Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls

8 events across 1 channel

Event	Title	Channel	Sample
1	task_0	Operational	N
2	task_02	Operational	Y
3	task_03	Operational	N
4	task_04	Operational	N
5	OpenProcess API call audited	Operational	Y
6	OpenThread API call audited	Operational	Y
7	task_07	Operational	N
8	task_08	Operational	N

Event ID 1: task_0

Provider: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls
Channel: Operational
Opcode: Info

Fields #

Name	Description
`NotifyRoutineAddress` Pointer
`ReturnCode` UInt32

Event ID 2: task_02

Provider: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls
Channel: Operational
Also via: realtime ETW trace
Level: Informational
Opcode: Info

Fields #

Name	Description
`TargetProcessId` UInt32	Process ID of the target process.
`ReturnCode` UInt32
`TargetProcessStartKey` UInt64	Kernel-assigned unique key for the target process.
`TargetProcessCreationTime` FILETIME

Example Event #

{
  "system": {
    "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls",
    "guid": "{E02A841C-75A3-4FA7-AFC8-AE09CF9B7F23}",
    "event_source_name": "",
    "event_id": 2,
    "version": 1,
    "level": 4,
    "task": 0,
    "opcode": 0,
    "keywords": "0x0000000000000000",
    "time_created": "2026-06-02T05:54:07.805+00:00",
    "event_record_id": 0,
    "correlation": {},
    "execution": {
      "process_id": 2596,
      "thread_id": 16456
    },
    "channel": "ETW Trace",
    "computer": "DESKTOP-FF3N5XK",
    "security": {
      "user_id": ""
    }
  },
  "event_data": {
    "ReturnCode": 3221225738,
    "TargetProcessCreationTime": "2026-06-02 05:54:07.672Z",
    "TargetProcessId": 17656,
    "TargetProcessStartKey": 1970324837006743
  },
  "message": ""
}

Event ID 3: task_03

Provider: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls
Channel: Operational
Opcode: Info

Fields #

Name	Description
`LinkSourceName` UnicodeString
`LinkTargetName` UnicodeString
`DesiredAccess` UInt32	Process access rights reference
`ReturnCode` UInt32

Event ID 4: task_04

Provider: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls
Channel: Operational
Opcode: Info

Fields #

Name	Description
`ReturnCode` UInt32

Event ID 5: OpenProcess API call audited

Provider: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls
Channel: Operational
Also via: realtime ETW trace
Level: Informational
Opcode: Info

Description

Kernel audit of a process-handle open (OpenProcess/NtOpenProcess). The manifest carries no event names (task_05); identification is grounded in the payload shape: TargetProcessId + DesiredAccess + ReturnCode. This is the same kernel audit hook Microsoft Defender for Endpoint surfaces as the DeviceEvents OpenProcessApiCall ActionType. Collectible by any admin ETW session, but payloads are sparse: process ids and access mask only, no image paths or command lines.

Fields #

Name	Description
`TargetProcessId` UInt32	Process ID of the target process.
`DesiredAccess` UInt32	Process access rights reference
`ReturnCode` UInt32

Example Event #

{
  "system": {
    "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls",
    "guid": "{E02A841C-75A3-4FA7-AFC8-AE09CF9B7F23}",
    "event_source_name": "",
    "event_id": 5,
    "version": 0,
    "level": 4,
    "task": 0,
    "opcode": 0,
    "keywords": "0x0000000000000000",
    "time_created": "2026-06-02T05:25:24.188+00:00",
    "event_record_id": 0,
    "correlation": {},
    "execution": {
      "process_id": 15888,
      "thread_id": 15800
    },
    "channel": "ETW Trace",
    "computer": "JD-DC01-2022",
    "security": {
      "user_id": ""
    }
  },
  "event_data": {
    "DesiredAccess": 0,
    "ReturnCode": 0,
    "TargetProcessId": 15888
  },
  "message": ""
}

Detection Patterns #

Defender-DeviceEvents OpenProcessApiCall: Process openedORProcessPrimaryTokenModified: Process primary token modifiedORKernel-Audit-API-Calls Event ID 5: OpenProcess API call auditedORSysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess

1 rule

Kusto

LSASS Dumping using Debug Privileges (source)

FalconForce

Event ID 6: OpenThread API call audited

Provider: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls
Channel: Operational
Also via: realtime ETW trace
Level: Informational
Opcode: Info

Description

Kernel audit of a thread-handle open (OpenThread/NtOpenThread). The manifest carries no event names (task_06); identification is grounded in the payload shape: TargetProcessId + TargetThreatId (sic) + DesiredAccess + ReturnCode. Sibling of event 5 (OpenProcess audit).

Fields #

Name	Description
`TargetProcessId` UInt32	Process ID of the target process.
`TargetThreatId` UInt32
`DesiredAccess` UInt32	Process access rights reference
`ReturnCode` UInt32

Example Event #

{
  "system": {
    "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls",
    "guid": "{E02A841C-75A3-4FA7-AFC8-AE09CF9B7F23}",
    "event_source_name": "",
    "event_id": 6,
    "version": 0,
    "level": 4,
    "task": 0,
    "opcode": 0,
    "keywords": "0x0000000000000000",
    "time_created": "2026-06-02T05:25:24.309+00:00",
    "event_record_id": 0,
    "correlation": {},
    "execution": {
      "process_id": 952,
      "thread_id": 4784
    },
    "channel": "ETW Trace",
    "computer": "JD-DC01-2022",
    "security": {
      "user_id": ""
    }
  },
  "event_data": {
    "DesiredAccess": 2097151,
    "ReturnCode": 0,
    "TargetProcessId": 13804,
    "TargetThreatId": 15016
  },
  "message": ""
}

Event ID 7: task_07

Provider: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls
Channel: Operational
Opcode: Info

Fields #

Name	Description
`DriverName` UnicodeString
`ReturnCode` UInt32

Event ID 8: task_08

Provider: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls
Channel: Operational
Opcode: Info

Fields #

Name	Description
`DriverName` UnicodeString
`ReturnCode` UInt32

Provenance

Where this provider's schema came from, and which Windows build it was observed on. Windows can change a provider's event schema between builds, so use this to judge whether it matches the build you collect from.

ETW provider GUID {E02A841C-75A3-4FA7-AFC8-AE09CF9B7F23}

Defined in Microsoft-Windows-System-Events.dll, which carries the event manifest.

Observed on:

WS2022-20348.4893, sample captured from a live trace, binary version 10.0.20348.3932, captured 2026-06-02
Win11-26200.6584, sample captured from a live trace, binary version 10.0.26100.5074, captured 2026-06-02
WS2022-20348.4893, schema read from the registered manifest, binary version 10.0.20348.3932, captured 2026-06-02
Win11-26200.6584, schema read from the registered manifest, binary version 10.0.26100.5074, captured 2026-06-02

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls

Event ID 1: task_0

Fields #

Event ID 2: task_02

Fields #

Example Event #

Event ID 3: task_03

Fields #

Event ID 4: task_04

Fields #

Event ID 5: OpenProcess API call audited

Description

Fields #

Example Event #

Detection Patterns #

Kusto

Event ID 6: OpenThread API call audited

Description

Fields #

Example Event #

Event ID 7: task_07

Fields #

Event ID 8: task_08

Fields #

Provenance

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