detection.wiki

Namespaces

OperationDescriptionSampleRule
get-namespacesYY
list-namespacesYY
watch-namespacesYY
create-namespacesYY
update-namespacesYY
patch-namespacesYY
delete-namespacesYY
update-namespaces-finalizeYN
get-namespaces-statusYN
update-namespaces-statusYN
patch-namespaces-statusYN
any-namespacesSynthetic aggregation for rules that filter the namespaces resource with no specific verb. Not a distinct audit record; hosts rule listings that key on objectRef.resource alone.NY

get namespaces

#
Resource
namespaces

Example Audit Event #

{
  "kind": "Event",
  "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
  "level": "Metadata",
  "auditID": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
  "stage": "ResponseComplete",
  "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces/dw-harn-namespaces",
  "verb": "get",
  "user": {
    "username": "kubernetes-admin",
    "groups": [
      "kubeadm:cluster-admins",
      "system:authenticated"
    ],
    "extra": {
      "authentication.kubernetes.io/credential-id": [
        "X509SHA256=9bb0383c49b319fbf6b5ed61ab944378956d4292c784d32244ce2fa4dd846a3c"
      ]
    }
  },
  "sourceIPs": [
    "203.0.113.10"
  ],
  "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.36.2 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/24e2b02",
  "objectRef": {
    "resource": "namespaces",
    "namespace": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "apiVersion": "v1"
  },
  "responseStatus": {
    "metadata": {},
    "code": 200
  },
  "requestReceivedTimestamp": "2026-07-02T04:48:07.469198Z",
  "stageTimestamp": "2026-07-02T04:48:07.470605Z",
  "annotations": {
    "authorization.k8s.io/decision": "allow",
    "authorization.k8s.io/reason": "RBAC: allowed by ClusterRoleBinding \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\" of ClusterRole \"cluster-admin\" to Group \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\""
  }
}

Detection Rules #

Full rule details for this event, including ATT&CK technique mappings and native queries →

Elastic #

  • Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities source low: This rule leverages a combination of Defend for Containers and Kubernetes audit logs to detect the execution of direct interactive Kubernetes API requests via unusual utilities. An adversary may need to execute direct interactive Kubernetes API requests to gain access to the Kubernetes API server or other resources within the cluster. These requests are often used to enumerate the Kubernetes API server or other resources within the cluster, and may indicate an attempt to move laterally within the cluster.T1059, T1059.004, T1069, T1087, T1609, T1610↳ also matches list-namespaces: list namespaces, watch-namespaces: watch namespaces, create-namespaces: create namespaces, update-namespaces: update namespaces, patch-namespaces: patch namespaces
    Investigation guide

    Triage and analysis#

    Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

    Investigating Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities#

    This rule detects interactive commands executed inside containers that use atypical utilities to hit the Kubernetes API, paired with near-simultaneous API activity on pods, secrets, service accounts, roles/bindings, or pod exec/attach/log/portforward. It surfaces hands-on-keyboard discovery and lateral movement using custom scripts that evade common tool allowlists; for example, an intruder opens a shell in a pod, uses Python to query the in-cluster API to list secrets, then triggers pods/exec to pivot into another workload.

    Possible investigation steps#

    • Identify the implicated pod, container image, and executing service account, then quickly review its RBAC bindings and effective permissions to determine blast radius.
    • Inspect the container’s interactive session context by pulling recent command lines, shell history, environment variables, and mounted service account tokens, and look for custom scripts or binaries issuing HTTP requests.
    • Correlate nearby Kubernetes audit entries tied to the same principal and pod to map accessed resources and verbs, noting any exec/attach/portforward or sensitive object interactions across namespaces.
    • Review network activity from the pod to the API server and any in-pod proxies, including DNS lookups and outbound connections, to spot nonstandard clients or tunneling behavior.
    • If suspicious, isolate the pod or node, capture runtime artifacts (e.g., process memory or HTTP client traffic), revoke and rotate the service account credentials, and verify image provenance and integrity.

    False positive analysis#

    • An operator interactively attaches to a pod and uses a Python REPL or bash with /dev/tcp to call the in-cluster API for routine troubleshooting (e.g., list pods, read ConfigMaps, or run selfsubjectaccessreviews), producing normal audit entries that match the rule signature.
    • A correlation artifact arises when two namespaces have pods with the same name: one pod starts an interactive shell while another independently performs get/list/watch calls, and the 1-second sequence keyed only on pod-name links the unrelated events.

    Response and remediation#

    • Immediately isolate the implicated pod that issued direct API calls using a nonstandard utility by applying a deny-all egress NetworkPolicy in its namespace (including to kubernetes.default.svc:443), terminating the interactive session, and scaling its owning Deployment/Job/StatefulSet to zero replicas.
    • Before teardown, capture a runtime snapshot of the container and node including the binary or script used to query the API (e.g., files under /tmp or /dev/tcp usage), shell history, environment, and the mounted service account token and CA bundle at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/.
    • Revoke access by removing the service account’s RoleBindings/ClusterRoleBindings, deleting all pods that mount that service account to force token rotation, rotating any Secrets and ConfigMaps that were read or created during the window, and deleting any unauthorized Jobs, CronJobs, or Deployments created by the same principal.
    • Restore workloads from a known-good image digest, re-enable the Deployment only after image scan and integrity checks pass, and monitor subsequent Kubernetes audit logs for pods/exec, portforward, and access to secrets across the affected namespaces.
    • Escalate to incident response leadership and consider cluster-wide containment if audit logs show create/patch of ClusterRoleBindings, access to secrets outside the workload’s namespace, or use of pods/exec to pivot into other nodes or system namespaces such as kube-system.
    • Harden access by enforcing least-privilege RBAC that denies pods/exec and attach for application service accounts, setting automountServiceAccountToken: false on workloads that do not need it, restricting egress to the API server with NetworkPolicies, and requiring just-in-time break-glass roles for interactive access.
  • GKE Multi-Resource Discovery source medium: Adversaries who land credentials in a GKE cluster—or abuse an over-privileged token, often map the environment before exfiltration or privilege escalation. A practical first pass is to learn where workloads run, how the cluster is partitioned, and what RBAC exists at namespace vs cluster scope. Rapid get/list traffic across many distinct API resource kinds that answer those questions (namespaces, workloads, roles, cluster-wide roles) is a common setup and orientation pattern for both interactive attackers and automated recon scripts. This rule highlights that cross-resource burst from a single client fingerprint within a one-minute bucket when both cluster-layout and RBAC resource kinds are touched, so analysts can separate routine automation from potential discovery ahead of follow-on actions.T1613↳ also matches list-namespaces: list namespaces
    Investigation guide

    Triage and analysis#

    Investigating GKE Multi-Resource Discovery#

    The rule groups GKE audit get/list events on namespaces, nodes, pods, configmaps, serviceaccounts, roles, rolebindings, clusterroles, and clusterrolebindings into one-minute windows per client.user.email, source.ip, and user_agent.original. It alerts when five or more distinct resource kinds appear and the burst includes both cluster-layout kinds (namespaces, pods, or nodes) and RBAC kinds. Allowed and denied authorizations are both included: failures still signal probing.

