Detection rules › YARA-L
YARA-L rules: 1m
| Rule | Severity |
|---|---|
| AWS Lateral Movement Using IAM Session Token | low |
| Google Workspace Encryption Key File Accessed By An Anonymous User | medium |
| O365 Entra ID App Permissions Percent Threshold Exceeded | medium |
AWS Lateral Movement Using IAM Session Token
#Detect when an IAM session token is created and used from a different IP.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry Coverage
Rule Body
// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule aws_lateral_movement_using_iam_session_token {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detect when an IAM session token is created and used from a different IP."
rule_id = "mr_ac0df875-fe5b-49af-bf2a-3da341177754"
rule_name = "AWS Lateral Movement Using IAM Session Token"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Lateral Movement"
mitre_attack_technique = "Use Alternate Authentication Material"
mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/"
mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
type = "Alert"
data_source = "AWS CloudTrail"
platform = "AWS"
severity = "Low"
priority = "Low"
events:
$accesskey.metadata.vendor_name = "AMAZON"
$accesskey.metadata.product_name = "AWS CloudTrail"
$accesskey.metadata.product_event_type = "GetSessionToken"
$accesskey.security_result.action= "ALLOW"
$accesskey.principal.user.userid = $p_userid
$latmove.metadata.vendor_name = "AMAZON"
$latmove.metadata.product_name = "AWS CloudTrail"
//Different IP address and Same Temp Session Token used
$accesskey.principal.ip != $latmove.principal.ip
$latmove.additional.fields["accessKeyId"] != ""
$accesskey.target.resource.product_object_id = $latmove.additional.fields["accessKeyId"]
$accesskey.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds < $latmove.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds
match:
$p_userid over 1h
outcome:
$risk_score = max(35)
$mitre_attack_tactic = "Lateral Movement"
$mitre_attack_technique = "Use Alternate Authentication Material"
$mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1550"
$event_count = count_distinct($latmove.metadata.id)
$network_http_user_agent = array_distinct($latmove.network.http.user_agent)
$principal_ip = array_distinct($latmove.principal.ip)
$principal_ip_country = array_distinct($latmove.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
$principal_ip_state = array_distinct($latmove.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
$principal_user_display_name = array_distinct($latmove.principal.user.user_display_name)
$dc_principal_user_display_name = count_distinct($latmove.principal.user.user_display_name)
$is_mfa_used = array_distinct($latmove.extensions.auth.auth_details)
$target_resource_name = array_distinct($latmove.target.resource.name)
$target_resource_product_object_id = array_distinct($latmove.target.resource.product_object_id)
$product_event_types = array_distinct($latmove.metadata.product_event_type)
condition:
$accesskey and $latmove
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $accesskey event in the 1h window and at least one $latmove event in the 1h window.
Events
$accesskey
metadata.product_event_type = "GetSessionToken"security_result.action = "ALLOW"principal.ip cross_field_compare "latmove.principal.ip"target.resource.product_object_id cross_field_compare "latmove.additional.fields["accessKeyId"]"
$latmove
additional.fields["accessKeyId"] is not null
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(35) |
event_count | count_distinct($latmove.metadata.id) |
network_http_user_agent | array_distinct($latmove.network.http.user_agent) |
principal_ip | array_distinct($latmove.principal.ip) |
principal_ip_country | array_distinct($latmove.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region) |
principal_ip_state | array_distinct($latmove.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state) |
principal_user_display_name | array_distinct($latmove.principal.user.user_display_name) |
dc_principal_user_display_name | count_distinct($latmove.principal.user.user_display_name) |
is_mfa_used | array_distinct($latmove.extensions.auth.auth_details) |
target_resource_name | array_distinct($latmove.target.resource.name) |
target_resource_product_object_id | array_distinct($latmove.target.resource.product_object_id) |
product_event_types | array_distinct($latmove.metadata.product_event_type) |
Google Workspace Encryption Key File Accessed By An Anonymous User
#Identifies when an encryption key file is accessed by an anonymous user in Google Drive. An adversary may attempt to access encryption keys before moving laterally and compromising sensitive data.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
Telemetry Coverage
Rules Detecting the Same Action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- Google Workspace Malicious File Downloaded (YARA-L)
- Google Workspace Many Docs Downloaded (Panther)
- Google Workspace Multiple Files Copied From Google Drive (YARA-L)
- Google Workspace Multiple Files Downloaded From Google Drive (YARA-L)
- Google Workspace Object Copied from External Drive with App Consent (Elastic)
- Google Workspace Suspicious Login and Google Drive File Download (YARA-L)
Rule Body
// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule google_workspace_encryption_key_files_accessed_by_anonymous_user {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Identifies when an encryption key file is accessed by an anonymous user in Google Drive. An adversary may attempt to access encryption keys before moving laterally and compromising sensitive data."
rule_id = "mr_5d7defeb-13d4-48f3-b6b0-d2cdab30ab57"
rule_name = "Google Workspace Encryption Key File Accessed By An Anonymous User"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Credential Access"
mitre_attack_technique = "Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys"
mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004/"
mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
type = "Alert"
data_source = "Workspace Activity"
severity = "Medium"
priority = "Medium"
events:
$ws.metadata.vendor_name = "Google Workspace"
$ws.metadata.product_name = "drive"
($ws.metadata.product_event_type = "download" or
$ws.metadata.product_event_type = "view" or
$ws.metadata.product_event_type = "copy")
($ws.target.resource.attribute.labels["visibility"] = "people_with_link" or
$ws.target.resource.attribute.labels["visibility"] = "public_on_the_web")
$ws.target.resource.name = /.*token|.*assig|.*pssc|.*keystore|.*pub|.*pgp.asc|.*ps1xml|.*pem|.*gpg.sig|.*der|.*key|.*p7r|.*p12|.*asc|.*jks|.*p7b|.*signature|.*gpg|.*pgp.sig|.*sst|.*pgp|.*gpgz|.*pfx|.*crt|.*p8|.*sig|.*pkcs7|.*jceks|.*pkcs8|.*psc1|.*p7c|.*csr|.*cer|.*spc|.*ps2xml/
outcome:
$risk_score = max(35)
$mitre_attack_tactic = "Credential Access"
$mitre_attack_technique = "Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys"
$mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1552.004"
$event_count = count_distinct($ws.metadata.id)
$product_event_type = $ws.metadata.product_event_type
$userid = $ws.principal.user.userid
$doc_type = $ws.src.resource.attribute.labels["doc_type"]
$owner = $ws.target.resource.attribute.labels["owner"]
$doc_name = $ws.target.resource.name
//$doc_id = $ws.target.resource.product_object_id
condition:
$ws
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $ws event.
