Secrets Kubernetes-secrets

8 operations, identified by Operation in the audit log.

Operation	Description
get-secrets	Secret accessed (credential theft; service account tokens, TLS certs, API keys).
list-secrets	Secrets enumerated across a namespace or cluster.
watch-secrets
create-secrets
update-secrets
patch-secrets
delete-secrets
any-secrets	Synthetic aggregation for rules that filter the secrets resource with no specific verb. Not a distinct audit record; hosts rule listings that key on objectRef.resource alone.

get-secrets: get secrets

Resource: Kubernetes-secrets

Description

Secret accessed (credential theft; service account tokens, TLS certs, API keys).

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`get`	2 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`list`	2 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`delete`	1 rule	elastic
`Esql.timestamp_first_seen`	ge	`NOW() - 9`	1 rule	elastic
`aws::userAgent`	is_not_null		1 rule	elastic, kusto
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	eq	`secrets`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`configmaps`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`secrets`	1 rule	elastic

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

Kubernetes Secret Access via Unusual User Agent source low: This rule detects when secrets are accessed via an unusual user agent, user name and source IP. Attackers may attempt to access secrets in a Kubernetes cluster to gain access to sensitive information after gaining access to the cluster.↳ also matches list-secrets: list secrets
Kubernetes Secret or ConfigMap Access via Azure Arc Proxy source medium: Detects when secrets or configmaps are accessed, created, modified, or deleted in a Kubernetes cluster by the Azure Arc AAD proxy service account. When operations are routed through the Azure Arc Cluster Connect proxy, the Kubernetes audit log records the acting user as system:serviceaccount:azure-arc:azure-arc-kube-aad-proxy-sa with the actual caller identity in the impersonatedUser field. This pattern indicates that someone is accessing the cluster through the Azure ARM API rather than directly via kubectl against the API server. While legitimate for Arc-managed workflows, adversaries with stolen service principal credentials can abuse Arc Cluster Connect to read, exfiltrate, or modify secrets and configmaps while appearing as the Arc proxy service account in K8s audit logs.↳ also matches list-secrets: list secrets, create-secrets: create secrets, update-secrets: update secrets, patch-secrets: patch secrets, delete-secrets: delete secrets

list-secrets: list secrets

Resource: Kubernetes-secrets

Description

Secrets enumerated across a namespace or cluster.

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`get`	2 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`list`	2 rules	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`delete`	1 rule	elastic
`aws::userAgent`	is_not_null		1 rule	elastic, kusto
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	eq	`secrets`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`configmaps`	1 rule	elastic
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	in	`secrets`	1 rule	elastic
`objectRef.resource`	eq	`secrets`	1 rule	sigma, splunk
`verb`	eq	`list`	1 rule	sigma, splunk

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Secrets Enumeration source low: Detects enumeration of Kubernetes secrets.

Elastic #

Kubernetes Secret or ConfigMap Access via Azure Arc Proxy source medium: Detects when secrets or configmaps are accessed, created, modified, or deleted in a Kubernetes cluster by the Azure Arc AAD proxy service account. When operations are routed through the Azure Arc Cluster Connect proxy, the Kubernetes audit log records the acting user as system:serviceaccount:azure-arc:azure-arc-kube-aad-proxy-sa with the actual caller identity in the impersonatedUser field. This pattern indicates that someone is accessing the cluster through the Azure ARM API rather than directly via kubectl against the API server. While legitimate for Arc-managed workflows, adversaries with stolen service principal credentials can abuse Arc Cluster Connect to read, exfiltrate, or modify secrets and configmaps while appearing as the Arc proxy service account in K8s audit logs.↳ also matches get-secrets: get secrets, create-secrets: create secrets, update-secrets: update secrets, patch-secrets: patch secrets, delete-secrets: delete secrets
Kubernetes Secret Access via Unusual User Agent source low: This rule detects when secrets are accessed via an unusual user agent, user name and source IP. Attackers may attempt to access secrets in a Kubernetes cluster to gain access to sensitive information after gaining access to the cluster.↳ also matches get-secrets: get secrets

watch-secrets: watch secrets

Resource: Kubernetes-secrets

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

create-secrets: create secrets

Resource: Kubernetes-secrets

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`objectRef.resource`	eq	`secrets`	1 rule	sigma, splunk

