Detection rules › YARA-L
YARA-L rules: 2c
| Rule | Severity |
|---|---|
| AWS API Call Outside Of Organization | high |
| AWS IAM Access Analyzer Deleted | low |
| Google Workspace Custom Admin Role Created | high |
| sap gateway acl bypass attempt | low |
AWS API Call Outside Of Organization
#Detects API Calls from AWS accounts that are not part of the organization.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Rule Body
// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule aws_api_call_outside_of_organization {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detects API Calls from AWS accounts that are not part of the organization."
rule_id = "mr_205120b7-6654-410a-ab6d-e40484e2fafb"
rule_name = "AWS API Call Outside Of Organization"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access"
mitre_attack_technique = "Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts"
mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/"
mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
type = "Alert"
data_source = "AWS CloudTrail"
platform = "AWS"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
events:
$cloudtrail.metadata.vendor_name = "AMAZON"
$cloudtrail.metadata.product_name = "AWS CloudTrail"
// Requires a Reference List named aws_accounts with a list of approved and known AWS Account IDs
not $cloudtrail.principal.user.group_identifiers in %aws_accounts
not $cloudtrail.target.user.group_identifiers in %aws_accounts
$cloudtrail.additional.fields["recipientAccountId"] = $accountId
match:
$accountId over 1h
outcome:
$risk_score = max(75)
$mitre_attack_tactic = "Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access"
$mitre_attack_technique = "Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts"
$mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1078.004"
$event_count = count_distinct($cloudtrail.metadata.id)
$network_http_user_agent = array_distinct($cloudtrail.network.http.user_agent)
$principal_ip = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip)
$principal_ip_country = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
$principal_ip_state = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
$principal_user_display_name = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.user.user_display_name)
$recipient_aws_account_id = array_distinct($cloudtrail.additional.fields["recipientAccountId"])
$aws_region = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.location.name)
$product_event_type = array_distinct($cloudtrail.metadata.product_event_type)
$target_resource_name = array_distinct($cloudtrail.target.resource.name)
$target_resource_product_object_id = array_distinct($cloudtrail.target.resource.product_object_id)
condition:
$cloudtrail
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $cloudtrail event in the 1h window.
Events
$cloudtrail
principal.user.group_identifiers in "%aws_accounts"target.user.group_identifiers in "%aws_accounts"
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(75) |
event_count | count_distinct($cloudtrail.metadata.id) |
network_http_user_agent | array_distinct($cloudtrail.network.http.user_agent) |
principal_ip | array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip) |
principal_ip_country | array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region) |
principal_ip_state | array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state) |
principal_user_display_name | array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.user.user_display_name) |
recipient_aws_account_id | array_distinct($cloudtrail.additional.fields["recipientAccountId"]) |
aws_region | array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.location.name) |
product_event_type | array_distinct($cloudtrail.metadata.product_event_type) |
target_resource_name | array_distinct($cloudtrail.target.resource.name) |
target_resource_product_object_id | array_distinct($cloudtrail.target.resource.product_object_id) |
AWS IAM Access Analyzer Deleted
#Detects when AWS IAM Access Analyzer is deleted.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry Coverage
Rule Body
// Copyright 2024 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule aws_iam_access_analyzer_deleted {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detects when AWS IAM Access Analyzer is deleted."
rule_id = "mr_c1c8c5e4-ad04-40de-b42e-9d1086360796"
rule_name = "AWS IAM Access Analyzer Deleted"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Defense Evasion"
mitre_attack_technique = "Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs"
mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008/"
mitre_attack_version = "v15.1"
type = "Alert"
data_source = "AWS CloudTrail"
platform = "AWS"
severity = "Low"
priority = "Low"
events:
$cloudtrail.metadata.vendor_name = "AMAZON"
$cloudtrail.metadata.product_name = "AWS CloudTrail"
$cloudtrail.metadata.event_type = "RESOURCE_DELETION"
$cloudtrail.metadata.product_event_type = "DeleteAnalyzer"
$cloudtrail.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
outcome:
$risk_score = max(35)
$mitre_attack_tactic = "Defense Evasion"
$mitre_attack_technique = "Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs"
$mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1562.008"
$event_count = count_distinct($cloudtrail.metadata.id)
$network_http_user_agent = array_distinct($cloudtrail.network.http.user_agent)
$principal_ip = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip)
$principal_ip_country = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
$principal_ip_state = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
$principal_user_display_name = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.user.user_display_name)
$recipient_aws_account_id = array_distinct($cloudtrail.additional.fields["recipientAccountId"])
$aws_region = array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.location.name)
$target_resource_name = array_distinct($cloudtrail.target.resource.name)
condition:
$cloudtrail
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $cloudtrail event.