    Possible investigation steps#

    • Review Esql.enumerated_resources, Esql.enumerated_namespaces, and Esql.enumerated_resource_names for ordering and targeted APIs.
    • Confirm whether source.ip and user_agent.original match expected admin or automation clients.
    • Correlate with follow-on secret reads, RoleBinding changes, pod exec, or unusual user agents from the same actor.

    False positive analysis#

    • Documented platform sync jobs that read layout and RBAC together; exclude known service accounts after validation.
    • Upgrade or install windows that briefly query many resource kinds; correlate with change records.

    Response and remediation#

    • If malicious, revoke or rotate the implicated credentials, tighten RBAC, and inspect for data access or persistence established after the burst.

References #

list namespaces

#
Resource
namespaces

Example Audit Event #

{
  "kind": "Event",
  "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
  "level": "Metadata",
  "auditID": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
  "stage": "ResponseComplete",
  "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces?labelSelector=dw-harn-patched%3D1",
  "verb": "list",
  "user": {
    "username": "kubernetes-admin",
    "groups": [
      "kubeadm:cluster-admins",
      "system:authenticated"
    ],
    "extra": {
      "authentication.kubernetes.io/credential-id": [
        "X509SHA256=fd038e49e5a46840f8f58360c3f09257f92bccd0cadad3ad68fcfec20b99b52c"
      ]
    }
  },
  "sourceIPs": [
    "203.0.113.10"
  ],
  "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.36.2 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/24e2b02",
  "objectRef": {
    "resource": "namespaces",
    "apiVersion": "v1"
  },
  "responseStatus": {
    "metadata": {},
    "code": 200
  },
  "requestReceivedTimestamp": "2026-07-02T22:13:01.607911Z",
  "stageTimestamp": "2026-07-02T22:13:01.609576Z",
  "annotations": {
    "authorization.k8s.io/decision": "allow",
    "authorization.k8s.io/reason": "RBAC: allowed by ClusterRoleBinding \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\" of ClusterRole \"cluster-admin\" to Group \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\""
  }
}

Detection Rules #

Full rule details for this event, including ATT&CK technique mappings and native queries →

Elastic #

  • Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities source low: This rule leverages a combination of Defend for Containers and Kubernetes audit logs to detect the execution of direct interactive Kubernetes API requests via unusual utilities. An adversary may need to execute direct interactive Kubernetes API requests to gain access to the Kubernetes API server or other resources within the cluster. These requests are often used to enumerate the Kubernetes API server or other resources within the cluster, and may indicate an attempt to move laterally within the cluster.T1059, T1059.004, T1069, T1087, T1609, T1610↳ also matches get-namespaces: get namespaces, watch-namespaces: watch namespaces, create-namespaces: create namespaces, update-namespaces: update namespaces, patch-namespaces: patch namespaces
    Investigation guide

    Triage and analysis#

    Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

    Investigating Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities#

    This rule detects interactive commands executed inside containers that use atypical utilities to hit the Kubernetes API, paired with near-simultaneous API activity on pods, secrets, service accounts, roles/bindings, or pod exec/attach/log/portforward. It surfaces hands-on-keyboard discovery and lateral movement using custom scripts that evade common tool allowlists; for example, an intruder opens a shell in a pod, uses Python to query the in-cluster API to list secrets, then triggers pods/exec to pivot into another workload.

    Possible investigation steps#

    • Identify the implicated pod, container image, and executing service account, then quickly review its RBAC bindings and effective permissions to determine blast radius.
    • Inspect the container’s interactive session context by pulling recent command lines, shell history, environment variables, and mounted service account tokens, and look for custom scripts or binaries issuing HTTP requests.
    • Correlate nearby Kubernetes audit entries tied to the same principal and pod to map accessed resources and verbs, noting any exec/attach/portforward or sensitive object interactions across namespaces.
    • Review network activity from the pod to the API server and any in-pod proxies, including DNS lookups and outbound connections, to spot nonstandard clients or tunneling behavior.
    • If suspicious, isolate the pod or node, capture runtime artifacts (e.g., process memory or HTTP client traffic), revoke and rotate the service account credentials, and verify image provenance and integrity.

    False positive analysis#

    • An operator interactively attaches to a pod and uses a Python REPL or bash with /dev/tcp to call the in-cluster API for routine troubleshooting (e.g., list pods, read ConfigMaps, or run selfsubjectaccessreviews), producing normal audit entries that match the rule signature.
    • A correlation artifact arises when two namespaces have pods with the same name: one pod starts an interactive shell while another independently performs get/list/watch calls, and the 1-second sequence keyed only on pod-name links the unrelated events.

