CertificateSigningRequests Kubernetes-certificatesigningrequests

10 operations, identified by Operation in the audit log.

Operation	Description
get-certificatesigningrequests
list-certificatesigningrequests
watch-certificatesigningrequests
create-certificatesigningrequests	Certificate signing request created (e.g. for TLS bootstrapping or privilege escalation via cert issuance).
update-certificatesigningrequests
patch-certificatesigningrequests
delete-certificatesigningrequests
update-certificatesigningrequests-approval	CSR approval/denial (Kubernetes client-certificate privilege escalation path).
update-certificatesigningrequests-status
any-certificatesigningrequests	Synthetic aggregation for rules that filter the certificatesigningrequests resource with no specific verb. Not a distinct audit record; hosts rule listings that key on objectRef.resource alone.

get-certificatesigningrequests: get certificatesigningrequests

Resource: Kubernetes-certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

list-certificatesigningrequests: list certificatesigningrequests

Resource: Kubernetes-certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

watch-certificatesigningrequests: watch certificatesigningrequests

Resource: Kubernetes-certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

create-certificatesigningrequests: create certificatesigningrequests

Resource: Kubernetes-certificatesigningrequests

Description

Certificate signing request created (e.g. for TLS bootstrapping or privilege escalation via cert issuance).

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

Kubernetes Client Certificate Signing Request Created or Approved source high: Detects creation or approval of a Kubernetes CertificateSigningRequest (CSR) by a non-system identity. Attackers who have gained cluster access can submit a CSR with a privileged Common Name such as system:kube-controller-manager or system:masters, then approve it themselves to obtain a long-lived client certificate. Unlike service account tokens which expire in hours, client certificates persist until they expire or the cluster CA is rotated, providing durable access that survives pod termination, token revocation, and RBAC changes. On non-EKS clusters, the signed certificate allows the attacker to authenticate as the privileged identity from anywhere without needing cluster network access, making it one of the most persistent backdoor mechanisms available in Kubernetes.↳ also matches update-certificatesigningrequests: update certificatesigningrequests, patch-certificatesigningrequests: patch certificatesigningrequests

update-certificatesigningrequests: update certificatesigningrequests

Resource: Kubernetes-certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

Kubernetes Client Certificate Signing Request Created or Approved source high: Detects creation or approval of a Kubernetes CertificateSigningRequest (CSR) by a non-system identity. Attackers who have gained cluster access can submit a CSR with a privileged Common Name such as system:kube-controller-manager or system:masters, then approve it themselves to obtain a long-lived client certificate. Unlike service account tokens which expire in hours, client certificates persist until they expire or the cluster CA is rotated, providing durable access that survives pod termination, token revocation, and RBAC changes. On non-EKS clusters, the signed certificate allows the attacker to authenticate as the privileged identity from anywhere without needing cluster network access, making it one of the most persistent backdoor mechanisms available in Kubernetes.↳ also matches create-certificatesigningrequests: create certificatesigningrequests, patch-certificatesigningrequests: patch certificatesigningrequests

patch-certificatesigningrequests: patch certificatesigningrequests

Resource: Kubernetes-certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

Kubernetes Client Certificate Signing Request Created or Approved source high: Detects creation or approval of a Kubernetes CertificateSigningRequest (CSR) by a non-system identity. Attackers who have gained cluster access can submit a CSR with a privileged Common Name such as system:kube-controller-manager or system:masters, then approve it themselves to obtain a long-lived client certificate. Unlike service account tokens which expire in hours, client certificates persist until they expire or the cluster CA is rotated, providing durable access that survives pod termination, token revocation, and RBAC changes. On non-EKS clusters, the signed certificate allows the attacker to authenticate as the privileged identity from anywhere without needing cluster network access, making it one of the most persistent backdoor mechanisms available in Kubernetes.↳ also matches create-certificatesigningrequests: create certificatesigningrequests, update-certificatesigningrequests: update certificatesigningrequests

delete-certificatesigningrequests: delete certificatesigningrequests

Resource: Kubernetes-certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

update-certificatesigningrequests-approval: update certificatesigningrequests/approval

Resource: Kubernetes-certificatesigningrequests

Description

CSR approval/denial (Kubernetes client-certificate privilege escalation path).

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

update-certificatesigningrequests-status: update certificatesigningrequests/status

Resource: Kubernetes-certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

any-certificatesigningrequests: any verb on certificatesigningrequests (synthetic aggregation)

Resource: Kubernetes-certificatesigningrequests

Description

Synthetic aggregation for rules that filter the certificatesigningrequests resource with no specific verb. Not a distinct audit record; hosts rule listings that key on objectRef.resource alone.

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

CertificateSigningRequests Kubernetes-certificatesigningrequests

get-certificatesigningrequests: get certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

list-certificatesigningrequests: list certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

watch-certificatesigningrequests: watch certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

create-certificatesigningrequests: create certificatesigningrequests

Description

Fields #

Detection Rules #

Elastic #

update-certificatesigningrequests: update certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

Detection Rules #

Elastic #

patch-certificatesigningrequests: patch certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

Detection Rules #

Elastic #

delete-certificatesigningrequests: delete certificatesigningrequests

Fields #

update-certificatesigningrequests-approval: update certificatesigningrequests/approval

Description

Fields #

update-certificatesigningrequests-status: update certificatesigningrequests/status

Fields #

any-certificatesigningrequests: any verb on certificatesigningrequests (synthetic aggregation)

Description

Fields #

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