Events
$cloudtrail
metadata.product_event_type = "DeleteAnalyzer"security_result.action = "ALLOW"
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(35) |
event_count | count_distinct($cloudtrail.metadata.id) |
network_http_user_agent | array_distinct($cloudtrail.network.http.user_agent) |
principal_ip | array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip) |
principal_ip_country | array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region) |
principal_ip_state | array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state) |
principal_user_display_name | array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.user.user_display_name) |
recipient_aws_account_id | array_distinct($cloudtrail.additional.fields["recipientAccountId"]) |
aws_region | array_distinct($cloudtrail.principal.location.name) |
target_resource_name | array_distinct($cloudtrail.target.resource.name) |
Google Workspace Custom Admin Role Created
#Identifies when a custom administrator role is created in Google Workspace. Security teams can monitor for malicious or accidental configuration of administrator privileges to prevent unauthorized access to data.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence |
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Google Workspace | CREATE_ROLE: Create Role |
Rules Detecting the Same Action
These rules filter on the same operation.
Rule Body
// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule google_workspace_custom_admin_role_created {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Identifies when a custom administrator role is created in Google Workspace. Security teams can monitor for malicious or accidental configuration of administrator privileges to prevent unauthorized access to data."
rule_id = "mr_a15f64fc-3eaf-49f0-9f74-c533a63cb531"
rule_name = "Google Workspace Custom Admin Role Created"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Persistence"
mitre_attack_technique = "Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles"
mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/"
mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
type = "Alert"
data_source = "Workspace Activity"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
events:
$ws.metadata.vendor_name = "Google Workspace"
$ws.metadata.product_name = "admin"
$ws.metadata.event_type = "USER_RESOURCE_CREATION"
$ws.metadata.product_event_type = "CREATE_ROLE"
$ws.security_result.category_details = "DELEGATED_ADMIN_SETTINGS"
outcome:
$risk_score = max(85)
$mitre_attack_tactic = "Persistence"
$mitre_attack_technique = "Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles"
$mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1098.003"
$event_count = count_distinct($ws.metadata.id)
$principal_ip = array_distinct($ws.principal.ip)
$principal_country = array_distinct($ws.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
$principal_state = array_distinct($ws.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
$principal_user_emails = array_distinct($ws.principal.user.email_addresses)
$target_user_emails = array_distinct($ws.target.user.email_addresses)
$principal_user_id = $ws.principal.user.userid
$role_id = $ws.target.resource.attribute.labels["role_id"]
$role_name = array_distinct($ws.target.resource.attribute.roles.name)
condition:
$ws
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $ws event.
Events
$ws
metadata.product_event_type = "CREATE_ROLE"security_result.category_details = "DELEGATED_ADMIN_SETTINGS"
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(85) |
event_count | count_distinct($ws.metadata.id) |
principal_ip | array_distinct($ws.principal.ip) |
principal_country | array_distinct($ws.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region) |
principal_state | array_distinct($ws.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state) |
principal_user_emails | array_distinct($ws.principal.user.email_addresses) |
target_user_emails | array_distinct($ws.target.user.email_addresses) |
principal_user_id | $ws.principal.user.userid |
role_id | $ws.target.resource.attribute.labels["role_id"] |
role_name | array_distinct($ws.target.resource.attribute.roles.name) |
sap gateway acl bypass attempt
#Detects rejected connections by Gateway ACLs (secinfo/reginfo), indicating an attempt to bypass network-layer security.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Rule Body
// Copyright 2026 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule sap_gateway_acl_bypass_attempt {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detects rejected connections by Gateway ACLs (secinfo/reginfo), indicating an attempt to bypass network-layer security."
severity = "Low"
tactic = "TA0001"
technique = "T1190"
events:
$e.metadata.product_name = "SAP_GATEWAY"
$e.additional.fields["event_action"] = /secinfo|reginfo/ nocase
$e.security_result.action = "BLOCK"
$source_ip = $e.principal.ip
match:
$source_ip over 30m
outcome:
$risk_score = 5
$acl_type = array_distinct($e.additional.fields["event_action"])
$attempted_programs = array_distinct($e.target.process.file.full_path)
$error_details = array_distinct($e.security_result.description)
$user_context = array_distinct($e.principal.user.userid)
$total_denials = count($e.metadata.product_log_id)
condition:
$e
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $e event in the 30m window.
Events
$e
additional.fields["event_action"] matches "secinfo|reginfo"security_result.action = "BLOCK"
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | 5 |
acl_type | array_distinct($e.additional.fields["event_action"]) |
attempted_programs | array_distinct($e.target.process.file.full_path) |
error_details | array_distinct($e.security_result.description) |
user_context | array_distinct($e.principal.user.userid) |
total_denials | count($e.metadata.product_log_id) |