    Response and remediation#

    • Immediately isolate the implicated pod that issued direct API calls using a nonstandard utility by applying a deny-all egress NetworkPolicy in its namespace (including to kubernetes.default.svc:443), terminating the interactive session, and scaling its owning Deployment/Job/StatefulSet to zero replicas.
    • Before teardown, capture a runtime snapshot of the container and node including the binary or script used to query the API (e.g., files under /tmp or /dev/tcp usage), shell history, environment, and the mounted service account token and CA bundle at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/.
    • Revoke access by removing the service account’s RoleBindings/ClusterRoleBindings, deleting all pods that mount that service account to force token rotation, rotating any Secrets and ConfigMaps that were read or created during the window, and deleting any unauthorized Jobs, CronJobs, or Deployments created by the same principal.
    • Restore workloads from a known-good image digest, re-enable the Deployment only after image scan and integrity checks pass, and monitor subsequent Kubernetes audit logs for pods/exec, portforward, and access to secrets across the affected namespaces.
    • Escalate to incident response leadership and consider cluster-wide containment if audit logs show create/patch of ClusterRoleBindings, access to secrets outside the workload’s namespace, or use of pods/exec to pivot into other nodes or system namespaces such as kube-system.
    • Harden access by enforcing least-privilege RBAC that denies pods/exec and attach for application service accounts, setting automountServiceAccountToken: false on workloads that do not need it, restricting egress to the API server with NetworkPolicies, and requiring just-in-time break-glass roles for interactive access.
  • GKE Multi-Resource Discovery source medium: Adversaries who land credentials in a GKE cluster—or abuse an over-privileged token, often map the environment before exfiltration or privilege escalation. A practical first pass is to learn where workloads run, how the cluster is partitioned, and what RBAC exists at namespace vs cluster scope. Rapid get/list traffic across many distinct API resource kinds that answer those questions (namespaces, workloads, roles, cluster-wide roles) is a common setup and orientation pattern for both interactive attackers and automated recon scripts. This rule highlights that cross-resource burst from a single client fingerprint within a one-minute bucket when both cluster-layout and RBAC resource kinds are touched, so analysts can separate routine automation from potential discovery ahead of follow-on actions.T1613↳ also matches get-namespaces: get namespaces
    Investigation guide

    Triage and analysis#

    Investigating GKE Multi-Resource Discovery#

    The rule groups GKE audit get/list events on namespaces, nodes, pods, configmaps, serviceaccounts, roles, rolebindings, clusterroles, and clusterrolebindings into one-minute windows per client.user.email, source.ip, and user_agent.original. It alerts when five or more distinct resource kinds appear and the burst includes both cluster-layout kinds (namespaces, pods, or nodes) and RBAC kinds. Allowed and denied authorizations are both included: failures still signal probing.

    Possible investigation steps#

    • Review Esql.enumerated_resources, Esql.enumerated_namespaces, and Esql.enumerated_resource_names for ordering and targeted APIs.
    • Confirm whether source.ip and user_agent.original match expected admin or automation clients.
    • Correlate with follow-on secret reads, RoleBinding changes, pod exec, or unusual user agents from the same actor.

    False positive analysis#

    • Documented platform sync jobs that read layout and RBAC together; exclude known service accounts after validation.
    • Upgrade or install windows that briefly query many resource kinds; correlate with change records.

    Response and remediation#

    • If malicious, revoke or rotate the implicated credentials, tighten RBAC, and inspect for data access or persistence established after the burst.

References #

watch namespaces

#
Resource
namespaces

Example Audit Event #

{
  "kind": "Event",
  "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
  "level": "Metadata",
  "auditID": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
  "stage": "ResponseComplete",
  "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces?resourceVersion=912&timeout=3s&watch=true",
  "verb": "watch",
  "user": {
    "username": "kubernetes-admin",
    "groups": [
      "kubeadm:cluster-admins",
      "system:authenticated"
    ],
    "extra": {
      "authentication.kubernetes.io/credential-id": [
        "X509SHA256=fd038e49e5a46840f8f58360c3f09257f92bccd0cadad3ad68fcfec20b99b52c"
      ]
    }
  },
  "sourceIPs": [
    "203.0.113.10"
  ],
  "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.36.2 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/24e2b02",
  "objectRef": {
    "resource": "namespaces",
    "apiVersion": "v1"
  },
  "responseStatus": {
    "metadata": {},
    "code": 200
  },
  "requestReceivedTimestamp": "2026-07-02T22:12:57.987165Z",
  "stageTimestamp": "2026-07-02T22:13:00.991722Z",
  "annotations": {
    "authorization.k8s.io/decision": "allow",
    "authorization.k8s.io/reason": "RBAC: allowed by ClusterRoleBinding \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\" of ClusterRole \"cluster-admin\" to Group \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\""
  }
}

Detection Rules #

Full rule details for this event, including ATT&CK technique mappings and native queries →

Elastic #

  • Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities source low: This rule leverages a combination of Defend for Containers and Kubernetes audit logs to detect the execution of direct interactive Kubernetes API requests via unusual utilities. An adversary may need to execute direct interactive Kubernetes API requests to gain access to the Kubernetes API server or other resources within the cluster. These requests are often used to enumerate the Kubernetes API server or other resources within the cluster, and may indicate an attempt to move laterally within the cluster.T1059, T1059.004, T1069, T1087, T1609, T1610↳ also matches get-namespaces: get namespaces, list-namespaces: list namespaces, create-namespaces: create namespaces, update-namespaces: update namespaces, patch-namespaces: patch namespaces
    Investigation guide

    Triage and analysis#

    Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

    Investigating Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities#

    This rule detects interactive commands executed inside containers that use atypical utilities to hit the Kubernetes API, paired with near-simultaneous API activity on pods, secrets, service accounts, roles/bindings, or pod exec/attach/log/portforward. It surfaces hands-on-keyboard discovery and lateral movement using custom scripts that evade common tool allowlists; for example, an intruder opens a shell in a pod, uses Python to query the in-cluster API to list secrets, then triggers pods/exec to pivot into another workload.

    Possible investigation steps#

    • Identify the implicated pod, container image, and executing service account, then quickly review its RBAC bindings and effective permissions to determine blast radius.
    • Inspect the container’s interactive session context by pulling recent command lines, shell history, environment variables, and mounted service account tokens, and look for custom scripts or binaries issuing HTTP requests.
    • Correlate nearby Kubernetes audit entries tied to the same principal and pod to map accessed resources and verbs, noting any exec/attach/portforward or sensitive object interactions across namespaces.
    • Review network activity from the pod to the API server and any in-pod proxies, including DNS lookups and outbound connections, to spot nonstandard clients or tunneling behavior.
    • If suspicious, isolate the pod or node, capture runtime artifacts (e.g., process memory or HTTP client traffic), revoke and rotate the service account credentials, and verify image provenance and integrity.

    False positive analysis#

    • An operator interactively attaches to a pod and uses a Python REPL or bash with /dev/tcp to call the in-cluster API for routine troubleshooting (e.g., list pods, read ConfigMaps, or run selfsubjectaccessreviews), producing normal audit entries that match the rule signature.
    • A correlation artifact arises when two namespaces have pods with the same name: one pod starts an interactive shell while another independently performs get/list/watch calls, and the 1-second sequence keyed only on pod-name links the unrelated events.

