Detection rules › YARA-L

YARA-L rules: 1n

Entra ID Application Hard Deletion

#
Severity
medium
Type
alert
Time window
5m
Match by
user
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Deletion of Entra ID application with no recovery of the application.

Telemetry Coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
AzureHard Delete application

Rules Detecting the Same Action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule Body

// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule entra_id_application_hard_deletion {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Deletion of Entra ID application with no recovery of the application."
    rule_id = "mr_b4b8a401-4803-498a-b601-d984cf5042fa"
    rule_name = "Entra ID Application Hard Deletion"
    type = "alert"
    platform = "azure"
    data_source = "azure ad audit"
    severity = "Medium"
    priority = "Medium"

  events:
    $app.metadata.event_type = "SETTING_DELETION"
    $app.metadata.product_event_type = "Hard Delete application"
    $app.metadata.product_name = "Azure AD Directory Audit"
    $app.metadata.vendor_name = "Microsoft"
    $app.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
    $app.principal.user.userid = $user

  match:
    $user over 5m

  outcome:
    $risk_score = 65
    $event_count = count_distinct($app.metadata.id)
    $principal_ip = array_distinct($app.principal.ip)
    $principal_email = array_distinct($app.principal.user.email_addresses)
    $principal_county_region = array_distinct($app.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
    $user_agent = array_distinct($app.network.http.user_agent)
    $network_session = array_distinct($app.network.session_id)
    $target_application = array_distinct($app.target.resource.name)
    $target_application_id = array_distinct($app.target.resource.product_object_id)

  condition:
    $app
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $app event in the 5m window.

Events

$app SETTING_DELETION

  • metadata.product_event_type = "Hard Delete application"
  • security_result.action = "ALLOW"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$user (principal.user.userid)
Within
5m

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_score65
event_countcount_distinct($app.metadata.id)
principal_iparray_distinct($app.principal.ip)
principal_emailarray_distinct($app.principal.user.email_addresses)
principal_county_regionarray_distinct($app.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
user_agentarray_distinct($app.network.http.user_agent)
network_sessionarray_distinct($app.network.session_id)
target_applicationarray_distinct($app.target.resource.name)
target_application_idarray_distinct($app.target.resource.product_object_id)

LSASS Process Memory Dump Files

#
Severity
high
Type
Detection
Time window
5m
Match by
hostname
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects creation of files with names used by different memory dumping tools to create a memory dump of the LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials

Known False Positives

  • Unknown

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential Access

References

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 11: FileCreate

Rule Body

// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule lsass_process_memory_dump_file_creation {

  meta:
    author = "Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)"
    description = "Detects creation of files with names used by different memory dumping tools to create a memory dump of the LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials"
    reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_lsass_default_dump_file_names.yml"
    license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
    rule_name = "LSASS Process Memory Dump Files"
    sigma_uuid = "a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391"
    sigma_status = "test"
    rule_id = "mr_8fd8cb2b-18dc-468d-acdf-899da9f6de43"
    tactic = "TA0006"
    technique = "T1003.001"
    type = "Detection"
    data_source = "Sysmon"
    platform = "Windows"
    severity = "High"
    priority = "High"
    false_positives = "Unknown"

  events:
    $file.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
    (
      re.regex($file.target.file.full_path, `\\(Andrew\.dmp|Coredump\.dmp|lsass\.dmp|lsass\.rar|lsass\.zip|NotLSASS\.zip|PPLBlade\.dmp|rustive\.dmp)\$`) nocase or
      strings.contains($file.target.file.full_path, "\\lsass_2") or
      strings.contains($file.target.file.full_path, "\\lsassdmp") or
      strings.contains($file.target.file.full_path, "\\lsassdump") or
      (
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($file.target.file.full_path), "\\lsass") and
        re.regex($file.target.file.full_path, `\.dmp$`) nocase
      )
      or
      (
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($file.target.file.full_path), "sqldmpr") and
        re.regex($file.target.file.full_path, `\.mdmp$`) nocase
      )
      or
      (
        (
          strings.contains(strings.to_lower($file.target.file.full_path), "\\nanodump") or
          strings.contains(strings.to_lower($file.target.file.full_path), "\\proc_")
        )
        and
        re.regex($file.target.file.full_path, `\.dmp$`) nocase
      )
    )
    $file.principal.hostname = $hostname

  match:
    $hostname over 5m

  outcome:
    //example usage of specifying test user and hostname to adjust risk score
    $risk_score = max(if($file.principal.user.userid = "user" and $file.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
    $principal_hostname = array_distinct($file.principal.hostname)
    $principal_process_pid = array_distinct($file.principal.process.pid)
    $principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($file.principal.process.command_line)
    $principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($file.principal.process.file.sha256)
    $principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($file.principal.process.file.full_path)
    $principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($file.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($file.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($file.principal.user.userid)
    $target_file_sha256 = array_distinct($file.target.file.sha256)
    $target_file_full_path = array_distinct($file.target.file.full_path)

  condition:
    $file
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $file event in the 5m window.

