Detection rules › YARA-L

YARA-L rules: 05

Client Secret Added to Entra ID Application

#
Severity
medium
Type
alert
Time window
5m
Match by
user
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Secrets added to applications have legitimate purposes, but can also be a method of persistence.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

 rule entra_id_secret_added_to_app {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Secrets added to applications have legitimate purposes, but can also be a method of persistence."
    rule_id = "mr_22d3881f-f84d-42ee-a1bc-5d5eb419b769"
    rule_name = "Client Secret Added to Entra ID Application"
    tactic = "TA0003"
    technique = "T1098.001"
    type = "alert"
    platform = "azure"
    data_source = "azure ad"
    severity = "Medium"
    priority = "Medium"

  events:
    $app.metadata.event_type = "SERVICE_MODIFICATION"
    $app.metadata.product_event_type = /Update application.*Certificates and secrets management/
    $app.metadata.product_name = "Azure AD Directory Audit"
    $app.metadata.vendor_name = "Microsoft"
    $app.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
    $app.principal.user.userid = $user

  match:
    $user over 5m

  outcome:
    $risk_score = 65
    $event_count = count_distinct($app.metadata.id)
    $user_agent = array_distinct($app.network.http.user_agent)
    $network_session = array_distinct($app.network.session_id)
    $principal_county_region = array_distinct($app.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
    $principal_ip = array_distinct($app.principal.ip)
    $principal_email = array_distinct($app.principal.user.email_addresses)
    $target_application = array_distinct($app.target.resource.name)
    $target_application_id = array_distinct($app.target.resource.product_object_id)

  condition:
    $app
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $app event in the 5m window.

Events

$app SERVICE_MODIFICATION

  • metadata.product_event_type matches "Update application.*Certificates and secrets management"
  • security_result.action = "ALLOW"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$user (principal.user.userid)
Within
5m

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_score65
event_countcount_distinct($app.metadata.id)
user_agentarray_distinct($app.network.http.user_agent)
network_sessionarray_distinct($app.network.session_id)
principal_county_regionarray_distinct($app.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
principal_iparray_distinct($app.principal.ip)
principal_emailarray_distinct($app.principal.user.email_addresses)
target_applicationarray_distinct($app.target.resource.name)
target_application_idarray_distinct($app.target.resource.product_object_id)

Multiple failed unique file downloads from OneDrive observed in the Microsoft Graph API

#
Severity
low
Type
alert
Time window
15m
Match by
ip, session
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

This detects when a 401 Unauthorized status code is returned when attempting to download multiple unique files from OneDrive and may indicate a permissions issue for the user.

Rule Body

// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule ms_graph_failed_file_downloads_uniq_docs {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "This detects when a 401 Unauthorized status code is returned when attempting to download multiple unique files from OneDrive and may indicate a permissions issue for the user."
    rule_id = "mr_63f3d1b6-6d0c-4d35-8faf-2876aeb5c2e7"
    rule_name = "Multiple failed unique file downloads from OneDrive observed in the Microsoft Graph API"
    type = "alert"
    data_source = "MS Graph Activity Logs"
    platform = "Azure"
    severity = "Low"
    priority = "Low"

  events:
    $api.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_HTTP"
    $api.metadata.product_event_type = "Microsoft Graph Activity"
    re.regex($api.target.url, `^https://graph\.microsoft\.com/v1\.0/drives/.*/content$`) nocase
    //Can be tuned for specific User Agent strings being used - by default GraphRunner does not forge the UA for this action
    //$api.network.http.user_agent = /PowerShell/ nocase
    $api.network.http.method = "GET"
    $api.network.http.response_code = 401
    $api.principal.ip = $ip
    $api.network.session_id = $session

  match:
    $ip, $session over 15m

  outcome:
    $risk_score = 35
    $event_count = count_distinct($api.metadata.id)
    $doc_count = count_distinct($api.target.url)
    $requesting_user_guid = array_distinct($api.principal.user.userid)
    $requesting_ip = array_distinct($api.principal.ip)
    $user_agent = array_distinct($api.network.http.user_agent)
    $location = array_distinct($api.principal.location.name)
    $target_application_id_guid = array_distinct($api.target.resource.product_object_id)
    $session_id = array_distinct($api.network.session_id)
    $target_url = array_distinct($api.target.url)

  condition:
    //Threshold on unique docs can be modified here
    $api and $doc_count > 2
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $api event in the 15m window and $doc_count > 2.