    Response and remediation#

    • Immediately isolate the implicated pod that issued direct API calls using a nonstandard utility by applying a deny-all egress NetworkPolicy in its namespace (including to kubernetes.default.svc:443), terminating the interactive session, and scaling its owning Deployment/Job/StatefulSet to zero replicas.
    • Before teardown, capture a runtime snapshot of the container and node including the binary or script used to query the API (e.g., files under /tmp or /dev/tcp usage), shell history, environment, and the mounted service account token and CA bundle at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/.
    • Revoke access by removing the service account’s RoleBindings/ClusterRoleBindings, deleting all pods that mount that service account to force token rotation, rotating any Secrets and ConfigMaps that were read or created during the window, and deleting any unauthorized Jobs, CronJobs, or Deployments created by the same principal.
    • Restore workloads from a known-good image digest, re-enable the Deployment only after image scan and integrity checks pass, and monitor subsequent Kubernetes audit logs for pods/exec, portforward, and access to secrets across the affected namespaces.
    • Escalate to incident response leadership and consider cluster-wide containment if audit logs show create/patch of ClusterRoleBindings, access to secrets outside the workload’s namespace, or use of pods/exec to pivot into other nodes or system namespaces such as kube-system.
    • Harden access by enforcing least-privilege RBAC that denies pods/exec and attach for application service accounts, setting automountServiceAccountToken: false on workloads that do not need it, restricting egress to the API server with NetworkPolicies, and requiring just-in-time break-glass roles for interactive access.

References #

create namespaces

#
Resource
namespaces

Example Audit Event #

{
  "kind": "Event",
  "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
  "level": "RequestResponse",
  "auditID": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
  "stage": "ResponseComplete",
  "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces?fieldManager=kubectl-create&fieldValidation=Strict",
  "verb": "create",
  "user": {
    "username": "kubernetes-admin",
    "groups": [
      "kubeadm:cluster-admins",
      "system:authenticated"
    ],
    "extra": {
      "authentication.kubernetes.io/credential-id": [
        "X509SHA256=9bb0383c49b319fbf6b5ed61ab944378956d4292c784d32244ce2fa4dd846a3c"
      ]
    }
  },
  "sourceIPs": [
    "203.0.113.10"
  ],
  "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.36.2 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/24e2b02",
  "objectRef": {
    "resource": "namespaces",
    "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "apiVersion": "v1"
  },
  "responseStatus": {
    "metadata": {},
    "code": 201
  },
  "requestObject": {
    "kind": "Namespace",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "metadata": {
      "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
      "labels": {
        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "dw-harn-namespaces"
      }
    },
    "spec": {},
    "status": {
      "phase": "Active"
    }
  },
  "responseObject": {
    "kind": "Namespace",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "metadata": {
      "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
      "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
      "resourceVersion": "1657",
      "creationTimestamp": "2026-07-02T04:48:07Z",
      "labels": {
        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "dw-harn-namespaces"
      }
    },
    "spec": {
      "finalizers": [
        "kubernetes"
      ]
    },
    "status": {
      "phase": "Active"
    }
  },
  "requestReceivedTimestamp": "2026-07-02T04:48:07.402413Z",
  "stageTimestamp": "2026-07-02T04:48:07.405606Z",
  "annotations": {
    "authorization.k8s.io/decision": "allow",
    "authorization.k8s.io/reason": "RBAC: allowed by ClusterRoleBinding \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\" of ClusterRole \"cluster-admin\" to Group \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\""
  }
}

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

FieldKindValueRulesVendors
objectRef.resource (falco rule field)eqnamespaces2 rulesfalco
stage (falco rule field)eqresponsecomplete2 rulesfalco

Detection Rules #

Full rule details for this event, including ATT&CK technique mappings and native queries →

Elastic #

  • Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities source low: This rule leverages a combination of Defend for Containers and Kubernetes audit logs to detect the execution of direct interactive Kubernetes API requests via unusual utilities. An adversary may need to execute direct interactive Kubernetes API requests to gain access to the Kubernetes API server or other resources within the cluster. These requests are often used to enumerate the Kubernetes API server or other resources within the cluster, and may indicate an attempt to move laterally within the cluster.T1059, T1059.004, T1069, T1087, T1609, T1610↳ also matches get-namespaces: get namespaces, list-namespaces: list namespaces, watch-namespaces: watch namespaces, update-namespaces: update namespaces, patch-namespaces: patch namespaces
    Investigation guide

    Triage and analysis#

    Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

    Investigating Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities#

    This rule detects interactive commands executed inside containers that use atypical utilities to hit the Kubernetes API, paired with near-simultaneous API activity on pods, secrets, service accounts, roles/bindings, or pod exec/attach/log/portforward. It surfaces hands-on-keyboard discovery and lateral movement using custom scripts that evade common tool allowlists; for example, an intruder opens a shell in a pod, uses Python to query the in-cluster API to list secrets, then triggers pods/exec to pivot into another workload.

    Possible investigation steps#

    • Identify the implicated pod, container image, and executing service account, then quickly review its RBAC bindings and effective permissions to determine blast radius.
    • Inspect the container’s interactive session context by pulling recent command lines, shell history, environment variables, and mounted service account tokens, and look for custom scripts or binaries issuing HTTP requests.
    • Correlate nearby Kubernetes audit entries tied to the same principal and pod to map accessed resources and verbs, noting any exec/attach/portforward or sensitive object interactions across namespaces.
    • Review network activity from the pod to the API server and any in-pod proxies, including DNS lookups and outbound connections, to spot nonstandard clients or tunneling behavior.
    • If suspicious, isolate the pod or node, capture runtime artifacts (e.g., process memory or HTTP client traffic), revoke and rotate the service account credentials, and verify image provenance and integrity.

    False positive analysis#

    • An operator interactively attaches to a pod and uses a Python REPL or bash with /dev/tcp to call the in-cluster API for routine troubleshooting (e.g., list pods, read ConfigMaps, or run selfsubjectaccessreviews), producing normal audit entries that match the rule signature.
    • A correlation artifact arises when two namespaces have pods with the same name: one pod starts an interactive shell while another independently performs get/list/watch calls, and the 1-second sequence keyed only on pod-name links the unrelated events.