Events

$file FILE_CREATION (11)

  • target.file.full_path matches "\\(Andrew\.dmp|Coredump\.dmp|lsass\.dmp|lsass\.rar|lsass\.zip|NotLSASS\.zip|PPLBlade\.dmp|rustive\.dmp)\$"
  • target.file.full_path contains "\lsass_2"
  • target.file.full_path contains "\lsassdmp"
  • target.file.full_path contains "\lsassdump"
  • target.file.full_path contains "\lsass"
  • target.file.full_path matches "\.dmp$"
  • target.file.full_path contains "sqldmpr"
  • target.file.full_path matches "\.mdmp$"
  • target.file.full_path contains "\nanodump"
  • target.file.full_path contains "\proc_"
  • target.file.full_path matches "\.dmp$"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$hostname (principal.hostname)
Within
5m

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax(if($file.principal.user.userid = "user" and $file.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
principal_hostnamearray_distinct($file.principal.hostname)
principal_process_pidarray_distinct($file.principal.process.pid)
principal_process_command_linearray_distinct($file.principal.process.command_line)
principal_process_file_sha256array_distinct($file.principal.process.file.sha256)
principal_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($file.principal.process.file.full_path)
principal_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($file.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($file.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_user_useridarray_distinct($file.principal.user.userid)
target_file_sha256array_distinct($file.target.file.sha256)
target_file_full_patharray_distinct($file.target.file.full_path)

O365 Entra ID App Modify Permission Change On Watchlist

#
Severity
medium
Type
alert
Time window
5m
Match by
app_name
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Alerts when a permission on the watchlist is applied to an Entra ID application.

References

Telemetry Coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
Microsoft 365Update application.

Rules Detecting the Same Action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule Body

// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule o365_entra_id_app_modify_permission_change_on_watchlist {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Alerts when a permission on the watchlist is applied to an Entra ID application."
    rule_id = "mr_678cafb8-ea1f-42ac-a396-238bc35e4d21"
    rule_name = "O365 Entra ID App Modify Permission Change On Watchlist"
    reference = "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/permissions-reference"
    assumption = "The list msgraph_watchlist_permissions is populated as needed with guid permissions Example: 024d486e-b451-40bb-833d-3e66d98c5c73 //Mail.Read.Write"
    type = "alert"
    platform = "azure"
    data_source = "o365"
    severity = "Medium"
    priority = "Medium"

  events:
    $app.metadata.event_type = "USER_RESOURCE_UPDATE_CONTENT"
    $app.metadata.product_name = "Office 365"
    $app.metadata.product_event_type = "Update application."
    $app.metadata.vendor_name = "Microsoft"
    $app.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
    (
        $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /NewValue_EntitlementId-/ or
        $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /OldValue_EntitlementId-/
    )
    $app.security_result.detection_fields["target_1"] = $app_name

  match:
    $app_name over 5m

  outcome:
    $risk_score = 65
    $event_count = count_distinct($app.metadata.id)
    $security_summary = array_distinct($app.security_result.summary)
    $user_agent = array_distinct($app.network.http.user_agent)
    //The reference list msgraph_watchlist_permissions matches on the GUID. List contents example row:  6aedf524-7e1c-45a7-bd76-ded8cab8d0fc //SecurityEvents.ReadWrite.All
    $watchlist_permissions_after_modification = array_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /NewValue_EntitlementId/ and $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value IN %msgraph_watchlist_permissions, $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value,""))
    $watchlist_permissions_before_modification = array_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /OldValue_EntitlementId/ and $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value IN %msgraph_watchlist_permissions, $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value,""))
    $permissions_after_modification = array_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /NewValue_EntitlementId/ and $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value !="", $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value,""))
    $permissions_before_modification = array_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /OldValue_EntitlementId/ and $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value !="", $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value,""))
    $total_permissions_after_modification = count_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /NewValue_EntitlementId/ and $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value !="", $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value, "")) - 1
    $total_permissions_before_modification = count_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /OldValue_EntitlementId/ and $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value !="", $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value, "")) - 1
    //added to populate alert graph with additional context
    $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($app.principal.user.userid)

  condition:
    $app
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $app event in the 5m window.