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Secrets Modified or Deleted source medium: Detects when Kubernetes Secrets are Modified or Deleted.↳ also matches update-secrets: update secrets, patch-secrets: patch secrets, delete-secrets: delete secrets

Elastic #

Kubernetes Secret or ConfigMap Access via Azure Arc Proxy source medium: Detects when secrets or configmaps are accessed, created, modified, or deleted in a Kubernetes cluster by the Azure Arc AAD proxy service account. When operations are routed through the Azure Arc Cluster Connect proxy, the Kubernetes audit log records the acting user as system:serviceaccount:azure-arc:azure-arc-kube-aad-proxy-sa with the actual caller identity in the impersonatedUser field. This pattern indicates that someone is accessing the cluster through the Azure ARM API rather than directly via kubectl against the API server. While legitimate for Arc-managed workflows, adversaries with stolen service principal credentials can abuse Arc Cluster Connect to read, exfiltrate, or modify secrets and configmaps while appearing as the Arc proxy service account in K8s audit logs.↳ also matches get-secrets: get secrets, list-secrets: list secrets, update-secrets: update secrets, patch-secrets: patch secrets, delete-secrets: delete secrets

update-secrets: update secrets

Resource: Kubernetes-secrets

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`objectRef.resource`	eq	`secrets`	1 rule	sigma, splunk

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Secrets Modified or Deleted source medium: Detects when Kubernetes Secrets are Modified or Deleted.↳ also matches create-secrets: create secrets, patch-secrets: patch secrets, delete-secrets: delete secrets

Elastic #

Kubernetes Secret or ConfigMap Access via Azure Arc Proxy source medium: Detects when secrets or configmaps are accessed, created, modified, or deleted in a Kubernetes cluster by the Azure Arc AAD proxy service account. When operations are routed through the Azure Arc Cluster Connect proxy, the Kubernetes audit log records the acting user as system:serviceaccount:azure-arc:azure-arc-kube-aad-proxy-sa with the actual caller identity in the impersonatedUser field. This pattern indicates that someone is accessing the cluster through the Azure ARM API rather than directly via kubectl against the API server. While legitimate for Arc-managed workflows, adversaries with stolen service principal credentials can abuse Arc Cluster Connect to read, exfiltrate, or modify secrets and configmaps while appearing as the Arc proxy service account in K8s audit logs.↳ also matches get-secrets: get secrets, list-secrets: list secrets, create-secrets: create secrets, patch-secrets: patch secrets, delete-secrets: delete secrets

patch-secrets: patch secrets

Resource: Kubernetes-secrets

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`objectRef.resource`	eq	`secrets`	1 rule	sigma, splunk

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Secrets Modified or Deleted source medium: Detects when Kubernetes Secrets are Modified or Deleted.↳ also matches create-secrets: create secrets, update-secrets: update secrets, delete-secrets: delete secrets

Elastic #

Kubernetes Secret or ConfigMap Access via Azure Arc Proxy source medium: Detects when secrets or configmaps are accessed, created, modified, or deleted in a Kubernetes cluster by the Azure Arc AAD proxy service account. When operations are routed through the Azure Arc Cluster Connect proxy, the Kubernetes audit log records the acting user as system:serviceaccount:azure-arc:azure-arc-kube-aad-proxy-sa with the actual caller identity in the impersonatedUser field. This pattern indicates that someone is accessing the cluster through the Azure ARM API rather than directly via kubectl against the API server. While legitimate for Arc-managed workflows, adversaries with stolen service principal credentials can abuse Arc Cluster Connect to read, exfiltrate, or modify secrets and configmaps while appearing as the Arc proxy service account in K8s audit logs.↳ also matches get-secrets: get secrets, list-secrets: list secrets, create-secrets: create secrets, update-secrets: update secrets, delete-secrets: delete secrets

delete-secrets: delete secrets

Resource: Kubernetes-secrets

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`objectRef.resource`	eq	`secrets`	1 rule	sigma, splunk

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma #

Kubernetes Secrets Modified or Deleted source medium: Detects when Kubernetes Secrets are Modified or Deleted.↳ also matches create-secrets: create secrets, update-secrets: update secrets, patch-secrets: patch secrets