    Response and remediation#

    • Immediately isolate the implicated pod that issued direct API calls using a nonstandard utility by applying a deny-all egress NetworkPolicy in its namespace (including to kubernetes.default.svc:443), terminating the interactive session, and scaling its owning Deployment/Job/StatefulSet to zero replicas.
    • Before teardown, capture a runtime snapshot of the container and node including the binary or script used to query the API (e.g., files under /tmp or /dev/tcp usage), shell history, environment, and the mounted service account token and CA bundle at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/.
    • Revoke access by removing the service account’s RoleBindings/ClusterRoleBindings, deleting all pods that mount that service account to force token rotation, rotating any Secrets and ConfigMaps that were read or created during the window, and deleting any unauthorized Jobs, CronJobs, or Deployments created by the same principal.
    • Restore workloads from a known-good image digest, re-enable the Deployment only after image scan and integrity checks pass, and monitor subsequent Kubernetes audit logs for pods/exec, portforward, and access to secrets across the affected namespaces.
    • Escalate to incident response leadership and consider cluster-wide containment if audit logs show create/patch of ClusterRoleBindings, access to secrets outside the workload’s namespace, or use of pods/exec to pivot into other nodes or system namespaces such as kube-system.
    • Harden access by enforcing least-privilege RBAC that denies pods/exec and attach for application service accounts, setting automountServiceAccountToken: false on workloads that do not need it, restricting egress to the API server with NetworkPolicies, and requiring just-in-time break-glass roles for interactive access.

Falco #

References #

update namespaces

#
Resource
namespaces

Example Audit Event #

{
  "kind": "Event",
  "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
  "level": "RequestResponse",
  "auditID": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
  "stage": "ResponseComplete",
  "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces/dw-harn-namespaces?fieldManager=kubectl-replace&fieldValidation=Strict",
  "verb": "update",
  "user": {
    "username": "kubernetes-admin",
    "groups": [
      "kubeadm:cluster-admins",
      "system:authenticated"
    ],
    "extra": {
      "authentication.kubernetes.io/credential-id": [
        "X509SHA256=4cf95d11cbd90036bab41cdc6b88cc8f91550e9135ed4bb61495b02f647812ff"
      ]
    }
  },
  "sourceIPs": [
    "203.0.113.10"
  ],
  "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.36.2 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/24e2b02",
  "objectRef": {
    "resource": "namespaces",
    "namespace": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "resourceVersion": "855"
  },
  "responseStatus": {
    "metadata": {},
    "code": 200
  },
  "requestObject": {
    "kind": "Namespace",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "metadata": {
      "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
      "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
      "resourceVersion": "855",
      "creationTimestamp": "2026-07-02T21:31:44Z",
      "labels": {
        "dw-harn-patched": "1",
        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "dw-harn-namespaces"
      }
    },
    "spec": {
      "finalizers": [
        "kubernetes"
      ]
    },
    "status": {
      "phase": "Active"
    }
  },
  "responseObject": {
    "kind": "Namespace",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "metadata": {
      "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
      "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
      "resourceVersion": "855",
      "creationTimestamp": "2026-07-02T21:31:44Z",
      "labels": {
        "dw-harn-patched": "1",
        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "dw-harn-namespaces"
      }
    },
    "spec": {
      "finalizers": [
        "kubernetes"
      ]
    },
    "status": {
      "phase": "Active"
    }
  },
  "requestReceivedTimestamp": "2026-07-02T21:31:47.726542Z",
  "stageTimestamp": "2026-07-02T21:31:47.729975Z",
  "annotations": {
    "authorization.k8s.io/decision": "allow",
    "authorization.k8s.io/reason": "RBAC: allowed by ClusterRoleBinding \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\" of ClusterRole \"cluster-admin\" to Group \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\""
  }
}

Detection Rules #

Full rule details for this event, including ATT&CK technique mappings and native queries →

Elastic #

  • Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities source low: This rule leverages a combination of Defend for Containers and Kubernetes audit logs to detect the execution of direct interactive Kubernetes API requests via unusual utilities. An adversary may need to execute direct interactive Kubernetes API requests to gain access to the Kubernetes API server or other resources within the cluster. These requests are often used to enumerate the Kubernetes API server or other resources within the cluster, and may indicate an attempt to move laterally within the cluster.T1059, T1059.004, T1069, T1087, T1609, T1610↳ also matches get-namespaces: get namespaces, list-namespaces: list namespaces, watch-namespaces: watch namespaces, create-namespaces: create namespaces, patch-namespaces: patch namespaces
    Investigation guide

    Triage and analysis#

    Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

    Investigating Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities#

    This rule detects interactive commands executed inside containers that use atypical utilities to hit the Kubernetes API, paired with near-simultaneous API activity on pods, secrets, service accounts, roles/bindings, or pod exec/attach/log/portforward. It surfaces hands-on-keyboard discovery and lateral movement using custom scripts that evade common tool allowlists; for example, an intruder opens a shell in a pod, uses Python to query the in-cluster API to list secrets, then triggers pods/exec to pivot into another workload.

    Possible investigation steps#

    • Identify the implicated pod, container image, and executing service account, then quickly review its RBAC bindings and effective permissions to determine blast radius.
    • Inspect the container’s interactive session context by pulling recent command lines, shell history, environment variables, and mounted service account tokens, and look for custom scripts or binaries issuing HTTP requests.
    • Correlate nearby Kubernetes audit entries tied to the same principal and pod to map accessed resources and verbs, noting any exec/attach/portforward or sensitive object interactions across namespaces.
    • Review network activity from the pod to the API server and any in-pod proxies, including DNS lookups and outbound connections, to spot nonstandard clients or tunneling behavior.
    • If suspicious, isolate the pod or node, capture runtime artifacts (e.g., process memory or HTTP client traffic), revoke and rotate the service account credentials, and verify image provenance and integrity.

    False positive analysis#

    • An operator interactively attaches to a pod and uses a Python REPL or bash with /dev/tcp to call the in-cluster API for routine troubleshooting (e.g., list pods, read ConfigMaps, or run selfsubjectaccessreviews), producing normal audit entries that match the rule signature.
    • A correlation artifact arises when two namespaces have pods with the same name: one pod starts an interactive shell while another independently performs get/list/watch calls, and the 1-second sequence keyed only on pod-name links the unrelated events.

