Detection rules › YARA-L

YARA-L rules: 2b

AWS New MFA Method Registered For User

#
Severity
medium
Type
Alert
Time window
1h
Match by
user_id
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects the registration of a new Multi Factor authentication method for an AWS user.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Detects the registration of a new Multi Factor authentication method for an AWS user."
    rule_id = "mr_bee2a210-111a-478a-a1a2-caeb9077eca2"
    rule_name = "AWS New MFA Method Registered For User"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Credential Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence"
    mitre_attack_technique = "Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication"
    mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/"
    mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
    type = "Alert"
    data_source = "AWS CloudTrail"
    platform = "AWS"
    severity = "Medium"
    priority = "Medium"

  events:
    $cloudtrail.metadata.vendor_name = "AMAZON"
    $cloudtrail.metadata.product_name = "AWS CloudTrail"
    (
    $cloudtrail.metadata.product_event_type = "CreateVirtualMFADevice" or
    $cloudtrail.metadata.product_event_type = "EnableMFADevice"
    )
    $cloudtrail.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
    $cloudtrail.principal.user.user_display_name = $user_id

  match:
    $user_id over 1h

  outcome:
    $risk_score = max(
      //Baseline
      35 +
      // High Risk for AWS Root User
      if($cloudtrail.src.user.user_display_name = "AWS Root User", 50)
    )
    $mitre_attack_tactic = "Credential Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence"
    $mitre_attack_technique = "Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication"
    $mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1556.006"
    $event_count = count_distinct($cloudtrail.metadata.id)
    $network_http_user_agent = array_distinct($cloudtrail.network.http.user_agent)
    $principal_ip = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip)
    $principal_ip_country = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
    $principal_ip_state = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
    $principal_user_display_name = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.user.user_display_name)
    $recipient_aws_account_id = array_distinct($cloudtrail.additional.fields["recipientAccountId"])
    $aws_region = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.location.name)
    $target_resource_name = array_distinct($cloudtrail.target.resource.name)
    $target_resource_product_object_id = array_distinct($cloudtrail.target.resource.product_object_id)

  condition:
    $cloudtrail
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $cloudtrail event in the 1h window.

Events

$cloudtrail

  • metadata.product_event_type = "CreateVirtualMFADevice" or "EnableMFADevice"
  • security_result.action = "ALLOW"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$user_id (principal.user.user_display_name)
Within
1h

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax( 35 + if($cloudtrail.src.user.user_display_name = "AWS Root User", 50) )
event_countcount_distinct($cloudtrail.metadata.id)
network_http_user_agentarray_distinct($cloudtrail.network.http.user_agent)
principal_iparray_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip)
principal_ip_countryarray_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
principal_ip_statearray_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
principal_user_display_namearray_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.user.user_display_name)
recipient_aws_account_idarray_distinct($cloudtrail.additional.fields["recipientAccountId"])
aws_regionarray_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.location.name)
target_resource_namearray_distinct($cloudtrail.target.resource.name)
target_resource_product_object_idarray_distinct($cloudtrail.target.resource.product_object_id)

AWS Privilege Escalation Using IAM Login Profile

#
Severity
low
Type
Alert
Time window
1h
Match by
p_userid
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detect when a user creates or updates a login profile for another user and escalates privileges using this new user from the same IP.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Persistence

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule aws_privilege_escalation_using_iam_login_profile {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Detect when a user creates or updates a login profile for another user and escalates privileges using this new user from the same IP."
    rule_id = "mr_b0d13079-dbe7-4c19-a8e9-23f98655a29b"
    rule_name = "AWS Privilege Escalation Using IAM Login Profile"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Persistence"
    mitre_attack_technique = "Cloud Account"
    mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/"
    mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
    type = "Alert"
    data_source = "AWS CloudTrail"
    platform = "AWS"
    severity = "Low"
    priority = "Low"

  events:
    $profile.metadata.vendor_name = "AMAZON"
    $profile.metadata.product_name = "AWS CloudTrail"
    $profile.metadata.product_event_type = "CreateLoginProfile" or $profile.metadata.product_event_type = "UpdateLoginProfile"
    $profile.security_result.action= "ALLOW"
    $profile.principal.user.userid = $p_userid
    $profile.target.user.userid = $t_userid

    $login.metadata.vendor_name = "AMAZON"
    $login.metadata.product_name = "AWS CloudTrail"
    $login.metadata.event_type = "USER_LOGIN"
    $login.metadata.product_event_type = "ConsoleLogin"
    $login.security_result.action= "ALLOW"

    //Same IP address
    $login.principal.ip = $profile.principal.ip

    //User created and logged in
    $profile.principal.user.user_display_name != $profile.target.user.userid
    $login.target.user.user_display_name = $profile.target.user.userid

    $profile.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds < $login.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds

  match:
    $p_userid over 1h

  outcome:
    $risk_score = max(35)
    $mitre_attack_tactic = "Persistence"
    $mitre_attack_technique = "Cloud Account"
    $mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1136.003"
    $event_count = count_distinct($login.metadata.id)
    $network_http_user_agent = array_distinct($login.network.http.user_agent)
    $principal_ip = array_distinct($login.principal.ip)
    $principal_ip_country = array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
    $principal_ip_state = array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
    $principal_user_display_name = array_distinct($login.principal.user.user_display_name)
    $dc_principal_user_display_name = count_distinct($login.principal.user.user_display_name)
    $is_mfa_used = array_distinct($login.principal.user.attribute.labels["mfaAuthenticated"])
    $target_resource_name = array_distinct($login.target.resource.name)
    $target_resource_product_object_id = array_distinct($login.target.resource.product_object_id)

  condition:
    $profile and $login
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $profile event in the 1h window and at least one $login event in the 1h window.