Events

$api NETWORK_HTTP

  • metadata.product_event_type = "Microsoft Graph Activity"
  • target.url matches "^https://graph\.microsoft\.com/v1\.0/drives/.*/content$"
  • network.http.method = "GET"
  • network.http.response_code = "401"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$ip (principal.ip), $session (network.session_id)
Within
15m

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_score35
event_countcount_distinct($api.metadata.id)
doc_countcount_distinct($api.target.url)
requesting_user_guidarray_distinct($api.principal.user.userid)
requesting_iparray_distinct($api.principal.ip)
user_agentarray_distinct($api.network.http.user_agent)
locationarray_distinct($api.principal.location.name)
target_application_id_guidarray_distinct($api.target.resource.product_object_id)
session_idarray_distinct($api.network.session_id)
target_urlarray_distinct($api.target.url)

PrintBrm ZIP Creation of Extraction

#
Severity
high
Type
Detection
Time window
5m
Match by
hostname
Author
frack113
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects the execution of the LOLBIN PrintBrm.exe, which can be used to create or extract ZIP files. PrintBrm.exe should not be run on a normal workstation

Known False Positives

  • Unknown

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Command & Control

References

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule printbrm_zip_creation_or_extraction {

  meta:
    author = "frack113"
    description = "Detects the execution of the LOLBIN PrintBrm.exe, which can be used to create or extract ZIP files. PrintBrm.exe should not be run on a normal workstation"
    reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_printbrm.yml"
    license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
    rule_name = "PrintBrm ZIP Creation of Extraction"
    sigma_uuid = "cafeeba3-01da-4ab4-b6c4-a31b1d9730c7"
    sigma_status = "test"
    rule_id = "mr_3d3036d7-f2f8-4037-ab33-f4cef1e1f4b5"
    tactic = "TA0011"
    technique = "T1105"
    type = "Detection"
    data_source = "Windows Event Logs"
    platform = "Windows"
    severity = "High"
    priority = "High"
    false_positives = "Unknown"

  events:
    $process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    re.regex($process.target.process.file.full_path, `\\PrintBrm\.exe$`) nocase
    (
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), " -f") and
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), ".zip")
    )
    $process.principal.hostname = $hostname

  match:
    $hostname over 5m

  outcome:
    //example usage of specifying test user and hostname to adjust risk score
    $risk_score = max(if($process.principal.user.userid = "user" and $process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
    $principal_process_pid = array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
    $principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
    $principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
    $principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
    $principal_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
    $target_process_pid = array_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
    $target_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
    $target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
    $target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
    $target_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
    $log_type = array_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type))

  condition:
    $process
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $process event in the 5m window.

Events

$process PROCESS_LAUNCH (1, 4688)

  • target.process.file.full_path matches "\\PrintBrm\.exe$"
  • target.process.command_line contains " -f"
  • target.process.command_line contains ".zip"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$hostname (principal.hostname)
Within
5m

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax(if($process.principal.user.userid = "user" and $process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
principal_process_pidarray_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
principal_process_command_linearray_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
principal_process_file_sha256array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
principal_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
principal_process_product_specfic_process_idarray_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_idarray_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
target_process_pidarray_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
target_process_command_linearray_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
target_process_file_sha256array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
target_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
target_process_product_specfic_process_idarray_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_user_useridarray_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
log_typearray_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type))

PUA - Nimgrab Execution

#
Severity
high
Type
Detection
Time window
5m
Match by
hostname
Author
frack113
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects the usage of nimgrab, a tool bundled with the Nim programming framework and used for downloading files.

