Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps alert events M365-MCASAlerts

11 operations, identified by Operation in the audit log.

OperationDescription
_catch_allCatch-all for M365-MCASAlerts rules matching the RecordType but no specific Operation.
Activity from anonymous IP addressesDefender for Cloud Apps detected user activity originating from an IP address associated with anonymizing proxies or Tor exit nodes.
Activity from infrequent countryDefender for Cloud Apps detected user activity from a geographic location not previously seen for that user.
Activity from suspicious IP addressesDefender for Cloud Apps detected user activity from an IP address classified as malicious by Microsoft Threat Intelligence.
Activity performed by terminated userDefender for Cloud Apps detected activity from a user account whose account has been disabled or terminated.
Data exfiltration to unsanctioned appsDefender for Cloud Apps detected a significant volume of data being transferred to unsanctioned cloud applications.
Impossible travel activityDefender for Cloud Apps detected sign-ins or activity from two geographically distant locations within a time window that precludes physical travel.
Log on from a risky IP addressDefender for Cloud Apps detected a sign-in from an IP address with a high risk score based on threat intelligence feeds.
Potential ransomware activityDefender for Cloud Apps detected file activity patterns consistent with ransomware, such as rapid mass file modification or deletion.
Suspicious inbox forwardingDefender for Cloud Apps detected a new inbox-forwarding rule that routes mail to an external address, a common data exfiltration technique.
Suspicious OAuth app file download activitiesDefender for Cloud Apps detected an OAuth application downloading an unusually large number of files, suggesting credential abuse or data staging.

_catch_all: Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps alert events (catch-all)

#
RecordType
M365-MCASAlerts

Description

Catch-all for M365-MCASAlerts rules matching the RecordType but no specific Operation.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.

References #

Activity from anonymous IP addresses

#
RecordType
M365-MCASAlerts

Description

Defender for Cloud Apps detected user activity originating from an IP address associated with anonymizing proxies or Tor exit nodes.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.

References #

Activity from infrequent country

#
RecordType
M365-MCASAlerts

Description

Defender for Cloud Apps detected user activity from a geographic location not previously seen for that user.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.

References #

Activity from suspicious IP addresses

#
RecordType
M365-MCASAlerts

Description

Defender for Cloud Apps detected user activity from an IP address classified as malicious by Microsoft Threat Intelligence.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.

References #

Activity performed by terminated user

#
RecordType
M365-MCASAlerts

Description

Defender for Cloud Apps detected activity from a user account whose account has been disabled or terminated.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.

References #

Data exfiltration to unsanctioned apps

#
RecordType
M365-MCASAlerts

Description

Defender for Cloud Apps detected a significant volume of data being transferred to unsanctioned cloud applications.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.

References #

Impossible travel activity

#
RecordType
M365-MCASAlerts

Description

Defender for Cloud Apps detected sign-ins or activity from two geographically distant locations within a time window that precludes physical travel.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.

References #

Log on from a risky IP address

#
RecordType
M365-MCASAlerts

Description

Defender for Cloud Apps detected a sign-in from an IP address with a high risk score based on threat intelligence feeds.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.

References #

Potential ransomware activity

#
RecordType
M365-MCASAlerts

Description

Defender for Cloud Apps detected file activity patterns consistent with ransomware, such as rapid mass file modification or deletion.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.

References #

Suspicious inbox forwarding

#
RecordType
M365-MCASAlerts

Description

Defender for Cloud Apps detected a new inbox-forwarding rule that routes mail to an external address, a common data exfiltration technique.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.

References #

Suspicious OAuth app file download activities

#
RecordType
M365-MCASAlerts

Description

Defender for Cloud Apps detected an OAuth application downloading an unusually large number of files, suggesting credential abuse or data staging.

Fields #

NameDescription
RecordTypeAuditLogRecordType enum value (named string in Sentinel OfficeActivity; integer in the raw Management Activity API JSON).
OperationThe name of the user or admin activity. For Exchange admin activity this is the cmdlet name; for DLP it is DlpRuleMatch/DlpRuleUndo/DlpInfo. The per-event discriminator (event.action in Elastic ECS).
WorkloadThe Microsoft 365 service where the activity occurred (Exchange, SharePoint, AzureActiveDirectory, MicrosoftTeams, ...). Surfaces as event.provider in Elastic ECS.
ResultStatusWhether the action succeeded: Succeeded, PartiallySucceeded, or Failed (True/False for Exchange admin). For STS-logon events this reflects only the HTTP operation, not logon success: check LogonError.
UserIdUPN of the user who performed the action; system-account and app@sharepoint values also appear.
UserTypeType of actor: Regular, Admin, System, DcAdmin, Application, ServicePrincipal.
UserKeyAlternative ID for the user (the PUID for SharePoint / OneDrive / Exchange events).
ClientIPIPv4/IPv6 address of the device used; may be a trusted-app IP, and is null for Microsoft Entra ID events.
ObjectIdFor SharePoint/OneDrive, the full path of the file/folder; for Exchange admin, the object modified by the cmdlet; shape is operation-specific.
OrganizationIdGUID of the tenant's Office 365 organization (constant per tenant).
IdUnique identifier (GUID) for the audit record.
CreationTimeUTC date/time when the audit record was generated.
ScopeSource of the event: online (a Microsoft 365 service) or onprem (an on-premises service; currently SharePoint only).
AppAccessContextApplication context for the user or service principal that performed the action.

References #