ also matches Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/delete

References #

Azure resource provider operations reference https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
Azure Monitor AzureActivity table schema https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/azureactivity

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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Azure AD Hybrid Health Service Azure-Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService

_catch_all: Azure AD Hybrid Health Service (catch-all)

Description

Fields #

References #

Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/delete

Description

Fields #

Common Indicators #

Detection Rules #

Sigma #

Kusto #

References #

Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/servicemembers/action

Description

Fields #

Common Indicators #

Detection Rules #

Sigma #

Kusto #

References #

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