Azure AD STS logon events M365-AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon

2 operations, identified by Operation in the audit log.

OperationDescription
_catch_allCatch-all for M365-AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon rules matching the RecordType but no specific Operation.
PasswordLogonInitialAuthUsingPasswordA user authenticated to Azure AD STS using a password as the initial credential, before any MFA step.

_catch_all: Azure AD STS logon events (catch-all)

#
RecordType
M365-AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon

Description

Catch-all for M365-AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon rules matching the RecordType but no specific Operation.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.
ApplicationIdGUID of the application requesting the login.
ClientClient device information provided by the browser performing the login.
DevicePropertiesDevice details: Id, DisplayName, OS, Browser, IsCompliant, SessionId, DeviceTrustType (0 registered / 1 joined / 2 hybrid-joined).
ErrorCodeFor UserLoginFailed, the AADSTS error code (0 indicates a successful login).
LogonErrorFor failed logins, a user-readable reason for the failure.

References #

PasswordLogonInitialAuthUsingPassword

#
RecordType
M365-AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon

Description

A user authenticated to Azure AD STS using a password as the initial credential, before any MFA step.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.
ApplicationIdGUID of the application requesting the login.
ClientClient device information provided by the browser performing the login.
DevicePropertiesDevice details: Id, DisplayName, OS, Browser, IsCompliant, SessionId, DeviceTrustType (0 registered / 1 joined / 2 hybrid-joined).
ErrorCodeFor UserLoginFailed, the AADSTS error code (0 indicates a successful login).
LogonErrorFor failed logins, a user-readable reason for the failure.

Common Indicators #

Field/value combinations most frequently checked by detection rules targeting this event, derived from cross-vendor predicate analysis.

FieldKindValueRulesVendors
EventTypeinPasswordLogonInitialAuthUsingPassword2 ruleselastic
EventTypeinUserLoginFailed2 ruleselastic
Provider_NameinAzureActiveDirectory2 ruleselastic
Provider_NameinExchange2 ruleselastic
m365::Target.Typein02 ruleselastic
m365::Target.Typein102 ruleselastic
m365::Target.Typein22 ruleselastic
m365::Target.Typein62 ruleselastic
Esql.brute_force_typeneother1 ruleelastic
Esql.event_countge101 ruleelastic
source.as.organization.nameneMICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-as-BLOCK1 ruleelastic

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Elastic #

  • M365 Identity User Brute Force Attempted source medium: Identifies brute-force authentication activity targeting Microsoft 365 user accounts using failed sign-in patterns that match password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing behavior. Adversaries may attempt brute-force authentication with credentials obtained from previous breaches, leaks, marketplaces or guessable passwords.
  • M365 Identity User Account Lockouts source medium: Detects a burst of Microsoft 365 user account lockouts within a short 5-minute window. A high number of IdsLocked login errors across multiple user accounts may indicate brute-force attempts for the same users resulting in lockouts.

References #