ClusterRoleBindings Kubernetes-clusterrolebindings

9 operations, identified by Operation in the audit log.

Operation	Description
get-clusterrolebindings
list-clusterrolebindings
watch-clusterrolebindings
create-clusterrolebindings	ClusterRoleBinding created (RBAC privilege escalation or persistence).
update-clusterrolebindings
replace-clusterrolebindings	ClusterRoleBinding replaced (PUT full-object; distinct from update/patch in the audit log).
patch-clusterrolebindings
delete-clusterrolebindings
any-clusterrolebindings	Synthetic aggregation for rules that filter the clusterrolebindings resource with no specific verb. Not a distinct audit record; hosts rule listings that key on objectRef.resource alone.

get-clusterrolebindings: get clusterrolebindings

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterrolebindings

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

list-clusterrolebindings: list clusterrolebindings

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterrolebindings

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

watch-clusterrolebindings: watch clusterrolebindings

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterrolebindings

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

create-clusterrolebindings: create clusterrolebindings

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterrolebindings

Description

ClusterRoleBinding created (RBAC privilege escalation or persistence).

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`kubernetes.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision`	eq	`allow`	3 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`clusterrolebindings`	3 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`rolebindings`	3 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	eq	`create`	2 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.level`	eq	`RequestResponse`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.stage`	eq	`ResponseComplete`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.user.username`	starts_with	`system\:serviceaccount\:`	1 rule	elastic

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Rolebinding Modification source medium: Detects when a Kubernetes Rolebinding is created or modified.↳ also matches update-clusterrolebindings: update clusterrolebindings, replace-clusterrolebindings: replace clusterrolebindings, patch-clusterrolebindings: patch clusterrolebindings, delete-clusterrolebindings: delete clusterrolebindings

Elastic #

Kubernetes Cluster-Admin Role Binding Created source medium: This rule detects the creation of a RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding that grants the cluster-admin ClusterRole, which provides unrestricted access to all Kubernetes resources and represents a high-risk privilege escalation or misconfiguration.
Kubernetes Creation of a RoleBinding Referencing a ServiceAccount source medium: This rule detects the creation of RoleBindings or ClusterRoleBindings that reference a ServiceAccount, which may indicate privilege delegation or potential RBAC misconfiguration leading to elevated access.
Kubernetes Service Account Modified RBAC Objects source medium: Detects write operations performed by Kubernetes service accounts against RBAC resources (Roles, ClusterRoles, RoleBindings, ClusterRoleBindings). Service accounts typically do not manage RBAC directly; this activity may indicate token abuse, misconfigured permissions, or unauthorized privilege escalation.↳ also matches update-clusterrolebindings: update clusterrolebindings, patch-clusterrolebindings: patch clusterrolebindings, delete-clusterrolebindings: delete clusterrolebindings

update-clusterrolebindings: update clusterrolebindings

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterrolebindings

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`kubernetes.audit.user.username`	starts_with	`system\:serviceaccount\:`	1 rule	elastic

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Rolebinding Modification source medium: Detects when a Kubernetes Rolebinding is created or modified.↳ also matches create-clusterrolebindings: create clusterrolebindings, replace-clusterrolebindings: replace clusterrolebindings, patch-clusterrolebindings: patch clusterrolebindings, delete-clusterrolebindings: delete clusterrolebindings

Elastic #

Kubernetes Service Account Modified RBAC Objects source medium: Detects write operations performed by Kubernetes service accounts against RBAC resources (Roles, ClusterRoles, RoleBindings, ClusterRoleBindings). Service accounts typically do not manage RBAC directly; this activity may indicate token abuse, misconfigured permissions, or unauthorized privilege escalation.↳ also matches create-clusterrolebindings: create clusterrolebindings, patch-clusterrolebindings: patch clusterrolebindings, delete-clusterrolebindings: delete clusterrolebindings

replace-clusterrolebindings: replace clusterrolebindings

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterrolebindings

Description

ClusterRoleBinding replaced (PUT full-object; distinct from update/patch in the audit log).