Events

$profile

  • metadata.product_event_type = "CreateLoginProfile" or "UpdateLoginProfile"
  • security_result.action = "ALLOW"
  • principal.user.user_display_name cross_field_compare "profile.target.user.userid"

$login USER_LOGIN

  • metadata.product_event_type = "ConsoleLogin"
  • security_result.action = "ALLOW"
  • principal.ip cross_field_compare "profile.principal.ip"
  • target.user.user_display_name cross_field_compare "profile.target.user.userid"

Match and Correlation

Order
$profile before $login
Match key
$p_userid (principal.user.userid)
Within
1h

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax(35)
event_countcount_distinct($login.metadata.id)
network_http_user_agentarray_distinct($login.network.http.user_agent)
principal_iparray_distinct($login.principal.ip)
principal_ip_countryarray_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
principal_ip_statearray_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
principal_user_display_namearray_distinct($login.principal.user.user_display_name)
dc_principal_user_display_namecount_distinct($login.principal.user.user_display_name)
is_mfa_usedarray_distinct($login.principal.user.attribute.labels["mfaAuthenticated"])
target_resource_namearray_distinct($login.target.resource.name)
target_resource_product_object_idarray_distinct($login.target.resource.product_object_id)

Network HTTP Low Prevalence Domain Access

#
Severity
critical
Type
alert
Time window
1h
Match by
ip
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects network web access to a low prevalence domain

Rule Body

// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule network_http_low_prevalence_domain_access {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Detects network web access to a low prevalence domain"
    rule_id = "mr_c376478e-1c93-4d27-8bea-a56c3c0052f5"
    rule_name = "Network HTTP Low Prevalence Domain Access"
    type = "alert"
    tags = "prevalence"
    data_source = "zscalar"
    severity = "Critical"
    priority = "Critical"

  events:
    $http.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_HTTP"
    $http.principal.ip = $ip
    // filter out URLs with RFC 1918 IP addresses, i.e., internal assets
    not re.regex($http.target.hostname, `(127(?:\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)){3}$)|(10(?:\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)){3}$)|(192\.168(?:\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)){2}$)|(172\.(?:1[6-9]|2\d|3[0-1])(?:\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)){2})`)
    // only match valid FQDN, filter out background non-routable noise
    re.regex($http.target.hostname, `(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\.)+[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9]`)
    $http.target.hostname = $domain_name

    $prevalence.graph.entity.domain.name = $domain_name
    // derived from events ingested by Google SecOps
    $prevalence.graph.metadata.entity_type = "DOMAIN_NAME"
    $prevalence.graph.metadata.source_type = "DERIVED_CONTEXT"
    $prevalence.graph.entity.domain.prevalence.day_count = 10
    // tune prevalence as fits your results
    $prevalence.graph.entity.domain.prevalence.rolling_max > 0
    $prevalence.graph.entity.domain.prevalence.rolling_max <= 3

  match:
    $ip over 1h

  outcome:
    $risk_score = max(
      // increment risk score based upon rolling_max prevalence
      if ( $prevalence.graph.entity.domain.prevalence.rolling_max >= 10, 10) +
      if ( $prevalence.graph.entity.domain.prevalence.rolling_max >= 2 and $prevalence.graph.entity.domain.prevalence.rolling_max <= 9 , 20) +
      if ( $prevalence.graph.entity.domain.prevalence.rolling_max = 1, 30)
    )
    $event_count = count_distinct($http.metadata.id)
    $domain_list = array_distinct($domain_name)
    $domain_count = count_distinct($domain_name)
    // added to populate alert graph with additional context
    $principal_hostname = array_distinct($http.principal.hostname)
    $target_hostname = array_distinct($http.target.hostname)
    $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($http.principal.user.userid)
    $target_url = array_distinct($http.target.url)


  condition:
    $http and $prevalence
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $http event in the 1h window and $prevalence matches entity context.

Events

$http NETWORK_HTTP

  • target.hostname matches "(127(?:\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)){3}$)|(10(?:\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)){3}$)|(192\.168(?:\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)){2}$)|(172\.(?:1[6-9]|2\d|3[0-1])(?:\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)){2})"
  • target.hostname matches "(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\.)+[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9]"

$prevalence entity context (DOMAIN_NAME)

  • graph.metadata.entity_type = "DOMAIN_NAME"
  • graph.metadata.source_type = "DERIVED_CONTEXT"
  • graph.entity.domain.prevalence.day_count = "10"
  • graph.entity.domain.prevalence.rolling_max > "0"
  • graph.entity.domain.prevalence.rolling_max <= "3"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$ip (principal.ip)
Within
1h

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax( if ( $prevalence.graph.entity.domain.prevalence.rolling_max >= 10, 10) + if ( $prevalence.graph.entity.domain.prevalence.rolling_max >= 2 and $prevalence.graph.entity.domain.prevalence.rolling_max <= 9 , 20) + if ( $prevalence.graph.entity.domain.prevalence.rolling_max = 1, 30) )
event_countcount_distinct($http.metadata.id)
domain_listarray_distinct($domain_name)
domain_countcount_distinct($domain_name)
principal_hostnamearray_distinct($http.principal.hostname)
target_hostnamearray_distinct($http.target.hostname)
principal_user_useridarray_distinct($http.principal.user.userid)
target_urlarray_distinct($http.target.url)

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