Elastic #

Kubernetes Secret or ConfigMap Access via Azure Arc Proxy source medium: Detects when secrets or configmaps are accessed, created, modified, or deleted in a Kubernetes cluster by the Azure Arc AAD proxy service account. When operations are routed through the Azure Arc Cluster Connect proxy, the Kubernetes audit log records the acting user as system:serviceaccount:azure-arc:azure-arc-kube-aad-proxy-sa with the actual caller identity in the impersonatedUser field. This pattern indicates that someone is accessing the cluster through the Azure ARM API rather than directly via kubectl against the API server. While legitimate for Arc-managed workflows, adversaries with stolen service principal credentials can abuse Arc Cluster Connect to read, exfiltrate, or modify secrets and configmaps while appearing as the Arc proxy service account in K8s audit logs.↳ also matches get-secrets: get secrets, list-secrets: list secrets, create-secrets: create secrets, update-secrets: update secrets, patch-secrets: patch secrets

any-secrets: any verb on secrets (synthetic aggregation)

Resource: Kubernetes-secrets

Description

Synthetic aggregation for rules that filter the secrets resource with no specific verb. Not a distinct audit record; hosts rule listings that key on objectRef.resource alone.

Fields #

Name	Description
`verb`	The request verb (get, list, watch, create, update, replace, patch, delete, deletecollection, ...).
`objectRef.resource`	The targeted resource type (plural API name, e.g. pods, secrets).
`objectRef.subresource`	The targeted subresource, when present (e.g. exec, log, token).
`objectRef.namespace`	Namespace of the targeted object (empty for cluster-scoped resources).
`objectRef.name`	Name of the targeted object.
`objectRef.apiGroup`	API group of the targeted resource (empty string for core group).
`user.username`	Authenticated identity that issued the request (user or service account).
`user.groups`	Groups of the requesting identity.
`sourceIPs`	Source IP addresses of the request.
`responseStatus.code`	HTTP status code of the API response (200, 201, 403, 404, ...).
`stage`	Audit stage: RequestReceived, ResponseStarted, ResponseComplete, Panic.
`requestReceivedTimestamp`	Time the apiserver received the request.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules	Vendors
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	eq	`secrets`	4 rules	elastic
`src_ip`	is_not_null		4 rules	elastic, kusto, panther
`EventType`	in	`get`	2 rules	elastic
`EventType`	in	`list`	2 rules	elastic
`aws::userAgent`	contains	`distrib#kali`	1 rule	elastic
`aws::userAgent`	contains	`kali-arm64`	1 rule	elastic
`user`	is_not_null		1 rule	elastic, kusto, splunk
`user`	starts_with	`system\:serviceaccount\:`	1 rule	elastic

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

Kubernetes Rapid Secret GET Activity Against Multiple Objects source high: This rule detects an unusual volume of Kubernetes API get requests against multiple distinct Secret objects from the same client fingerprint (user, source IP, and user agent) within a defined lookback window. This can indicate credential access or in-cluster reconnaissance, where a user or token is used to enumerate and retrieve sensitive data such as service account tokens, registry credentials, TLS material, or application configuration. Failed get requests are also included, as they may reveal RBAC boundaries, confirm the existence of targeted secrets, or reflect automated probing activity.
Kubernetes Secret get or list with Suspicious User Agent source high: Detects read access to Kubernetes Secrets (get/list) with a user agent matching a curated set of non-standard or attacker-leaning clients, for example minimal HTTP tooling, common scripting stacks, default library fingerprints, or distribution-tagged strings associated with offensive-security Linux images. Legitimate in-cluster automation usually presents stable, purpose-specific user agents (for example controller or client-go variants used by known components).
Kubernetes Secret get or list from Node or Pod Service Account source medium: Kubernetes audit identities for kubelet (system:node:*) and workloads (system:serviceaccount:*) are meant to operate with tight, predictable API usage. Direct get or list on the Secrets API from those principals is often a sign of credential access. Attackers who stole a pod service-account token or node credentials sweep Secret objects for tokens, registry credentials, TLS keys, or application configuration. Even denied attempts still reveal intent to reach sensitive material. Legitimate controllers do read secrets they mount or manage, so this signal is most valuable when paired with triage (namespace scope, user agent, RBAC, and whether the identity should touch those secret names at all).

Show 1 more (4 total)

Kubernetes Secrets List Across Cluster or Sensitive Namespaces source high: Detects list operations on Kubernetes Secrets from a non-loopback client when the request URI targets cluster-wide secrets or list operations under kube-system or default. Useful for spotting broad secret enumeration from remote clients.

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)