    Response and remediation#

    • Immediately isolate the implicated pod that issued direct API calls using a nonstandard utility by applying a deny-all egress NetworkPolicy in its namespace (including to kubernetes.default.svc:443), terminating the interactive session, and scaling its owning Deployment/Job/StatefulSet to zero replicas.
    • Before teardown, capture a runtime snapshot of the container and node including the binary or script used to query the API (e.g., files under /tmp or /dev/tcp usage), shell history, environment, and the mounted service account token and CA bundle at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/.
    • Revoke access by removing the service account’s RoleBindings/ClusterRoleBindings, deleting all pods that mount that service account to force token rotation, rotating any Secrets and ConfigMaps that were read or created during the window, and deleting any unauthorized Jobs, CronJobs, or Deployments created by the same principal.
    • Restore workloads from a known-good image digest, re-enable the Deployment only after image scan and integrity checks pass, and monitor subsequent Kubernetes audit logs for pods/exec, portforward, and access to secrets across the affected namespaces.
    • Escalate to incident response leadership and consider cluster-wide containment if audit logs show create/patch of ClusterRoleBindings, access to secrets outside the workload’s namespace, or use of pods/exec to pivot into other nodes or system namespaces such as kube-system.
    • Harden access by enforcing least-privilege RBAC that denies pods/exec and attach for application service accounts, setting automountServiceAccountToken: false on workloads that do not need it, restricting egress to the API server with NetworkPolicies, and requiring just-in-time break-glass roles for interactive access.

References #

patch namespaces

#
Resource
namespaces

Example Audit Event #

{
  "kind": "Event",
  "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
  "level": "RequestResponse",
  "auditID": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
  "stage": "ResponseComplete",
  "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces/dw-harn-namespaces?fieldManager=kubectl-patch",
  "verb": "patch",
  "user": {
    "username": "kubernetes-admin",
    "groups": [
      "kubeadm:cluster-admins",
      "system:authenticated"
    ],
    "extra": {
      "authentication.kubernetes.io/credential-id": [
        "X509SHA256=9bb0383c49b319fbf6b5ed61ab944378956d4292c784d32244ce2fa4dd846a3c"
      ]
    }
  },
  "sourceIPs": [
    "203.0.113.10"
  ],
  "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.36.2 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/24e2b02",
  "objectRef": {
    "resource": "namespaces",
    "namespace": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "apiVersion": "v1"
  },
  "responseStatus": {
    "metadata": {},
    "code": 200
  },
  "requestObject": {
    "metadata": {
      "labels": {
        "dw-harn-patched": "1"
      }
    }
  },
  "responseObject": {
    "kind": "Namespace",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "metadata": {
      "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
      "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
      "resourceVersion": "1663",
      "creationTimestamp": "2026-07-02T04:48:07Z",
      "labels": {
        "dw-harn-patched": "1",
        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "dw-harn-namespaces"
      }
    },
    "spec": {
      "finalizers": [
        "kubernetes"
      ]
    },
    "status": {
      "phase": "Active"
    }
  },
  "requestReceivedTimestamp": "2026-07-02T04:48:10.671620Z",
  "stageTimestamp": "2026-07-02T04:48:10.676471Z",
  "annotations": {
    "authorization.k8s.io/decision": "allow",
    "authorization.k8s.io/reason": "RBAC: allowed by ClusterRoleBinding \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\" of ClusterRole \"cluster-admin\" to Group \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\""
  }
}

Detection Rules #

Full rule details for this event, including ATT&CK technique mappings and native queries →

Elastic #

  • Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities source low: This rule leverages a combination of Defend for Containers and Kubernetes audit logs to detect the execution of direct interactive Kubernetes API requests via unusual utilities. An adversary may need to execute direct interactive Kubernetes API requests to gain access to the Kubernetes API server or other resources within the cluster. These requests are often used to enumerate the Kubernetes API server or other resources within the cluster, and may indicate an attempt to move laterally within the cluster.T1059, T1059.004, T1069, T1087, T1609, T1610↳ also matches get-namespaces: get namespaces, list-namespaces: list namespaces, watch-namespaces: watch namespaces, create-namespaces: create namespaces, update-namespaces: update namespaces
    Investigation guide

    Triage and analysis#

    Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

    Investigating Direct Interactive Kubernetes API Request by Unusual Utilities#

    This rule detects interactive commands executed inside containers that use atypical utilities to hit the Kubernetes API, paired with near-simultaneous API activity on pods, secrets, service accounts, roles/bindings, or pod exec/attach/log/portforward. It surfaces hands-on-keyboard discovery and lateral movement using custom scripts that evade common tool allowlists; for example, an intruder opens a shell in a pod, uses Python to query the in-cluster API to list secrets, then triggers pods/exec to pivot into another workload.

    Possible investigation steps#

    • Identify the implicated pod, container image, and executing service account, then quickly review its RBAC bindings and effective permissions to determine blast radius.
    • Inspect the container’s interactive session context by pulling recent command lines, shell history, environment variables, and mounted service account tokens, and look for custom scripts or binaries issuing HTTP requests.
    • Correlate nearby Kubernetes audit entries tied to the same principal and pod to map accessed resources and verbs, noting any exec/attach/portforward or sensitive object interactions across namespaces.
    • Review network activity from the pod to the API server and any in-pod proxies, including DNS lookups and outbound connections, to spot nonstandard clients or tunneling behavior.
    • If suspicious, isolate the pod or node, capture runtime artifacts (e.g., process memory or HTTP client traffic), revoke and rotate the service account credentials, and verify image provenance and integrity.

    False positive analysis#

    • An operator interactively attaches to a pod and uses a Python REPL or bash with /dev/tcp to call the in-cluster API for routine troubleshooting (e.g., list pods, read ConfigMaps, or run selfsubjectaccessreviews), producing normal audit entries that match the rule signature.
    • A correlation artifact arises when two namespaces have pods with the same name: one pod starts an interactive shell while another independently performs get/list/watch calls, and the 1-second sequence keyed only on pod-name links the unrelated events.