Events

$app USER_RESOURCE_UPDATE_CONTENT

  • metadata.product_event_type = "Update application."
  • security_result.action = "ALLOW"
  • target.resource.attribute.labels.key matches "NewValue_EntitlementId-"
  • target.resource.attribute.labels.key matches "OldValue_EntitlementId-"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$app_name (security_result.detection_fields["target_1"])
Within
5m

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_score65
event_countcount_distinct($app.metadata.id)
security_summaryarray_distinct($app.security_result.summary)
user_agentarray_distinct($app.network.http.user_agent)
watchlist_permissions_after_modificationarray_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /NewValue_EntitlementId/ and $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value IN %msgraph_watchlist_permissions, $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value,""))
watchlist_permissions_before_modificationarray_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /OldValue_EntitlementId/ and $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value IN %msgraph_watchlist_permissions, $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value,""))
permissions_after_modificationarray_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /NewValue_EntitlementId/ and $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value !="", $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value,""))
permissions_before_modificationarray_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /OldValue_EntitlementId/ and $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value !="", $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value,""))
total_permissions_after_modificationcount_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /NewValue_EntitlementId/ and $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value !="", $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value, "")) - 1
total_permissions_before_modificationcount_distinct(if($app.target.resource.attribute.labels.key = /OldValue_EntitlementId/ and $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value !="", $app.target.resource.attribute.labels.value, "")) - 1
principal_user_useridarray_distinct($app.principal.user.userid)

sap sensitive tables direct access by rfc logon data table

#
Severity
high
Time window
1h
Match by
table
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects direct access to sensitive SAP tables (e.g., USR02, T000) specifically via RFC logon. This identifies potential data exfiltration or unauthorized inspection of security-critical data tables.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Collection

Rule Body

// Copyright 2026 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule sap_sensitive_tables_direct_access_by_rfc_logon_data_table {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Detects direct access to sensitive SAP tables (e.g., USR02, T000) specifically via RFC logon. This identifies potential data exfiltration or unauthorized inspection of security-critical data tables."
    severity = "High"
    tactic = "TA0009"
    technique = "T1005"

  events:
    $e.metadata.log_type = "SAP_SECURITY_AUDIT"
    $e.additional.fields["msg_1"] = "CUZ"
    $SID = $e.target.application
    $table = $e.additional.fields["param1_1"]

    $table in %sap_sensitive_tables.name

  match:
    $table over 1h

  outcome:
    $user_list = array_distinct($e.principal.user.userid)
    $source_ips = array_distinct($e.principal.ip)
    $system_ids = array_distinct($SID)
    $event_count = count($e.metadata.id)
    $terminal_names = array_distinct($e.principal.hostname)

  condition:
    $e
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $e event in the 1h window.

Events

$e

  • metadata.log_type = "SAP_SECURITY_AUDIT"
  • additional.fields["msg_1"] = "CUZ"
  • additional.fields["param1_1"] in "%sap_sensitive_tables.name"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$table
Within
1h

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
user_listarray_distinct($e.principal.user.userid)
source_ipsarray_distinct($e.principal.ip)
system_idsarray_distinct($SID)
event_countcount($e.metadata.id)
terminal_namesarray_distinct($e.principal.hostname)

Unauthorized KMS Decryption

#
Type
Alert
Author
Drew Pilarski - Tempus AI
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects when a Key Management Service (KMS) decryption operation is carried out by a service account that's not in the allowlist. This behavior may indicate unauthorized access to information.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
PersistenceNo specific technique

Telemetry Coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
GCPDecrypt

Rule Body

// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule gcp_kms_decryption_by_unexpected_service_account {
  meta:
    author = "Drew Pilarski - Tempus AI"
    description = "Detects when a Key Management Service (KMS) decryption operation is carried out by a service account that's not in the allowlist. This behavior may indicate unauthorized access to information."
    rule_id = "mr_90cd5b0d-60a7-4028-bc41-dce0947fbafd"
    rule_name = "Unauthorized KMS Decryption"
    reference = "Internal Security Policy" // Include link to your organization's internal documentation if available
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Persistence"
    mitre_attack_technique = "Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts"
    type = "Alert"
    platform = "GCP"
    data_source = "Cloud Audit Logs"
    severity = "Medium"  // Adjust based on your risk assessment
    priority = "Medium"  // Adjust based on your incident response process

  events:
    $decrypt.metadata.product_name = "Google Cloud Platform"
    $decrypt.metadata.vendor_name = "Google Cloud Platform"

    // Generic KMS Key Pattern - Pick the relevant one to your environment
    re.regex($decrypt.target.resource.name, `^projects/[^/]+/locations/[^/]+/keyRings/[^/]+/cryptoKeys/[^/]+$`)
    $decrypt.metadata.product_event_type = "Decrypt"
    not $decrypt.principal.user.email_addresses in %kms_decryption_service_account_allowlist

  outcome:
    $action = $decrypt.metadata.product_event_type
    $account_name = array_distinct($decrypt.principal.user.email_addresses)
    $mitre_attack_tactic = array_distinct("Persistence")
    $mitre_attack_technique = array_distinct("Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts")
    $mitre_attack_technique_id = array_distinct("T1078.004")

  condition:
    $decrypt
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $decrypt event.

Events

$decrypt

  • target.resource.name matches "^projects/[^/]+/locations/[^/]+/keyRings/[^/]+/cryptoKeys/[^/]+$"
  • metadata.product_event_type = "Decrypt"
  • principal.user.email_addresses in "%kms_decryption_service_account_allowlist"

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
action$decrypt.metadata.product_event_type
account_namearray_distinct($decrypt.principal.user.email_addresses)

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