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Rolebinding Modification source medium: Detects when a Kubernetes Rolebinding is created or modified.↳ also matches create-clusterrolebindings: create clusterrolebindings, update-clusterrolebindings: update clusterrolebindings, patch-clusterrolebindings: patch clusterrolebindings, delete-clusterrolebindings: delete clusterrolebindings

patch-clusterrolebindings: patch clusterrolebindings

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterrolebindings

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`kubernetes.audit.user.username`	starts_with	`system\:serviceaccount\:`	1 rule	elastic

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Rolebinding Modification source medium: Detects when a Kubernetes Rolebinding is created or modified.↳ also matches create-clusterrolebindings: create clusterrolebindings, update-clusterrolebindings: update clusterrolebindings, replace-clusterrolebindings: replace clusterrolebindings, delete-clusterrolebindings: delete clusterrolebindings

Elastic #

Kubernetes Service Account Modified RBAC Objects source medium: Detects write operations performed by Kubernetes service accounts against RBAC resources (Roles, ClusterRoles, RoleBindings, ClusterRoleBindings). Service accounts typically do not manage RBAC directly; this activity may indicate token abuse, misconfigured permissions, or unauthorized privilege escalation.↳ also matches create-clusterrolebindings: create clusterrolebindings, update-clusterrolebindings: update clusterrolebindings, delete-clusterrolebindings: delete clusterrolebindings

delete-clusterrolebindings: delete clusterrolebindings

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterrolebindings

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`kubernetes.audit.user.username`	starts_with	`system\:serviceaccount\:`	1 rule	elastic

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Rolebinding Modification source medium: Detects when a Kubernetes Rolebinding is created or modified.↳ also matches create-clusterrolebindings: create clusterrolebindings, update-clusterrolebindings: update clusterrolebindings, replace-clusterrolebindings: replace clusterrolebindings, patch-clusterrolebindings: patch clusterrolebindings

Elastic #

Kubernetes Service Account Modified RBAC Objects source medium: Detects write operations performed by Kubernetes service accounts against RBAC resources (Roles, ClusterRoles, RoleBindings, ClusterRoleBindings). Service accounts typically do not manage RBAC directly; this activity may indicate token abuse, misconfigured permissions, or unauthorized privilege escalation.↳ also matches create-clusterrolebindings: create clusterrolebindings, update-clusterrolebindings: update clusterrolebindings, patch-clusterrolebindings: patch clusterrolebindings

any-clusterrolebindings: any verb on clusterrolebindings (synthetic aggregation)

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterrolebindings

Description

Synthetic aggregation for rules that filter the clusterrolebindings resource with no specific verb. Not a distinct audit record; hosts rule listings that key on objectRef.resource alone.

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`EventType`	in	`get`	1 rule	elastic
`EventType`	in	`list`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`clusterrolebindings`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`clusterroles`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`namespaces`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`nodes`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`pods`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`rolebindings`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`roles`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`serviceaccounts`	1 rule	elastic
`user`	is_not_null		1 rule	elastic, kusto, splunk

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

Kubernetes Multi-Resource Discovery source medium: Adversaries who land credentials in a cluster—or abuse an over-privileged token—often map the environment before exfiltration or privilege escalation. A practical first pass is to learn where workloads run, how the cluster is partitioned, and what RBAC exists at namespace vs cluster scope. Rapid get/list traffic across distinct API resource kinds that answer those questions (namespaces, workloads, roles, cluster-wide roles) is a common setup and orientation pattern for both interactive attackers and automated recon scripts. It is less typical for steady-state controllers, which usually touch a narrow set of resources repeatedly. This rule highlights that cross-resource burst from a single client fingerprint within a one-minute bucket so analysts can separate routine automation from potential discovery and permission reconnaissance ahead of follow-on actions.

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)