    Response and remediation#

    • Immediately isolate the implicated pod that issued direct API calls using a nonstandard utility by applying a deny-all egress NetworkPolicy in its namespace (including to kubernetes.default.svc:443), terminating the interactive session, and scaling its owning Deployment/Job/StatefulSet to zero replicas.
    • Before teardown, capture a runtime snapshot of the container and node including the binary or script used to query the API (e.g., files under /tmp or /dev/tcp usage), shell history, environment, and the mounted service account token and CA bundle at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/.
    • Revoke access by removing the service account’s RoleBindings/ClusterRoleBindings, deleting all pods that mount that service account to force token rotation, rotating any Secrets and ConfigMaps that were read or created during the window, and deleting any unauthorized Jobs, CronJobs, or Deployments created by the same principal.
    • Restore workloads from a known-good image digest, re-enable the Deployment only after image scan and integrity checks pass, and monitor subsequent Kubernetes audit logs for pods/exec, portforward, and access to secrets across the affected namespaces.
    • Escalate to incident response leadership and consider cluster-wide containment if audit logs show create/patch of ClusterRoleBindings, access to secrets outside the workload’s namespace, or use of pods/exec to pivot into other nodes or system namespaces such as kube-system.
    • Harden access by enforcing least-privilege RBAC that denies pods/exec and attach for application service accounts, setting automountServiceAccountToken: false on workloads that do not need it, restricting egress to the API server with NetworkPolicies, and requiring just-in-time break-glass roles for interactive access.

References #

delete namespaces

#
Resource
namespaces

Example Audit Event #

{
  "kind": "Event",
  "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
  "level": "RequestResponse",
  "auditID": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
  "stage": "ResponseComplete",
  "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces/dw-harn-namespaces",
  "verb": "delete",
  "user": {
    "username": "kubernetes-admin",
    "groups": [
      "kubeadm:cluster-admins",
      "system:authenticated"
    ],
    "extra": {
      "authentication.kubernetes.io/credential-id": [
        "X509SHA256=9bb0383c49b319fbf6b5ed61ab944378956d4292c784d32244ce2fa4dd846a3c"
      ]
    }
  },
  "sourceIPs": [
    "203.0.113.10"
  ],
  "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.36.2 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/24e2b02",
  "objectRef": {
    "resource": "namespaces",
    "namespace": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "apiVersion": "v1"
  },
  "responseStatus": {
    "metadata": {},
    "code": 200
  },
  "requestObject": {
    "kind": "DeleteOptions",
    "apiVersion": "meta.k8s.io/__internal",
    "propagationPolicy": "Background"
  },
  "responseObject": {
    "kind": "Namespace",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "metadata": {
      "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
      "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
      "resourceVersion": "1664",
      "creationTimestamp": "2026-07-02T04:48:07Z",
      "deletionTimestamp": "2026-07-02T04:48:10Z",
      "labels": {
        "dw-harn-patched": "1",
        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "dw-harn-namespaces"
      }
    },
    "spec": {
      "finalizers": [
        "kubernetes"
      ]
    },
    "status": {
      "phase": "Terminating"
    }
  },
  "requestReceivedTimestamp": "2026-07-02T04:48:10.744437Z",
  "stageTimestamp": "2026-07-02T04:48:10.751248Z",
  "annotations": {
    "authorization.k8s.io/decision": "allow",
    "authorization.k8s.io/reason": "RBAC: allowed by ClusterRoleBinding \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\" of ClusterRole \"cluster-admin\" to Group \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\""
  }
}

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

FieldKindValueRulesVendors
objectRef.resource (falco rule field)eqnamespaces1 rulefalco

Detection Rules #

Full rule details for this event, including ATT&CK technique mappings and native queries →

Falco #

References #

update namespaces/finalize

#
Resource
namespaces

Example Audit Event #

{
  "kind": "Event",
  "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
  "level": "RequestResponse",
  "auditID": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
  "stage": "ResponseComplete",
  "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces/dw-harn-namespaces/finalize",
  "verb": "update",
  "user": {
    "username": "kubernetes-admin",
    "groups": [
      "kubeadm:cluster-admins",
      "system:authenticated"
    ],
    "extra": {
      "authentication.kubernetes.io/credential-id": [
        "X509SHA256=2f9bb39ae9e6831406f8ad02206bf46e69b5760f7adffe5feb860da290b80a7e"
      ]
    }
  },
  "sourceIPs": [
    "203.0.113.10"
  ],
  "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.36.2 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/24e2b02",
  "objectRef": {
    "resource": "namespaces",
    "namespace": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "resourceVersion": "1028",
    "subresource": "finalize"
  },
  "responseStatus": {
    "metadata": {},
    "code": 200
  },
  "requestObject": {
    "kind": "Namespace",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "metadata": {
      "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
      "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
      "resourceVersion": "1028",
      "creationTimestamp": "2026-07-03T00:15:33Z",
      "labels": {
        "dw-harn-patched": "1",
        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "dw-harn-namespaces"
      }
    },
    "spec": {
      "finalizers": [
        "kubernetes"
      ]
    },
    "status": {
      "phase": "Active"
    }
  },
  "responseObject": {
    "kind": "Namespace",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "metadata": {
      "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
      "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
      "resourceVersion": "1028",
      "creationTimestamp": "2026-07-03T00:15:33Z",
      "labels": {
        "dw-harn-patched": "1",
        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "dw-harn-namespaces"
      }
    },
    "spec": {
      "finalizers": [
        "kubernetes"
      ]
    },
    "status": {
      "phase": "Active"
    }
  },
  "requestReceivedTimestamp": "2026-07-03T00:15:37.224579Z",
  "stageTimestamp": "2026-07-03T00:15:37.227306Z",
  "annotations": {
    "authorization.k8s.io/decision": "allow",
    "authorization.k8s.io/reason": "RBAC: allowed by ClusterRoleBinding \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\" of ClusterRole \"cluster-admin\" to Group \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\""
  }
}

