Detection rules › YARA-L
YARA-L rules: 18
| Rule | Severity |
|---|---|
| LSASS Memory Access by Tool With Dump Keyword In Name | high |
| Office 365 mail accessed via unexpected application | medium |
LSASS Memory Access by Tool With Dump Keyword In Name
#Detects LSASS process access requests from a source process with the dump keyword in its image name
Known False Positives
- Rare programs that contain the word dump in their name and access lsass
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
References
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 10: ProcessAccess |
Rule Body
// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule lsass_memory_access_by_tool_dump_keyword_name {
meta:
author = "Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)"
description = "Detects LSASS process access requests from a source process with the dump keyword in its image name"
reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_dump_keyword_image.yml"
license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
rule_name = "LSASS Memory Access by Tool With Dump Keyword In Name"
sigma_uuid = "9bd012ee-0dff-44d7-84a0-aa698cfd87a3"
sigma_status = "test"
rule_id = "mr_98164cc1-0051-49c1-b915-421b3c119bfe"
tactic = "TA0006"
technique = "T1003.001"
type = "Detection"
data_source = "Sysmon"
platform = "Windows"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
false_positives = "Rare programs that contain the word dump in their name and access lsass"
events:
$process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_OPEN"
re.regex($process.target.process.file.full_path, `\\lsass.exe$`) nocase
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.principal.process.file.full_path), "dump")
re.regex($process.target.resource.name, `(10|30|50|70|90|B0|D0|F0|18|38|58|78|98|B8|D8|F8|1A|3A|5A|7A|9A|BA|DA|FA|0x14C2|FF)$`) nocase
$process.principal.hostname = $hostname
match:
$hostname over 5m
outcome:
//example usage of specifying test hostname to adjust risk score
$risk_score = max(if($process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
$principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
$target_process_pid = array_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
$target_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
$target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
$target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
$target_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
$log_type = array_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type))
condition:
$process
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $process event in the 5m window.
Events
$process
target.process.file.full_path matches "\\lsass.exe$"principal.process.file.full_path contains "dump"target.resource.name matches "(10|30|50|70|90|B0|D0|F0|18|38|58|78|98|B8|D8|F8|1A|3A|5A|7A|9A|BA|DA|FA|0x14C2|FF)$"
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(if($process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15)) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line) |
principal_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id) |
target_process_pid | array_distinct($process.target.process.pid) |
target_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line) |
target_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256) |
target_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path) |
target_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id) |
log_type | array_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type)) |
Office 365 mail accessed via unexpected application
#Detect mail items accessed via API through an unapproved Entra ID application.
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Microsoft 365 | MailItemsAccessed |
Rule Body
// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule o365_mail_access_api {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detect mail items accessed via API through an unapproved Entra ID application."
rule_id = "mr_c8d8368c-db01-4903-a81f-bab51fc1a732"
rule_name = "Office 365 mail accessed via unexpected application"
type = "alert"
platform = "azure"
data_source = "o365"
severity = "Medium"
priority = "Medium"
events:
$email.metadata.event_type = "EMAIL_UNCATEGORIZED"
$email.metadata.product_event_type = "MailItemsAccessed"
$email.metadata.product_name = "Office 365"
$email.metadata.vendor_name = "Microsoft"
$email.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
$email.network.http.user_agent = /Client=REST;/ nocase
//Reference list could be used; add Entra ID applications that users would normally access mail through to this list so they are not detected
NOT (
$email.target.labels["ClientAppId"] = "a3883eba-fbe9-48bd-9ed3-dca3e0e84250" or //Exchange Online
$email.target.labels["ClientAppId"] = "13937bba-652e-4c46-b222-3003f4d1ff97" or //Substrate Context Service
$email.target.labels["ClientAppId"] = "d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c" //Microsoft Office
)
//$email.target.labels["ClientAppId"] != ""
$email.principal.user.userid = $user
match:
$user over 5m
outcome:
$risk_score = 65
$event_count = count_distinct($email.metadata.id)
$user_agent = array_distinct($email.network.http.user_agent)
$target_application = array_distinct($email.target.application)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($email.principal.user.userid)
$application_guid = array_distinct($email.target.labels["ClientAppId"])
$mail_folder = array_distinct($email.about.resource.name)
condition:
$email
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $email event in the 5m window.
Events
$email
metadata.product_event_type = "MailItemsAccessed"security_result.action = "ALLOW"network.http.user_agent matches "Client=REST;"target.labels["ClientAppId"]is one of:a3883eba-fbe9-48bd-9ed3-dca3e0e8425013937bba-652e-4c46-b222-3003f4d1ff97d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | 65 |
event_count | count_distinct($email.metadata.id) |
user_agent | array_distinct($email.network.http.user_agent) |
target_application | array_distinct($email.target.application) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($email.principal.user.userid) |
application_guid | array_distinct($email.target.labels["ClientAppId"]) |
mail_folder | array_distinct($email.about.resource.name) |