ClusterRoles Kubernetes-clusterroles

9 operations, identified by Operation in the audit log.

Operation	Description
get-clusterroles
list-clusterroles
watch-clusterroles
create-clusterroles	ClusterRole created (sensitive RBAC change; wildcard verbs/resources indicate overprivilege).
update-clusterroles
replace-clusterroles	ClusterRole replaced via PUT.
patch-clusterroles
delete-clusterroles
any-clusterroles	Synthetic aggregation for rules that filter the clusterroles resource with no specific verb. Not a distinct audit record; hosts rule listings that key on objectRef.resource alone.

get-clusterroles: get clusterroles

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterroles

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

list-clusterroles: list clusterroles

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterroles

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

watch-clusterroles: watch clusterroles

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterroles

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

create-clusterroles: create clusterroles

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterroles

Description

ClusterRole created (sensitive RBAC change; wildcard verbs/resources indicate overprivilege).

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`clusterroles`	3 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`roles`	3 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`cronjobs`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`daemonsets`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`deployments`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`create`	3 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision`	eq	`allow`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.level`	eq	`RequestResponse`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.stage`	eq	`ResponseComplete`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.user.username`	starts_with	`system\:serviceaccount\:`	1 rule	elastic

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

Kubernetes Creation or Modification of Sensitive Role source medium: Detects the creation or modification of Kubernetes Roles or ClusterRoles that grant high-risk permissions, such as wildcard access or RBAC escalation verbs (e.g., bind, escalate, impersonate), which may enable privilege escalation or unauthorized access within the cluster.↳ also matches update-clusterroles: update clusterroles, patch-clusterroles: patch clusterroles
Kubernetes Sensitive RBAC Change Followed by Workload Modification source medium: Detects a sequence where a principal creates or modifies a Role/ClusterRole to include high-risk permissions (e.g., wildcard access or escalation verbs) and then creates or patches a workload resource (DaemonSet, Deployment, or CronJob) shortly after, which may indicate RBAC-based privilege escalation followed by payload deployment. This pattern is often used by adversaries to gain unauthorized access to sensitive resources and deploy malicious payloads.↳ also matches update-clusterroles: update clusterroles, patch-clusterroles: patch clusterroles
Kubernetes Service Account Modified RBAC Objects source medium: Detects write operations performed by Kubernetes service accounts against RBAC resources (Roles, ClusterRoles, RoleBindings, ClusterRoleBindings). Service accounts typically do not manage RBAC directly; this activity may indicate token abuse, misconfigured permissions, or unauthorized privilege escalation.↳ also matches update-clusterroles: update clusterroles, patch-clusterroles: patch clusterroles, delete-clusterroles: delete clusterroles

update-clusterroles: update clusterroles

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterroles

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`clusterroles`	4 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`roles`	4 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`cronjobs`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`daemonsets`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`deployments`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`patch`	4 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`update`	4 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`create`	3 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision`	eq	`allow`	3 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.level`	eq	`RequestResponse`	2 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.stage`	eq	`ResponseComplete`	2 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision`	eq	`allow`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.user.username`	starts_with	`system\:serviceaccount\:`	1 rule	elastic

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

Kubernetes Creation or Modification of Sensitive Role source medium: Detects the creation or modification of Kubernetes Roles or ClusterRoles that grant high-risk permissions, such as wildcard access or RBAC escalation verbs (e.g., bind, escalate, impersonate), which may enable privilege escalation or unauthorized access within the cluster.↳ also matches create-clusterroles: create clusterroles, patch-clusterroles: patch clusterroles
Kubernetes RBAC Wildcard Elevation on Existing Role source high: Flags an existing Role or ClusterRole being changed (patch or update) so the effective rules become cluster-admin-like: wildcard on every API resource and wildcard on every verb. That is usually a deliberate privilege expansion, not a typo. RequestResponse audit and the response body are required so the detection reads the merged role after apply; loopback source IPs are ignored.↳ also matches patch-clusterroles: patch clusterroles
Kubernetes Sensitive RBAC Change Followed by Workload Modification source medium: Detects a sequence where a principal creates or modifies a Role/ClusterRole to include high-risk permissions (e.g., wildcard access or escalation verbs) and then creates or patches a workload resource (DaemonSet, Deployment, or CronJob) shortly after, which may indicate RBAC-based privilege escalation followed by payload deployment. This pattern is often used by adversaries to gain unauthorized access to sensitive resources and deploy malicious payloads.↳ also matches create-clusterroles: create clusterroles, patch-clusterroles: patch clusterroles

Show 1 more (4 total)

Kubernetes Service Account Modified RBAC Objects source medium: Detects write operations performed by Kubernetes service accounts against RBAC resources (Roles, ClusterRoles, RoleBindings, ClusterRoleBindings). Service accounts typically do not manage RBAC directly; this activity may indicate token abuse, misconfigured permissions, or unauthorized privilege escalation.↳ also matches create-clusterroles: create clusterroles, patch-clusterroles: patch clusterroles, delete-clusterroles: delete clusterroles

replace-clusterroles: replace clusterroles

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterroles

Description

ClusterRole replaced via PUT.

