MutatingWebhookConfigurations Kubernetes-mutatingwebhookconfigurations

9 operations, identified by Operation in the audit log.

Operation	Description
get-mutatingwebhookconfigurations
list-mutatingwebhookconfigurations
watch-mutatingwebhookconfigurations
create-mutatingwebhookconfigurations	MutatingWebhookConfiguration created (admission controller modification; persistence or defense evasion).
update-mutatingwebhookconfigurations
replace-mutatingwebhookconfigurations
patch-mutatingwebhookconfigurations
delete-mutatingwebhookconfigurations
any-mutatingwebhookconfigurations	Synthetic aggregation for rules that filter the mutatingwebhookconfigurations resource with no specific verb. Not a distinct audit record; hosts rule listings that key on objectRef.resource alone.

get-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: get mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Resource: Kubernetes-mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

list-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: list mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Resource: Kubernetes-mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

watch-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: watch mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Resource: Kubernetes-mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

create-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: create mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Resource: Kubernetes-mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Description

MutatingWebhookConfiguration created (admission controller modification; persistence or defense evasion).

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`verb`	eq	`create`	1 rule	panther, sigma, splunk
`verb`	eq	`delete`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`patch`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`replace`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`update`	1 rule	sigma, splunk

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Admission Controller Modification source medium: Detects when a modification (create, update or replace) action is taken that affects mutating or validating webhook configurations, as they can be used by an adversary to achieve persistence or exfiltrate access credentials.↳ also matches update-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: update mutatingwebhookconfigurations, replace-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: replace mutatingwebhookconfigurations, patch-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: patch mutatingwebhookconfigurations, delete-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: delete mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Elastic #

Kubernetes Admission Webhook Created or Modified source medium: Detects creation, modification, or deletion of Kubernetes MutatingWebhookConfigurations or ValidatingWebhookConfigurations by non-system identities. Admission webhooks intercept every API request matching their rules before persistence, giving an attacker powerful capabilities: injecting malicious sidecars into every new pod via a mutating webhook, blocking security tooling deployments via a validating webhook, or silently exfiltrating pod specifications to an external server. Webhook manipulation is a stealthy persistence and defense evasion technique because the webhook configuration itself looks benign in kubectl output while actively modifying or intercepting all matching Kubernetes API traffic.↳ also matches update-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: update mutatingwebhookconfigurations, patch-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: patch mutatingwebhookconfigurations, delete-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: delete mutatingwebhookconfigurations

update-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: update mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Resource: Kubernetes-mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`verb`	eq	`create`	1 rule	panther, sigma, splunk
`verb`	eq	`delete`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`patch`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`replace`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`update`	1 rule	sigma, splunk

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Admission Controller Modification source medium: Detects when a modification (create, update or replace) action is taken that affects mutating or validating webhook configurations, as they can be used by an adversary to achieve persistence or exfiltrate access credentials.↳ also matches create-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: create mutatingwebhookconfigurations, replace-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: replace mutatingwebhookconfigurations, patch-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: patch mutatingwebhookconfigurations, delete-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: delete mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Elastic #

Kubernetes Admission Webhook Created or Modified source medium: Detects creation, modification, or deletion of Kubernetes MutatingWebhookConfigurations or ValidatingWebhookConfigurations by non-system identities. Admission webhooks intercept every API request matching their rules before persistence, giving an attacker powerful capabilities: injecting malicious sidecars into every new pod via a mutating webhook, blocking security tooling deployments via a validating webhook, or silently exfiltrating pod specifications to an external server. Webhook manipulation is a stealthy persistence and defense evasion technique because the webhook configuration itself looks benign in kubectl output while actively modifying or intercepting all matching Kubernetes API traffic.↳ also matches create-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: create mutatingwebhookconfigurations, patch-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: patch mutatingwebhookconfigurations, delete-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: delete mutatingwebhookconfigurations

replace-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: replace mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Resource: Kubernetes-mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`verb`	eq	`create`	1 rule	panther, sigma, splunk
`verb`	eq	`delete`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`patch`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`replace`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`update`	1 rule	sigma, splunk

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Admission Controller Modification source medium: Detects when a modification (create, update or replace) action is taken that affects mutating or validating webhook configurations, as they can be used by an adversary to achieve persistence or exfiltrate access credentials.↳ also matches create-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: create mutatingwebhookconfigurations, update-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: update mutatingwebhookconfigurations, patch-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: patch mutatingwebhookconfigurations, delete-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: delete mutatingwebhookconfigurations

patch-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: patch mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Resource: Kubernetes-mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`verb`	eq	`create`	1 rule	panther, sigma, splunk
`verb`	eq	`delete`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`patch`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`replace`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`update`	1 rule	sigma, splunk

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Admission Controller Modification source medium: Detects when a modification (create, update or replace) action is taken that affects mutating or validating webhook configurations, as they can be used by an adversary to achieve persistence or exfiltrate access credentials.↳ also matches create-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: create mutatingwebhookconfigurations, update-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: update mutatingwebhookconfigurations, replace-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: replace mutatingwebhookconfigurations, delete-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: delete mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Elastic #

Kubernetes Admission Webhook Created or Modified source medium: Detects creation, modification, or deletion of Kubernetes MutatingWebhookConfigurations or ValidatingWebhookConfigurations by non-system identities. Admission webhooks intercept every API request matching their rules before persistence, giving an attacker powerful capabilities: injecting malicious sidecars into every new pod via a mutating webhook, blocking security tooling deployments via a validating webhook, or silently exfiltrating pod specifications to an external server. Webhook manipulation is a stealthy persistence and defense evasion technique because the webhook configuration itself looks benign in kubectl output while actively modifying or intercepting all matching Kubernetes API traffic.↳ also matches create-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: create mutatingwebhookconfigurations, update-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: update mutatingwebhookconfigurations, delete-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: delete mutatingwebhookconfigurations

delete-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: delete mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Resource: Kubernetes-mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`verb`	eq	`create`	1 rule	panther, sigma, splunk
`verb`	eq	`delete`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`patch`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`replace`	1 rule	sigma
`verb`	eq	`update`	1 rule	sigma, splunk

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Admission Controller Modification source medium: Detects when a modification (create, update or replace) action is taken that affects mutating or validating webhook configurations, as they can be used by an adversary to achieve persistence or exfiltrate access credentials.↳ also matches create-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: create mutatingwebhookconfigurations, update-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: update mutatingwebhookconfigurations, replace-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: replace mutatingwebhookconfigurations, patch-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: patch mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Elastic #

Kubernetes Admission Webhook Created or Modified source medium: Detects creation, modification, or deletion of Kubernetes MutatingWebhookConfigurations or ValidatingWebhookConfigurations by non-system identities. Admission webhooks intercept every API request matching their rules before persistence, giving an attacker powerful capabilities: injecting malicious sidecars into every new pod via a mutating webhook, blocking security tooling deployments via a validating webhook, or silently exfiltrating pod specifications to an external server. Webhook manipulation is a stealthy persistence and defense evasion technique because the webhook configuration itself looks benign in kubectl output while actively modifying or intercepting all matching Kubernetes API traffic.↳ also matches create-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: create mutatingwebhookconfigurations, update-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: update mutatingwebhookconfigurations, patch-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: patch mutatingwebhookconfigurations

any-mutatingwebhookconfigurations: any verb on mutatingwebhookconfigurations (synthetic aggregation)

Resource: Kubernetes-mutatingwebhookconfigurations

Description

Synthetic aggregation for rules that filter the mutatingwebhookconfigurations resource with no specific verb. Not a distinct audit record; hosts rule listings that key on objectRef.resource alone.

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)