Events
$ws
metadata.product_event_typeis one of:downloadviewcopy
target.resource.attribute.labels["visibility"]is one of:people_with_linkpublic_on_the_web
target.resource.name matches ".*token|.*assig|.*pssc|.*keystore|.*pub|.*pgp.asc|.*ps1xml|.*pem|.*gpg.sig|.*der|.*key|.*p7r|.*p12|.*asc|.*jks|.*p7b|.*signature|.*gpg|.*pgp.sig|.*sst|.*pgp|.*gpgz|.*pfx|.*crt|.*p8|.*sig|.*pkcs7|.*jceks|.*pkcs8|.*psc1|.*p7c|.*csr|.*cer|.*spc|.*ps2xml"
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(35) |
event_count | count_distinct($ws.metadata.id) |
product_event_type | $ws.metadata.product_event_type |
userid | $ws.principal.user.userid |
doc_type | $ws.src.resource.attribute.labels["doc_type"] |
owner | $ws.target.resource.attribute.labels["owner"] |
doc_name | $ws.target.resource.name |
O365 Entra ID App Permissions Percent Threshold Exceeded
#Detects when an excessive number of permissions are assigned to an Entra ID application within a time window, potentially indicating a greedy permission grab, as a percentage from old permissions to new permissions
References
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Microsoft 365 | Update application. |
Rules Detecting the Same Action
These rules filter on the same operation.
Rule Body
// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule o365_entra_id_app_permissions_percent_threshold_exceeded {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detects when an excessive number of permissions are assigned to an Entra ID application within a time window, potentially indicating a greedy permission grab, as a percentage from old permissions to new permissions"
rule_id = "mr_6dcdb335-0054-46ae-a742-ecf6ac4e442b"
rule_name = "O365 Entra ID App Permissions Percent Threshold Exceeded"
assumption = "This rule does not compare the specific permissions of the old and new permissions. Removing 8 permissions and replacing with 8 different permissions would not cause this rule to trigger"
reference = "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/permissions-reference"
type = "alert"
platform = "azure"
data_source = "o365"
severity = "Medium"
priority = "Medium"
events:
$app.metadata.event_type = "USER_RESOURCE_UPDATE_CONTENT"
$app.metadata.product_name = "Office 365"
$app.metadata.product_event_type = "Update application."
$app.metadata.vendor_name = "Microsoft"
$app.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
(
$app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /OldValue_EntitlementId-/ or
$app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /NewValue_EntitlementId-/
)
$app.security_result.detection_fields["target_1"] = $app_name
match:
$app_name over 5m
outcome:
$risk_score = 65
$event_count = count_distinct($app.metadata.id)
$security_summary = array_distinct($app.security_result.summary)
$user_agent = array_distinct($app.network.http.user_agent)
$old_permissions = array_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /OldValue_EntitlementId-/, $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value, ""))
$new_permissions = array_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /NewValue_EntitlementId-/, $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value, ""))
/*
Apps created via the portal come with a permission of user.read, however apps created via the Graph API do not. The first time permissions are added to an app created via the API,
the distinct count for new permissions will be off by one. Subsequent events will reflect the correct counts of old and new permissions.
*/
$old_permissions_count = count_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /OldValue_EntitlementId-/, $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value, "")) - 1
$new_permissions_count = count_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /NewValue_EntitlementId-/, $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value, "")) - 1
//calculate the difference between the old and new permissions within the match window
$old_permission_zero_handler = if($old_permissions_count = 0, 1, $old_permissions_count)
$permission_change_percentage = (($new_permissions_count - $old_permission_zero_handler) / $old_permission_zero_handler) * 100
//added to populate alert graph with additional context
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($app.principal.user.userid)
condition:
$app and $permission_change_percentage > 70
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $app event in the 5m window and $permission_change_percentage > 70.
Events
$app
metadata.product_event_type = "Update application."security_result.action = "ALLOW"target.resource.attribute.labels.key matches "OldValue_EntitlementId-"target.resource.attribute.labels.key matches "NewValue_EntitlementId-"
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | 65 |
event_count | count_distinct($app.metadata.id) |
security_summary | array_distinct($app.security_result.summary) |
user_agent | array_distinct($app.network.http.user_agent) |
old_permissions | array_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /OldValue_EntitlementId-/, $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value, "")) |
new_permissions | array_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /NewValue_EntitlementId-/, $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value, "")) |
old_permissions_count | count_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /OldValue_EntitlementId-/, $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value, "")) - 1 |
new_permissions_count | count_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /NewValue_EntitlementId-/, $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value, "")) - 1 |
old_permission_zero_handler | if($old_permissions_count = 0, 1, $old_permissions_count) |
permission_change_percentage | (($new_permissions_count - $old_permission_zero_handler) / $old_permission_zero_handler) * 100 |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($app.principal.user.userid) |