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate use of Nim on a developer systems

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Command & Control

References

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule pua_nimgrab_execution {

  meta:
    author = "frack113"
    description = "Detects the usage of nimgrab, a tool bundled with the Nim programming framework and used for downloading files."
    reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_nimgrab.yml"
    license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
    rule_name = "PUA - Nimgrab Execution"
    sigma_uuid = "74a12f18-505c-4114-8d0b-8448dd5485c6"
    sigma_status = "test"
    rule_id = "mr_70b5f0f8-6bd3-42ab-be2f-928084b09942"
    tactic = "TA0011"
    technique = "T1105"
    type = "Detection"
    data_source = "Sysmon"
    platform = "Windows"
    severity = "High"
    priority = "High"
    false_positives = "Legitimate use of Nim on a developer systems"

  events:
    $process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    (
        re.regex($process.target.process.file.full_path, `\\nimgrab\.exe$`) nocase or
        (
            strings.contains(strings.to_upper($process.target.process.file.md5), "2DD44C3C29D667F5C0EF5F9D7C7FFB8B") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_upper($process.target.process.file.sha256), "F266609E91985F0FE3E31C5E8FAEEEC4FFA5E0322D8B6F15FE69F4C5165B9559") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_upper($process.target.process.file.pe_file.imphash), "C07FDDD21D123EA9B3A08EEF44AAAC45")
        )
    )
    $process.principal.hostname = $hostname

  match:
    $hostname over 5m

  outcome:
    //example usage of specifying test user and hostname to adjust risk score
    $risk_score = max(if($process.principal.user.userid = "user" and $process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
    $principal_process_pid = array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
    $principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
    $principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
    $principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
    $principal_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
    $target_process_pid = array_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
    $target_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
    $target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
    $target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
    $target_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
    $log_type = array_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type))

  condition:
    $process
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $process event in the 5m window.

Events

$process PROCESS_LAUNCH (1, 4688)

  • target.process.file.full_path matches "\\nimgrab\.exe$"
  • target.process.file.md5 contains "2DD44C3C29D667F5C0EF5F9D7C7FFB8B"
  • target.process.file.sha256 contains "F266609E91985F0FE3E31C5E8FAEEEC4FFA5E0322D8B6F15FE69F4C5165B9559"
  • target.process.file.pe_file.imphash contains "C07FDDD21D123EA9B3A08EEF44AAAC45"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$hostname (principal.hostname)
Within
5m

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax(if($process.principal.user.userid = "user" and $process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
principal_process_pidarray_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
principal_process_command_linearray_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
principal_process_file_sha256array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
principal_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
principal_process_product_specfic_process_idarray_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_idarray_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
target_process_pidarray_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
target_process_command_linearray_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
target_process_file_sha256array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
target_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
target_process_product_specfic_process_idarray_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_user_useridarray_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
log_typearray_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type))

sap function module testing detected

#
Severity
medium
Time window
1h
Match by
user
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects direct execution and testing of SAP Function Modules via SE37 test frame. This identifies correlation between a transaction start (AU7) and a function module call (BU4) in close succession

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Execution

Rule Body

// Copyright 2026 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule sap_function_module_testing_detected {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Detects direct execution and testing of SAP Function Modules via SE37 test frame. This identifies correlation between a transaction start (AU7) and a function module call (BU4) in close succession"
    severity = "Medium"
    tactic = "TA0002"
    technique = "T1129"

  events:
    $e.security_result.detection_fields["slgtc_1"] = /^SE37$|^SE80$|^SEU_INT$/
    $e.principal.process.file.names = "RS_TESTFRAME_CALL"

    $user = $e.principal.user.userid

  match:
    $user over 1h

  outcome:
    $resource_accessed = array_distinct($e.additional.fields["param1_1"])
    $event_name = array_distinct($e.security_result.summary)
    $description = array_distinct($e.metadata.description)
    $msg = array_distinct($e.additional.fields["msg_1"])
    $src_ip = array_distinct($e.principal.ip)

  condition:
    $e
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $e event in the 1h window.

Events

$e

  • security_result.detection_fields["slgtc_1"] matches "^SE37$|^SE80$|^SEU_INT$"
  • principal.process.file.names = "RS_TESTFRAME_CALL"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$user
Within
1h

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
resource_accessedarray_distinct($e.additional.fields["param1_1"])
event_namearray_distinct($e.security_result.summary)
descriptionarray_distinct($e.metadata.description)
msgarray_distinct($e.additional.fields["msg_1"])
src_iparray_distinct($e.principal.ip)

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