GitHub-git

2 operations, identified by action in the audit log.

action	Description
git.clone	A repository was cloned. This event is not available in the web interface, only via the REST API, audit log streaming, or JSON/CSV exports.
git.push	Changes were pushed to a repository. This event is not available in the web interface, only via the REST API, audit log streaming, or JSON/CSV exports.

git.clone

Category: GitHub-git

Description

A repository was cloned. This event is not available in the web interface, only via the REST API, audit log streaming, or JSON/CSV exports.

Logged only when the organization or enterprise has Git-events audit logging enabled; absent by default.

Fields #

Name	Description
`action`	The audit-log action string (e.g. repo.create).
`actor`	Login of the user (or app) that performed the action.
`actor_id`	Numeric ID of the actor.
`user`	Login of the user the action targeted, when applicable.
`org`	Organization in which the action occurred.
`repo`	Repository the action targeted (owner/name), when applicable.
`business`	Enterprise account, when the org belongs to one.
`@timestamp`	Time the event was recorded (epoch ms).
`created_at`	Time the action occurred (epoch ms).
`operation_type`	Operation class: create, modify, remove, access, transfer, authentication.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`EventType`	eq	`git.clone`	2 rules	elastic
`github.repository_public`	eq	`false`	2 rules	elastic
`github.programmatic_access_type`	in	`Fine-grained personal access token`	1 rule	elastic
`github.programmatic_access_type`	in	`OAuth access token`	1 rule	elastic

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

High Number of Cloned GitHub Repos From PAT source low: Detects a high number of unique private repo clone events originating from a single personal access token within a short time period.
GitHub Exfiltration via High Number of Repository Clones by User source medium: Detects a high number of repository cloning actions by a single user within a short time frame. Adversaries may clone multiple repositories to exfiltrate sensitive data.
Github Activity on a Private Repository from an Unusual IP source low: Detects when there is activity on a private GitHub repository from an unusual IP address. Adversaries may access private repositories from unfamiliar IPs to exfiltrate sensitive code or data, potentially indicating a compromise or unauthorized access.↳ also matches git.push

YARA-L #

GitHub High Number Of Non Public GitHub Repositories Cloned source: Detects when a user clones a high number of non-public GitHub repositories. An adversary may attempt to steal the contents of several GitHub repositories after compromising a user account.
GitHub Access Granted To Personal Access Token Followed By High Number Of Cloned Non Public Repositories source: Detects when a user grants access to a GitHub Personal Access Token prior to cloning several GitHub non-public GitHub repositories. An adversary may grant access to a Personal Access Token before attempting to steal the contents of several GitHub repositories using a an automated script or offensive tool.

git.push

Category: GitHub-git

Description

Changes were pushed to a repository. This event is not available in the web interface, only via the REST API, audit log streaming, or JSON/CSV exports.

Logged only when the organization or enterprise has Git-events audit logging enabled; absent by default.

Fields #

Name	Description
`action`	The audit-log action string (e.g. repo.create).
`actor`	Login of the user (or app) that performed the action.
`actor_id`	Numeric ID of the actor.
`user`	Login of the user the action targeted, when applicable.
`org`	Organization in which the action occurred.
`repo`	Repository the action targeted (owner/name), when applicable.
`business`	Enterprise account, when the org belongs to one.
`@timestamp`	Time the event was recorded (epoch ms).
`created_at`	Time the action occurred (epoch ms).
`operation_type`	Operation class: create, modify, remove, access, transfer, authentication.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`github.repository_public`	eq	`false`	1 rule	elastic

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

Github Activity on a Private Repository from an Unusual IP source low: Detects when there is activity on a private GitHub repository from an unusual IP address. Adversaries may access private repositories from unfamiliar IPs to exfiltrate sensitive code or data, potentially indicating a compromise or unauthorized access.↳ also matches git.clone
GitHub Actions Unusual Bot Push to Repository source low: Detects when the github-actions[bot] pushes code to a repository where it has not performed this behavior before in a certain time window. This may indicate a supply chain attack where malicious code running in a CI workflow attempts to modify repository contents, such as injecting backdoor workflow files.

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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

GitHub-git

git.clone

Description

Fields #

Common Indicators #

Detection Rules #

Elastic #

YARA-L #

git.push

Description

Fields #

Common Indicators #

Detection Rules #

Elastic #

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