References #

get namespaces/status

#
Resource
namespaces

Example Audit Event #

{
  "kind": "Event",
  "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
  "level": "Metadata",
  "auditID": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
  "stage": "ResponseComplete",
  "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces/dw-harn-namespaces/status",
  "verb": "get",
  "user": {
    "username": "kubernetes-admin",
    "groups": [
      "kubeadm:cluster-admins",
      "system:authenticated"
    ],
    "extra": {
      "authentication.kubernetes.io/credential-id": [
        "X509SHA256=4cf95d11cbd90036bab41cdc6b88cc8f91550e9135ed4bb61495b02f647812ff"
      ]
    }
  },
  "sourceIPs": [
    "203.0.113.10"
  ],
  "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.36.2 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/24e2b02",
  "objectRef": {
    "resource": "namespaces",
    "namespace": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "subresource": "status"
  },
  "responseStatus": {
    "metadata": {},
    "code": 200
  },
  "requestReceivedTimestamp": "2026-07-02T21:31:47.794602Z",
  "stageTimestamp": "2026-07-02T21:31:47.796243Z",
  "annotations": {
    "authorization.k8s.io/decision": "allow",
    "authorization.k8s.io/reason": "RBAC: allowed by ClusterRoleBinding \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\" of ClusterRole \"cluster-admin\" to Group \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\""
  }
}

References #

update namespaces/status

#
Resource
namespaces

Example Audit Event #

{
  "kind": "Event",
  "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
  "level": "RequestResponse",
  "auditID": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
  "stage": "ResponseComplete",
  "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces/dw-harn-namespaces/status?fieldManager=kubectl-replace&fieldValidation=Strict",
  "verb": "update",
  "user": {
    "username": "kubernetes-admin",
    "groups": [
      "kubeadm:cluster-admins",
      "system:authenticated"
    ],
    "extra": {
      "authentication.kubernetes.io/credential-id": [
        "X509SHA256=4cf95d11cbd90036bab41cdc6b88cc8f91550e9135ed4bb61495b02f647812ff"
      ]
    }
  },
  "sourceIPs": [
    "203.0.113.10"
  ],
  "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.36.2 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/24e2b02",
  "objectRef": {
    "resource": "namespaces",
    "namespace": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "resourceVersion": "855",
    "subresource": "status"
  },
  "responseStatus": {
    "metadata": {},
    "code": 200
  },
  "requestObject": {
    "kind": "Namespace",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "metadata": {
      "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
      "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
      "resourceVersion": "855",
      "creationTimestamp": "2026-07-02T21:31:44Z",
      "labels": {
        "dw-harn-patched": "1",
        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "dw-harn-namespaces"
      }
    },
    "spec": {
      "finalizers": [
        "kubernetes"
      ]
    },
    "status": {
      "phase": "Active"
    }
  },
  "responseObject": {
    "kind": "Namespace",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "metadata": {
      "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
      "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
      "resourceVersion": "855",
      "creationTimestamp": "2026-07-02T21:31:44Z",
      "labels": {
        "dw-harn-patched": "1",
        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "dw-harn-namespaces"
      }
    },
    "spec": {
      "finalizers": [
        "kubernetes"
      ]
    },
    "status": {
      "phase": "Active"
    }
  },
  "requestReceivedTimestamp": "2026-07-02T21:31:47.923124Z",
  "stageTimestamp": "2026-07-02T21:31:47.925795Z",
  "annotations": {
    "authorization.k8s.io/decision": "allow",
    "authorization.k8s.io/reason": "RBAC: allowed by ClusterRoleBinding \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\" of ClusterRole \"cluster-admin\" to Group \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\""
  }
}

References #

patch namespaces/status

#
Resource
namespaces

Example Audit Event #

{
  "kind": "Event",
  "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
  "level": "RequestResponse",
  "auditID": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
  "stage": "ResponseComplete",
  "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces/dw-harn-namespaces/status?fieldManager=kubectl-patch",
  "verb": "patch",
  "user": {
    "username": "kubernetes-admin",
    "groups": [
      "kubeadm:cluster-admins",
      "system:authenticated"
    ],
    "extra": {
      "authentication.kubernetes.io/credential-id": [
        "X509SHA256=786fc563dbb253683c44d23d0aac3742ea61ade7f27a43f50934a82662e15409"
      ]
    }
  },
  "sourceIPs": [
    "203.0.113.10"
  ],
  "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.36.2 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/24e2b02",
  "objectRef": {
    "resource": "namespaces",
    "namespace": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "subresource": "status"
  },
  "responseStatus": {
    "metadata": {},
    "code": 200
  },
  "requestObject": {},
  "responseObject": {
    "kind": "Namespace",
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "metadata": {
      "name": "dw-harn-namespaces",
      "uid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
      "resourceVersion": "908",
      "creationTimestamp": "2026-07-02T22:18:27Z",
      "labels": {
        "dw-harn-patched": "1",
        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "dw-harn-namespaces"
      }
    },
    "spec": {
      "finalizers": [
        "kubernetes"
      ]
    },
    "status": {
      "phase": "Active"
    }
  },
  "requestReceivedTimestamp": "2026-07-02T22:18:31.057261Z",
  "stageTimestamp": "2026-07-02T22:18:31.059449Z",
  "annotations": {
    "authorization.k8s.io/decision": "allow",
    "authorization.k8s.io/reason": "RBAC: allowed by ClusterRoleBinding \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\" of ClusterRole \"cluster-admin\" to Group \"kubeadm:cluster-admins\""
  }
}

References #

any verb on namespaces (synthetic aggregation)

#
Resource
namespaces

Description

Synthetic aggregation for rules that filter the namespaces resource with no specific verb. Not a distinct audit record; hosts rule listings that key on objectRef.resource alone.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

FieldKindValueRulesVendors
EventType (elastic rule field)inget1 ruleelastic
EventType (elastic rule field)inlist1 ruleelastic

Detection Rules #

Full rule details for this event, including ATT&CK technique mappings and native queries →

Elastic #

  • Kubernetes Multi-Resource Discovery source medium: Adversaries who land credentials in a cluster—or abuse an over-privileged token—often map the environment before exfiltration or privilege escalation. A practical first pass is to learn where workloads run, how the cluster is partitioned, and what RBAC exists at namespace vs cluster scope. Rapid get/list traffic across distinct API resource kinds that answer those questions (namespaces, workloads, roles, cluster-wide roles) is a common setup and orientation pattern for both interactive attackers and automated recon scripts. It is less typical for steady-state controllers, which usually touch a narrow set of resources repeatedly. This rule highlights that cross-resource burst from a single client fingerprint within a one-minute bucket so analysts can separate routine automation from potential discovery and permission reconnaissance ahead of follow-on actions.T1613