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

patch-clusterroles: patch clusterroles

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterroles

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`clusterroles`	4 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`roles`	4 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`patch`	4 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`update`	4 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`create`	3 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision`	eq	`allow`	3 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.level`	eq	`RequestResponse`	2 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.stage`	eq	`ResponseComplete`	2 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision`	eq	`allow`	1 rule	elastic

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

Kubernetes Creation or Modification of Sensitive Role source medium: Detects the creation or modification of Kubernetes Roles or ClusterRoles that grant high-risk permissions, such as wildcard access or RBAC escalation verbs (e.g., bind, escalate, impersonate), which may enable privilege escalation or unauthorized access within the cluster.↳ also matches create-clusterroles: create clusterroles, update-clusterroles: update clusterroles
Kubernetes RBAC Wildcard Elevation on Existing Role source high: Flags an existing Role or ClusterRole being changed (patch or update) so the effective rules become cluster-admin-like: wildcard on every API resource and wildcard on every verb. That is usually a deliberate privilege expansion, not a typo. RequestResponse audit and the response body are required so the detection reads the merged role after apply; loopback source IPs are ignored.↳ also matches update-clusterroles: update clusterroles
Kubernetes Sensitive RBAC Change Followed by Workload Modification source medium: Detects a sequence where a principal creates or modifies a Role/ClusterRole to include high-risk permissions (e.g., wildcard access or escalation verbs) and then creates or patches a workload resource (DaemonSet, Deployment, or CronJob) shortly after, which may indicate RBAC-based privilege escalation followed by payload deployment. This pattern is often used by adversaries to gain unauthorized access to sensitive resources and deploy malicious payloads.↳ also matches create-clusterroles: create clusterroles, update-clusterroles: update clusterroles

Show 1 more (4 total)

Kubernetes Service Account Modified RBAC Objects source medium: Detects write operations performed by Kubernetes service accounts against RBAC resources (Roles, ClusterRoles, RoleBindings, ClusterRoleBindings). Service accounts typically do not manage RBAC directly; this activity may indicate token abuse, misconfigured permissions, or unauthorized privilege escalation.↳ also matches create-clusterroles: create clusterroles, update-clusterroles: update clusterroles, delete-clusterroles: delete clusterroles

delete-clusterroles: delete clusterroles

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterroles

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

Kubernetes Service Account Modified RBAC Objects source medium: Detects write operations performed by Kubernetes service accounts against RBAC resources (Roles, ClusterRoles, RoleBindings, ClusterRoleBindings). Service accounts typically do not manage RBAC directly; this activity may indicate token abuse, misconfigured permissions, or unauthorized privilege escalation.↳ also matches create-clusterroles: create clusterroles, update-clusterroles: update clusterroles, patch-clusterroles: patch clusterroles

any-clusterroles: any verb on clusterroles (synthetic aggregation)

Resource: Kubernetes-clusterroles

Description

Synthetic aggregation for rules that filter the clusterroles resource with no specific verb. Not a distinct audit record; hosts rule listings that key on objectRef.resource alone.

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`EventType`	in	`get`	1 rule	elastic
`EventType`	in	`list`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`clusterrolebindings`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`clusterroles`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`namespaces`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`nodes`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`pods`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`rolebindings`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`roles`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`serviceaccounts`	1 rule	elastic
`user`	is_not_null		1 rule	elastic, kusto, splunk

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

Kubernetes Multi-Resource Discovery source medium: Adversaries who land credentials in a cluster—or abuse an over-privileged token—often map the environment before exfiltration or privilege escalation. A practical first pass is to learn where workloads run, how the cluster is partitioned, and what RBAC exists at namespace vs cluster scope. Rapid get/list traffic across distinct API resource kinds that answer those questions (namespaces, workloads, roles, cluster-wide roles) is a common setup and orientation pattern for both interactive attackers and automated recon scripts. It is less typical for steady-state controllers, which usually touch a narrow set of resources repeatedly. This rule highlights that cross-resource burst from a single client fingerprint within a one-minute bucket so analysts can separate routine automation from potential discovery and permission reconnaissance ahead of follow-on actions.

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

ClusterRoles Kubernetes-clusterroles

get-clusterroles: get clusterroles

Fields #

list-clusterroles: list clusterroles

Fields #

watch-clusterroles: watch clusterroles

Fields #

create-clusterroles: create clusterroles

Description

Fields #

Common Indicators #

Detection Rules #

Elastic #

update-clusterroles: update clusterroles

Fields #

Common Indicators #

Detection Rules #

Elastic #

replace-clusterroles: replace clusterroles

Description

Fields #

patch-clusterroles: patch clusterroles

Fields #

Common Indicators #

Detection Rules #

Elastic #

delete-clusterroles: delete clusterroles

Fields #

Detection Rules #

Elastic #

any-clusterroles: any verb on clusterroles (synthetic aggregation)

Description

Fields #

Common Indicators #

Detection Rules #

Elastic #

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